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How does organizational decline affect organizational search routines? Do search 
routines change differently in declining firms than in surviving firms? This dissertation 
compares the propositions of threat rigidity theory and behavioral theory of the firm to 
examine if declining firms exhibit rigidity or adaptive behavior in terms of their search 
routines. It measures search routines by research and development expenditure and by patent 
counts. It examines the role of the following contingencies: time to bankruptcy, 
organizational slack and the interaction of organizational slack with time. 
Results indicate that declining firms in the US chemical and allied products industry 
exhibit rigidity in their organizational search routines. Interestingly, the time to bankruptcy 
did not matter. This dissertation shows that declining firms did not change their year to year 
search routines in the five years preceding bankruptcy. The results also indicate that both 
declining firms and their matched surviving counterparts increase search in the presence of 
available slack and potential slack. Both declining firms and surviving firms use available 
slack and potential slack during the early years of the decline to enhance search.  
Overall, there are two interesting contributions of this dissertation. First, it questions 
the dominant wisdom in the literature that organizational decline is associated with continued 
iv 
and accelerated deterioration within firms. Surprisingly, the search routines did not continue 
deteriorating during the last five years before bankruptcy. Second, organizational search 
routines are dynamic routines that are supposed to change. However, in this dissertation, 
these dynamic routines exhibit no change in the five years before bankruptcy. This stimulates 
further research thought on under what conditions do dynamic routines change and under 
what conditions do dynamic routines remain stable. 
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 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Are failed firms different than surviving firms?  As the process of failure unfolds over 
time, failed firms may behave differently than survivors. If this is true, the cause of failure 
might rest in the different behavior. However, failed firms may behave in ways similar to 
surviving firms. In this instance, interpretations about the causes of failure become more 
complicated. While failed and failing firm have been studied from a financial perspective and 
a managerial perspective, scholars on organizational decline have not directly examined 
specific organizational routines within declining firms. The financial and managerial 
perspectives tend to explicitly assume that routines are malleable, or subject to management 
control. In contrast, the routines literature is less encumbered by assumptions of direct 
managerial control. In this study, I link literature on organizational decline and organizational 
routines in an attempt to develop increased understanding of the behaviors and issues 
relevant to firm decline.  
Several issues related to declining firms, such as,  predictions about bankruptcy 
(Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 1980), causes of decline (Argenti, 1976; Cameron, Sutton and 
Whetten, 1988), and behaviors during a period  of decline (Latham and Braun, 2009; Nelson, 
1981) have been examined. Among the behaviors during decline, some scholars found 
evidence of adaptive responses (Ketchen and Palmer, 1999; Zajac and Kraatz, 1993) while 
some others found evidence of dysfunctional behavior (Cameron, Whetten and Kim, 1987; 
Cameron, Kim and Whetten, 1987; D’Aunno and Sutton, 1992).  In comparing failed firms to 
survivors, some researchers found differences between the two groups, while others found 
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 similarities (Khanna and Poulsen, 1995). In this study, I focus on organizational routines. I 
examine how search routines within declining firms change or not change in the five years 
prior to bankruptcy when compared with those within surviving firms that are similar. I also 
examine changes in the routines across time for failed firms. I relate contextual factors that 
might influence perceptions of stress with the patterns of change in routines. I examine 
declining firms in the US SIC1 2800: Chemical and allied products industry. I draw on two 
key theories: threat rigidity theory (a theory drawn from psychology) and the behavioral 
theory of a firm (a theory developed in economics), to  empirically examine the changes in 
the search routines of declining firms with respect to those of surviving firms and across 
time.  
The chapter unfolds in four steps. Initially, I discuss briefly about the current 
scholarship on organizational decline, and then on organizational routines. Next, I connect 
these two bodies of literature and discuss my main theoretical model. Finally, I discuss why I 
think this research is important.   
1.1 Organizational decline 
Organizational decline has been widely studied since the late 1970s (e.g. Argenti, 
1976; Rubin, 1979; Whetten, 1980). Along with scholars of strategic management and 
organizational theory, scholars in the allied fields of accounting (Beaver, 1966, Ohlson, 
1980) and finance (Altman, 1968; Altman, 1984) have also examined organizational decline. 
Within strategic management, two main theoretical perspectives that have been used to study 
organizational decline are:  threat rigidity theory (Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981) and 
__________________ 
1 SIC stands for Standard Industrial Classification. 
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 the behavioral theory of a firm (Cyert and March, 1963). A third perspective, prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) addresses similar issues. These theoretical lenses predict and 
find evidence of different responses (adaptive or rigid) within declining firms.  
Threat rigidity theory (Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981) suggests that declining 
firms become rigid. Rigidity inhibits innovation (Cameron, Whetten and Kim, 1987), 
strategic change (D’Aveni, 1989a), risky initiatives (Greenhalgh, 1983) and domain change 
(D’Aveni, 1989a). Hence, threat rigidity theory paints a conservative picture of declining 
firms. In contrast, the behavioral theory of the firm suggests that declining firms enhance 
innovation, risk-taking and strategic change activities in order to survive. The behavioral 
theory asserts that boundedly rational decision makers within declining firms cater to the 
immediate goal of firm survival by adapting the firms’ strategies to the declining conditions. 
Since the declining performance of these firms fall below their aspiration levels, decision 
makers foster innovation (Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt and Holcomb, 2007) and become risk-
seeking (Bromiley, 1991). Therefore, behavioral theory suggests that managers within 
declining firms proactively engage in change initiatives in the hope of reviving their firms. 
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) also suggests that declining firms adapt.  
The theories disagree, and the evidence is inconclusive. Does decline promote or 
inhibit adaptive change, innovation and risk-taking? Are there specific contingencies that 
direct the behavior of declining firms? An explanation for the varying responses to decline 
might be found at the level of organizational routines. Behavioral theories build on the 
assumption of a powerful unitary actor: the manager. What if the manager’s zone of action is 
constrained by organizational routines? Put differently, when might routines constrain the 
manager’s actions?     
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 1.2 Organizational routines and their modifications 
Organizations have been described as repositories of routines (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). Three main schools define routines a bit differently. Routines are described as 
behavioral regularities. Scholars (Becker, 2005b; Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003; Felin and Foss, 2011; Winter, 1964) focus on studying the recurring action 
patterns that are expressed in organizational routines. Second, routines are defined as 
physical technology. Scholars in this perspective (March and Simon, 1958:142; Massimo 
Egidi in Cohen, Burkhart, Dosi, Egidi, Marengo, Warglien and Winter, 1996:686; Nelson, 
2009; Nelson and Winter, 1982:92) treat organizational routines as computer programs. 
According to them, routines are a set of condition-action rules. Routines involve the 
processing of inputs to develop outputs. The third school asserts that routines are 
dispositions. This third group of scholars (Hodgson, 2003; Hodgson, 2009; Hodgson and 
Knudsen, 2010:141) considers routines to be dispositions to behave in specific patterned 
ways when stimulated by the same kinds of inputs. Across all schools, routines shape 
behavior.  
Here I follow the second group of scholars and define organizational routines as 
activities that require particular inputs and equipment, in order to produce a product or a 
service that involves particular inputs and equipment. Scientific and technological 
understanding guides the organizational routines (Nelson, 2009).  Here, I adopt this definition 
because I do not directly observe the motivation of the multiple actors of the routine. Instead, 
I assume that behaviors are the consequences of mental models of the routine actors (Egidi in 
Cohen et al., 1996:686). I plan to consider the search routine as a black-box and examine its 
inputs and a few chosen characteristics. For the purpose of this study, I define a search 
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 routine as a dynamic routine that enables change in organizational routines (Dosi, Teece and 
Winter, 1992). A search routine involves a meta-routine (Adler, Goldoftas and Levine, 1999; 
Grant, 1996) that enables change in operating routines by suggesting alternative solutions 
that are improvements on the existing solutions (Cohendet and Llerena, 2003:275). This 
search is guided by “boundedly rational” organizational members (Cyert and March, 1963).       
Interestingly, Nelson (2009) pointed out that the “routines as behavioral regularities” 
and “routines as physical technology” views are often complementary. He cites the examples 
of the lean production system in Toyota and the Ford mass production routine where both the 
definitions (“routines as behavioral regularities” and “routines as physical technology”) are 
applicable. This is because the Toyota and Ford automobile production routines include tight 
links between machinery, job specifications and mechanisms for coordination. I indirectly 
adopt the “routines as recurrent behavioral patterns” definition when I build the arguments 
for hypotheses.   
In Chapter 5, I review existing studies on organizational routines. However, I find 
that the following key unresolved issues remain in the existing literature on organizational 
routines. Are organizational routines stable or changing? Under what conditions do 
organizational routines change? Under what conditions are organizational routines stable? 
What types of change (e.g. expansion and shrinkage) of organizational routines occurs? How 
does organizational decline affect organizational routines? This last question identifies the 
gap in the combined body of literature on organizational routines and organizational decline. 
This is the gap that I address in this study.   
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 In discussing the potential for change in routines, Winter (1964:263) suggested that 
an organizational routine is a “pattern of behavior that is followed repeatedly, but is subject 
to change if conditions change”. Several empirical studies found that routines are not inert 
and typically change over time (Adler, Goldoftas and Levine, 1999; Feldman, 2000; 
Feldman, 2003; Narduzzo, Rocco and Warglien, 2000; Pentland and Rueter, 1994). 
Organizational routines change mainly through any of the following mechanisms: selection, 
learning and ad-hoc problem solving. I briefly discuss each of these mechanisms in the next 
few paragraphs and their relevance for this study.   
Selection mechanisms work on the whole set of organizational routines that are 
available within a firm. The routines that are rejected by selection mechanisms are not likely 
to recur. In contrast, the routines that are selected by selection mechanisms are retained and 
employed by the firms. These selection mechanisms can be external or internal or a 
combination of them. Market forces (Zollo and Winter, 2002:344) often act as external 
selection mechanisms. For example, when the market for photography was moving from 
analog to digital, the routines related to the analog photography products and services 
contracted (i.e. shrunk) in many photo companies (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). This is 
because the external selection mechanism of the market did not favor analog photography 
products any more. A few internal selection mechanisms are economic costs of carrying out 
the routine (Nelson and Winter, 1982:122), lapses in controlling the routine by managers 
(Becker, Lazaric, Nelson and Winter, 2005:779; Cohen et al., 1996:672) and the instability of 
organizational and individual goals (March, 1994). For example, an organizational routine 
shrinks when the cost of carrying out a routine far exceeds the economic benefits from the 
routine (Nelson and Winter, 1982:122). 
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 Learning in organizational routine happens as a result of feedback regarding 
outcomes of the routine (Levitt and March, 1988:319). When an organizational routine fails 
to meet its target, the received feedback either facilitates learning and improvement in the 
routine or it reduces the chances of using the routine in the future (Cyert and March, 1963). 
In contrast, when an organizational routine meets its expected target, the received feedback 
can facilitate further improvement in the current routine. For example, the production routine 
in a North American truck plant improved as a result of learning when employees trained on 
the first shift were transferred to the second shift (Epple, Argote and Devadas, 1991).  
Ad hoc problem solving occurs as a response to new and relatively unpredictable 
challenges (Winter, 2003:993). Adoption of new technology within organizations often 
triggers ad hoc problem solving, which in turn trigger changes in associated organizational 
routines. For example, hospitals that implemented an innovative technology for cardiac 
surgery needed to reallocate roles among members involved in the operating room routine. 
However, hospitals that employed ad-hoc problem solving and did not select separate 
operating room teams for the new technology implementation failed in successfully using the 
new technology even after changing their operating room routines (Edmondson, Bohmer and 
Pisano, 2001).    
In this study, I focus on the debate of whether routines promote stability or change by 
proposing if and when firm decline is likely to change search routines.  Ex ante, I may not 
know if the change is due to selection, learning, or ad hoc problem solving. Ex post, I will 
know that firms have failed, and therefore demonstrate adverse selection. My research 
focuses on the firm’s responses prior to the selection event (rigidity or learning), and the 
distinctions (or lack there-of) in responses observed in surviving firms.  
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 1.3 Bridging the two bodies of literature - organizational decline and organizational 
routines 
Do organizations consistently respond to decline by becoming rigid? Do 
organizations respond to decline by changing and adapting? Do organizations demonstrate 
both responses? Does the response vary by context or by type of routine? 
Strategy theorists who study failing firms tend to consider bankruptcy of firms as 
driven mainly by external factors (Daily, 1994). In contrast, behavioral theorists look at 
internal causes, and study the importance and activities of strategic leaders, such as the top 
management and the board of bankrupt firms (Daily, 1994). Hence, both perspectives try to 
find out whether managers of bankrupt firms realize the failing conditions early on, what 
decisions they take, what activities they undertake and what activities other employees 
undertake under their command, control and supervision. Therefore, they tell a story of 
decision making efforts of strategic leaders (who are either “boundedly rational” or 
“rational”).  
In this study, I develop a contingent model of the change of search routines within 
declining firms when compared to the change of search routines within matched surviving 
firms (Refer: Figure 1.1). Drawing upon the threat rigidity theory (Staw, Sandelands and 
Dutton, 1981) and the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963), I offer 
contrasting propositions of reduced search routines or enhanced search routines within 
declining firms. I also propose that failed firms and surviving firms are likely to vary in their 
search routines based upon the following contingent factors: (1) annual calendar time; (2) the 
level of organizational slack (total, available, recoverable and potential slack); and (3) the 
interaction of organizational slack and the annual calendar time. I create the sample of failing 
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 firms by choosing firms that filed for bankruptcy and then gathering their expenditure 
histories over the five years prior to bankruptcy. In order to measure the search routines, I 
focus on the research and development expenditure of each firm and the number of patents 
filed by each firm in the US Patents and Trademarks Office (USPTO).  
In this dissertation, I use the following terms: “failed firms”, “bankrupt firms”, 
“failing firms” and “declining firms” interchangeably. For the purpose of this study, each of 
these terms means the same. Further, “absorbed slack” and “recoverable slack” mean the 
same. 
1.4 The main research questions 
In this study, I address the following questions: 
1. How do failing firms change their search routines when compared with their matched 
surviving firms? Is this change a function of calendar time? 
2. How are the search routines of failing firms and surviving firms affected by the level 
of organizational slack (total, available, absorbed and potential)? 
3. How are the search routines of failing firms and surviving firms affected by the 
interaction of the level of organizational slack (total, available, absorbed and 
potential) and annual calendar time? Even after controlling for these interaction 
effects, do the search routines of failing firms differ from the search routines of 
matched surviving firms?   
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 1.5 The focal industry 
The sample firms in the dataset are from the Chemical and allied products industry 
(two-digit SIC of 2800). At the four-digit SIC level, this dataset includes firms from multiple 
industries. Forty percent of the firms are from Pharmaceutical preparations (SIC 2834). More 
than twenty two percent of the firms are from Biological Products, Except Diagnostic 
Substances (SIC 2836). The rest of the firms are from Diagnostic substances (SIC 2835), 
Plastic materials, synthetic resins, synthetic rubber, cellulose, and other manmade fibers, 
except glass (SIC 2820), Soap, detergents, cleaning preparations, perfumes, cosmetics, and 
other toilet preparations (SIC 2840), Industrial inorganic chemicals (SIC 2810), Industrial 
organic chemicals (SIC 2860) and Miscellaneous chemical products (SIC 2890). The failing 
firms in this dataset file for bankruptcy between 2001 and 2011.   
1.6 The novelty of this study 
This study is one of the first to directly examine search routines within declining 
firms. McKinley (1993) has pointed out that there is a dearth of dynamic models of the 
internal dynamics of failing firms. I cater to this gap by examining how the search routines 
(which may contribute to the presence or absence of dynamic behavior in the firm) of 
declining firms change with the passage of time towards bankruptcy. Further, I examine how 
the amounts of organizational slack interact with the passage of time to affect the search 
routines of declining as well as surviving firms. To date, very few studies (D’Aveni, 1989a; 
Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988) have examined the contingent role of time in declining firms. 
Out of these two studies, only one (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988) examined how domain 
initiatives change in declining firms and their matched surviving firms with respect to annual 
calendar time. The second study (D’Aveni, 1989a) identified patterns of decline with respect 
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 to annual calendar time. D’Aveni (1989a) found that not all firms have the same pace of 
deterioration of their financial performance with respect to annual calendar time. These 
studies hint at the variety of responses that exist in declining firms, and how these responses 
might change across time. In turn, this study will show how patterns of change in search 
routines contribute to this variance.  
Additionally, prior scholars have also not examined the effect of organizational slack 
on the change of search routines in failing firms. However, scholars have found contradictory 
evidences of the effect of slack on phenomena that are similar to search routines, such as, 
change initiatives, innovation and risk taking.  Some researchers found a positive and linear 
relationship between slack and change initiatives (Barker and Duhaime, 1997), slack and 
innovation (Mone, McKinley and Barker, 1998) and slack and risk taking (Audia and Greve, 
2006). A second set of scholars reported a negative linear relationship between slack and 
change initiatives (Cheng and Kesner, 1997) and slack and innovation (Latham and Braun, 
2009). And yet a third research group reported an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
slack and innovation (Geiger and Cashen, 2002; Nohria and Gulati, 1996) and slack and risk 
taking (Martinez and Artz, 2006). These varied patterns, I suggest, will be related to time and 
context differences across declining firms.  
1.7 Why is this study interesting and important? 
This study is interesting because it challenges the dominant wisdom in the existing 
literature. Decline is associated as a negative phenomenon within the strategic management 
literature. This sentiment is portrayed by strategic management scholars when they discuss 
how organizational decline promotes rigidity within firms (Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 
1981). However, some scholars have found that organizational decline shakes up firms in 
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 many ways. Under declining conditions, firms take risks that they would not take under 
profitable conditions (Bromiley, 1991; Singh, 1986). Declining firms also undertake 
innovative activities (Cameron, 1983; Koberg, 1987) and adapt to the changing conditions 
(Boeker, 1997; Cameron and Zammuto, 1983). Therefore, declining conditions may trigger 
adaptive responses in some firms and dysfunctional responses in some other firms.  Each of 
the stories of risk-taking, innovation and adaptation within the context of declining firms, is 
likely to have a background story about organizational search routines. 
Interestingly, modification of search routines might be observed within both groups 
of firms: declining and surviving. Organizational decline need not always be highly 
correlated with shrinkage of organizational routines. Both declining and surviving firms may 
shrink as well as expand their routines. This potential finding challenges the traditional 
wisdom that routine shrinkage is associated with organizational decline and routine 
expansion is associated with organizational success (Nelson and Winter, 1982).   
Barley (2006) has noted that studies that are interesting need not be important. 
Interesting studies are important, though, if they contribute to increased understanding of an 
important phenomena. In the organizational routine literature, prior scholars have studied 
higher-level routines such as meta-routines (Adler, Goldoftas and Levine, 1999; Grant, 1996; 
Peng, Schroeder and Shah, 2008; Zollo and Winter, 2002). But, none of these scholars have 
studied higher-level routines in the context of failing or declining firms. In fact, there is a 
dearth of empirical studies on the evolution of organizational routines in failing firms. Here, I 
address this gap in the existing literature. I focus on the evolution of search routines because 
they are suitable candidates for studying change (or its absence) in routines in failing firms.  
In addition, the modification of search routines that I examine within failing firms and 
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 surviving firms are also likely to indicate micro-level phenomena related to routines, such as: 
routine expansion (e.g. when there is an increase in a routine), routine contraction (e.g. when 
there is a decrease in a routine) and routine death (e.g. when a routine is halted). As prior 
scholars (Lewin, Massini and Peeters, 2011; Zbaracki and Bergen, 2010) have noted, very 
few studies have focused on micro-level phenomena related to organizational routines. Here, 
I cater to this gap in the literature on organizational routines.            
1.8 The limitations of this study 
The main limitation of this study is that the major part of the work is based on 
secondary data on the outcomes of routines. Therefore, this study mainly considers “routines 
as a black-box” (Pentland and Feldman, 2005) in order to conduct an empirical analysis 
based on secondary data. This somewhat reduces the possibility of rich and fine grained 
analysis (Becker, Lazaric, Nelson and Winter, 2005). The “routines as a black-box” approach 
also inhibits understanding of the internal structure of processes that transform inputs into 
outputs and may result in a narrow understanding of the research phenomenon (Pentland and 
Feldman, 2005: 793,801).  
Further, this study examines the change (or lack of change) in higher-level 
organizational routines. According to Nelson and Winter (1982), out of the three varieties of 
routines: operating routines, investment routines and search routines; search routines are the 
higher-level routines that bring change in operating level routines. Change in search routines 
then may be necessary, but not sufficient, to explain failure in firms. In the future, researchers 
can examine the role of operating level routines or investment level routines within declining 
firms.  
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 In addition, in this study I consider only a few of the contingent factors that affect the 
changes of search routines in failing firms. The contingent factors are: the amount of 
organizational slack (all three types of slack: available, absorbed and potential), time (annual 
calendar time) and the interaction of organizational slack and the annual calendar time. 
Future studies can consider other important contingent factors that alter the fate of search 
routines in failing firms, such as the ecology of competition and the patterns of exogenous 
shocks.   
Last but not least, I consider the change in the direction and magnitude of research 
and development (R&D) expenditure and the count of patents filed in the US Patent and 
Trademarks Office (USPTO). At a later date, scholars can examine other dimensions of 
routine modification, such as, changes in the number of sites where the routine is conducted, 
the total amount of time taken to complete the routine, and the quality of the routine.
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 CHAPTER 2: ORGANIZATIONAL DECLINE: KEY THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 
A wide variety of scholars have studied organizational decline. The key aspects of 
organizational decline that these scholars have studied include the causes of decline, the 
conditions under which decline unfolds and the consequences of decline. In this chapter, I 
review a subset of this literature. My choice of this subset of literature is dictated by this 
study’s focus on the dynamics of organizational routines within firms that went bankrupt. 
The study period is the pre-bankruptcy period. I review those studies that examined the 
internal processes of failing firms. A majority of these studies investigate the consequences 
of decline. However, a few studies also discuss the conditions of decline.  
The chapter is organized as follows.  I discuss definitions of organizational decline.  
Next, I discuss the three main theoretical perspectives adopted in studying organizational 
decline.  For each of these theoretical perspectives, I cite theoretical and empirical examples 
from prior studies on profit-making business organizations, public organizations and 
universities (private as well as public). I also discuss normative literature on organizational 
decline. Then, I discuss the common themes and the conflicting issues that remain across the 
three theoretical perspectives on organizational decline. Finally, I identify the gap in the 
literature on organizational decline that I intend to fill in this study.       
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 2.1 Defining decline: Many definitions, three key perspectives  
There is no consensus on a definition of organizational decline (Cameron, Sutton and 
Whetten, 1988). Organizational decline has been categorized into the following five: 
“decline-as-stagnation” (Whetten, 1980), “decline-as-crisis” (Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984), 
“decline-as-cutback” (Whetten, 1980), decline as misfit with the internal or the external 
environment (Miles and Snow, 1994) and decline as “a stage in the organization’s life cycle” 
(Mintzberg, 1984).  
The “decline-as-stagnation” definition is especially suited for mature firms that 
become passive, bureaucratic and show a decrease in the rate of increase of income 
(Whetten, 1980). The “decline-as-crisis” (Levy, 1986; Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984) 
perspective proposes that top managers within failing firms initially fail to perceive that 
crises are developing. Eventually, when top managers notice the problems, they adopt 
weathering-the-storm strategies, such as postponing investments, reducing maintenance, and 
halting training. Adopted for the wrong reasons or too late, such weathering-the-storm 
strategies do not lead to recovery.  Then a second phase of crisis occurs. Successful 
organizational response to crisis in the second phase involves unlearning yesterday’s ideas 
(Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984).  
The “decline-as-cutback” suggests that declining firms are those that face continued 
deterioration when measured in terms of a performance  variable, such as: profits (Nelson, 
1981; Witteloostuijn, 1998), net income (Moulton and Thomas, 1993), sales (Moulton, 
Thomas and Pruett, 1996), total assets (Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996), market share (Miller, 
1977) and earnings per share (Bolton, 1993) or their  combination (Bruton, Oviatt and White, 
1994; Daily, 1996; Miller, 1977). Cutback is often defined based on employee counts over 
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 time (Cameron, 1983; Ludwig, 1993). A succinct definition within the “decline-as-cutback” 
perspective describes decline as “a condition in which a substantial, absolute decrease in an 
organization’s resource base occurs over a specified period of time” (Cameron, Kim and 
Whetten, 1987:224; Mone, McKinley and Barker, 1998; Whetten, 1981).  
Declining firms are those that are misfits with their internal and/or external 
environments (Greenhalgh, 1983; Miles and Snow, 1994).  Weitzel and Jonsson (1989:94) 
defined declining firms as those that enter a stage of decline when they “fail to anticipate, 
recognize, avoid, neutralize, or adapt to external or internal pressures that threaten the 
organization’s long-term survival.” Decline can be a stage in the lifecycle of a firm (Adizes, 
1979; Mintzberg, 1984:213). The decline stage can include different phases or substages. For 
example, Cameron, Sutton and Whetten (1988) propose that organizational decline consists 
of two stages. Stage 1 involves deterioration of an organization’s adaptation to its domain. 
Stage 2 involves reduction of resources within the organization.  
For some declining firms, the decline is reversed, as firms can successfully 
turnaround to profitable conditions (Barker and Duhaime, 1997). A second subset of 
declining firms continue to exist in deteriorating conditions as “permanently failing 
organizations” (Meyer and Zucker, 1989:19)  “whose performance, by any standard, falls 
short of the expectations of owners, members, and clients, yet whose existence continues, 
sometimes indefinitely.” A third subset of declining firms eventually fail, through bankruptcy 
(Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code), acquisition or disbanding. 
In this study, my focal interest is on bankrupt firms, with respect to the patterns of 
search routines in the five year period preceding bankruptcy. Since my focus is on the 
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 consequences of decline (i.e. the effect of decline on the search routines), none of the 
categories of definitions exactly fit my purpose. The five broad categories of definitions of 
decline are based on either the cause of decline or on the condition of decline. The following 
three categories of definitions of decline: “decline-as-crisis” (Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984), 
“decline-as-cutback” (Whetten, 1980) and “decline-as-misfit-with-environment (internal or 
external)” (Miles and Snow, 1994) are based on the causes of decline. In contrast, the 
definitions: “decline-as-stagnation” (Whetten, 1980) and “decline-as-a-stage-in-the-
organization’s-life-cycle” (Mintzberg, 1984) are based on the conditions of decline. Here, I 
focus on those firms that finally file for bankruptcy (either a Chapter 11 or a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy). And, I define failing firms as those firms that file for bankruptcy (Daily and 
Dalton, 1994a:1606; Daily, 1996) because of deteriorating financial conditions. My focus is 
on these failing firms during the period prior to filing for bankruptcy. While reviewing prior 
studies, I use the terms “declining firms” and “failing firms” interchangeably.  
Some firms in my study may file for bankruptcy due to a lack of fit with their 
environment. For such firms, the “decline-as-misfit-with-environment” definition is relevant. 
Other firms file for bankruptcy after periods of crises where ineffective top managers could 
not address the crisis situation. For these firms, the “decline-as-crisis” definition is suitable. 
However, all of these firms file for bankruptcy due to poor financial conditions. Some 
bankrupt firms experience fluctuating financial conditions, while others have monotonically 
declining finances.  Those firms that faced continued financial deterioration fit into the 
definition category “decline-as-cutback” where cutback involves cutback in financial 
resources.                             
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 2.2 Failing firms 
Management scholars offer differing perspective about failing firms. The three main 
theoretical perspectives on organizational decline are threat rigidity theory (Staw, Sandelands 
and Dutton, 1981), prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992) and the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963). Threat rigidity theory 
and prospect theory draw mainly from psychology, while the behavioral theory of the firm is 
based on early scholarship in administrative science and economics (Alchian, 1950; Barnard, 
1938; Schumpeter, 1934; Schumpeter, 1942). These three theories draw their ideas from 
different levels of analyses. Threat rigidity theory, initially based on individual responses to 
crisis situations, was extended to a multi-level theory that is applicable at the levels of 
individuals, groups and firms. Prospect theory was mainly proposed as a theory of individual 
risk taking. In contrast, the behavioral theory of the firm was developed for application at the 
level of a firm.  
Threat rigidity theory (Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981) holds that firms and 
decision makers within failing firms become rigid. In contrast, both prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and the behavioral theory of 
the firm (Cyert and March, 1963), imply that managers adapt.  
Staw, Sandelands and Dutton (1981), early proponents of the threat rigidity theory 
proposed that individuals, groups and firms faced with the threat of a disruptive change 
become rigid in their responses. The two main threat rigidity responses are a restriction of 
information processing, such as a narrowing in the field of attention, and a constriction of 
control, such as a concentration of power. The implications are that when faced with threat 
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 conditions such as the prospect of failing in the near future, firms are likely to stick to well-
learned or dominant responses.  
In contrast, Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the proponents of prospect theory, 
suggested that individuals become more risk-seeking in the face of potential threats and 
losses. This risk-seeking behavior at the individual level can be applied to decision makers 
within failing firms. When faced with the threat of firm failure, then, decision makers within 
failing firms become risk seekers. They then initiate changes within their failing firms.  
Similar to prospect theory scholars, the proponents of a behavioral theory of the firm 
(Cyert and March, 1963) proposed that firms undertake change initiatives based on their 
expectations and aspirations. Firms have goals, expectations and aspirations. The expectation 
level of a firm is set by drawing inferences from the environment. The aspiration level of a 
firm is a weighted function of the firm’s past goals, its past performance and the past 
performance of other comparable firms. Applying the behavioral theory to failing firms, 
managers within such firms with performance below their aspiration levels should initiate 
change activities in order to cater to their survival goal, and reach their aspiration levels 
(Ketchen and Palmer, 1999).  
This tension between adaptive change and threat rigidity appears in empirical studies 
and theoretical work, in samples of both profit and not-for profit organizations.  Table 2.1 
provides a list of these prior studies.  Though the studies cover a period from the 1980s to the 
2010s, there is no clear indication that declining firms became more threat rigid or more 
adaptive. In addition, the indiscriminant patterns of behavior persist in both profit-seeking 
and not-for-profit organizations.  
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 2.3 Threat rigidity responses within failing firms 
The central thesis of the threat rigidity theory is that when faced with threat situations, 
decision makers will tend to continue with their well-learned responses even when they are 
inappropriate in the changed environment (Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981:502). The 
threat rigidity theory predicts that decision makers within declining firms will become rigid 
in their responses to change. Rigid responses include retaining legacy strategies and/or 
engaging in incremental reductions. Rigid firms inhibit innovation and avoid risks. In the 
following paragraphs, I discuss the evidence concerning threat rigidity. Do declining firms 
undertake change initiatives other than incremental cuts?   Do declining firms innovate?     
The main types of threat rigidity behavior can best be discussed with the help of the 
model developed by Sutton and D’Aunno (1989). In their model, decreased financial 
resources led to three main types of rigid responses within declining organizations: restriction 
in information processing, constriction of control and conservation of resources. The first 
type of rigid response (restriction in information processing) was evident in increased used of 
standard operating procedures. The second type of rigid response (constriction of control) 
was observed in increased centralization of authority. Finally, the third type of rigid response 
(conservation of resources) was operationalized through cost cutting and efforts to assure 
accountability.  
What are the specific rigid responses observed within declining firms? In a sample of 
drug abuse treatment organizations D’Aunno and Sutton (1992) found evidence of threat 
rigidity responses under financial adversity, as the organizations adhered to existing 
procedures, reduced workforce, and faced increased conflicts among organizational 
members. Additionally, when funding sources were reduced these organizations reduced 
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 participative decision making, decreased the workforce, and increased competition among 
members. Other scholars found evidence of rigid use of existing procedures (D’Aunno and 
Sutton, 1992), lack of change initiatives (Nelson, 1981), rumor (Sutton and Callahan, 1987), 
conflict among employees (Sutton and Callahan, 1987), high extent of centralization (Daily 
and Dalton, 1994b; D’Aveni, 1989a), less participative decision-making (D’Aunno and 
Sutton, 1992; Sutton and Callahan, 1987) and relationship disengagement (Sutton and 
Callahan, 1987).  
In addition to the above evidence of threat rigidity responses in profit-making 
business organizations, declining public organizations also showed threat rigidity responses 
such as a lack of long term planning, and a loss of slack and non-prioritized cuts (Cameron, 
Whetten and Kim, 1987). Managers within a large non-profit organization that ran anti-
poverty programs in the US behaved in self-defeating ways during its decline. They were 
driven by personal interests, engaged in conflict and accomplished less (Krantz, 1985). 
Similarly declining colleges and universities showed distinct signs of threat rigidity 
(Cameron, 1983). Managers in declining universities employed standardized structures, 
relied on prior conservative practices, focused on internal efficiency and ignored public 
relations (Cameron, 1983). Interestingly, the negative attributes, such as curtailed innovation, 
scapegoating, resistance to change, turnover and conflict, predicted to be associated with 
decline are characteristic of both failing and stagnant higher educational institutions. These 
attributes were not present under conditions of growth (Cameron, Whetten and Kim, 1987; 
Cameron, Kim and Whetten, 1987).         
In conformance with the threat rigidity hypothesis, declining firms reduced initiatives 
for change. They engaged in fewer mergers and acquisitions while they liquidated and 
       22
 divested more subunits (D’Aveni, 1989a). Relative to surviving firms, the top management 
team characteristics in declining firms deteriorated at an accelerated rate in the five years 
prior to bankruptcy filing (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992). The presence of a shrinking top 
management team with fewer members experienced in the core functional areas is probably 
why managers undertook fewer change initiatives within declining firms. Similarly, declining 
public organizations constrained their domain definition (Bozeman and Slusher, 1979), 
engaged in cutbacks (Hardy, 1990; Levine, 1979; McKinley, Cheng and Schick, 1986), 
deferred maintenance (Levine, 1985) and reduced budget across all levels (Levine, 1985). 
Cutback management is a well discussed phenomenon in the organizational decline literature 
on public organizations including universities (Levine, 1978; Levine, 1979). Cutback 
involves shrinking organizational activity in order to consume fewer resources. Cutback 
management involves making hard decisions about layoffs, downsizing of subunits, 
terminating programs, and scaling down operations (Levine, 1979).      
Do declining firms engage in innovation? In concordance with the threat rigidity 
predictions, prior scholars found evidence of lack of innovation within failing firms. Latham 
and Braun (2009) found that failing firms with more managerial ownership and more slack 
reduced their innovation spending. In a sample of thirteen firms, Nelson (1981) found that in 
the years immediately prior to bankruptcy, managers within failing firms inhibited 
innovation. Under severe adversity, failing firms exhibited evidence of counter-productive 
responses and threat rigid behavior (Nelson, 1981). Lack of innovation is also evident in 
declining higher educational institutions (Cameron, Kim and Whetten, 1987).         
The previous discussions and empirical evidences clearly support the threat rigidity 
perspective on organizational decline. When organizations face the threat of failure, their 
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 decision makers become threat rigid and show two main types of rigid behavior: restrictive 
information processing (e.g. reduced number of channels) and constricted control (e.g. 
concentrated power) (Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981). Hence, according to the threat 
rigidity perspective, declining organizations undertake no or few change initiatives.  The 
threat rigidity theory also proposes that declining organizations tend to shrink or continue 
with their existing core domain(s) of expertise, not innovate and show risk aversion.  
While threat rigidity is clearly a frequent response to decline, the threat-rigidity 
literature, at least in its normative implications, implies that it should not be the only 
response. In addition, organization theorists (Miller and Friesen, 1983) and strategy 
researchers (D’Aveni, 1989a) suggest that there are different patterns or types of decline. It is 
not at all obvious that all types of decline would trigger the threat-rigidity pattern. Prospect 
theory and the behavioral theory of the firm provide this evidence.  
2.4 Prospect theory predictions within failing firms 
In this section, I discuss findings of prior studies on organizational decline that used a 
prospect theory perspective. I frame this discussion around similar questions that I had used 
in organizing the discussion on the threat rigidity perspective.  Do managers within declining 
firms undertake change initiatives?  Do managers within declining firms become more risk 
seeking? Do these managers innovate?  
The prospect theory lens proposes that managers will change, they will become risk-
seeking, and they will innovate.  In keeping with the predictions of prospect theory, managers 
of failing firms do diversify their product market domains (Boeker, 1997), they do improve 
processes (Nelson, 1981), and they do change board composition (Boeker and Goodstein, 
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 1991). Relative to the managers of surviving firms, managers of declining firms enter into 
more board interlocks as they decline (Sheppard, 1994) and invest a greater percentage of 
sales revenue on advertising (Willard and Cooper, 1985). Khanna and Poulsen (1995) found 
that managers of declining firms are as capable in taking value enhancing decisions, such as 
issuing new debt and equity, as are the managers of surviving firms. 
Like their counterparts in profit seeking firms, administrators of declining public 
organizations also exhibit adaptive changes in the face of decline. Koberg (1987) found that 
when faced with the prospect of decline, school administrators undertook five broad 
categories of organizational adjustments: procedural, personnel (e.g. eliminating positions for 
teacher-coordinators), process (e.g. reducing expenditures on textbook repairs), structural 
(e.g. creating school closure task forces) and strategic (e.g. closing under-enrolled schools).  
According to the prospect theory, decision makers within failing firms should expand 
beyond the core domains of their firms while attempting to improve declining conditions. 
Khanna and Poulsen (1995) found that managers within declining firms engaged in 
acquisitions and expansions in the three year period prior to bankruptcy. Miller and Friesen 
(1983) reported that managers of some declining firms took bold new market entry steps. 
Nelson (1981) found that decision makers of a failing firm tried to vertically integrate in the 
hope of cutting costs and reducing dependence on a competitor.    
Since failing firms typically have substandard performance, prospect theory 
predictions regarding risk-taking should fit these firms (Bowman, 1982). As expected, 
D’Aveni (1989b) found that some firms can delay bankruptcy by undertaking risky initiatives 
that give creditors the hope that these firms will become dependable in the near future. 
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 Creditors continue to support declining firms as long as these firms have sufficient 
managerial and financial resources (D’Aveni, 1989b).  Hiring practices of declining firms 
become riskier as managers often hire outside CEOs (Davidson, Worrell and Dutia, 1993), 
and prestigious top managers (D’Aveni, 1990).       
In keeping with the theme of innovation as a prospect theory prediction, some 
declining firms adopted prospector strategies; i.e. they refocused their product markets, 
channeled their innovation and had well defined marketing plans (Evans and Green, 2000). 
Managers of declining firms allowed early adoption of an organizational innovation (Bolton, 
1993) by joining a research and development consortium early on. In a sample of 
organization closings in the public sector and the private sector, Sutton (1983) found that 
employees constructed new ways of doing things before closure.              
The previous paragraphs elaborated the prospect theory perspective on organizational 
decline. According to this theory, managers within declining firms perceive the threat of 
bankruptcy in the near future as a situation of potential loss. They then become risk seekers, 
undertake change initiatives, adapt their key domains of expertise and enhance innovation. 
Overall, the prospect theory portrays managers within declining firms as active decision 
makers who are willing to take risks in order to reverse the deteriorating conditions. This 
theoretical perspective is then, in sharp contrast to the threat rigidity perspective that I have 
discussed in the previous section.  
Both the threat-rigidity perspective and the prospect theory perspective have some 
supporting evidence in empirical research. For both theories, though, there is evidence that 
the relationship between decline and either response, rigidity or innovative change, is 
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 complex. Nelson (1981) and Miller and Friesen (1983) argue that there can be too much or 
too little innovation. Wiseman and Bromiley (1996) report evidence of a cyclical process 
where decline increases risk seeking, but the risk seeking then aggravates firm decline.        
2.5 Behavioral theory predictions within failing firms 
In this section, I elaborate on findings from prior studies on organizational decline 
that employed a behavioral theory lens. In drawing upon a behavioral theory of the firm, 
Boeker (1997) found that managers within failing firms actively initiated changes. Hambrick 
and D’Aveni (1988) reported that declining and surviving firms undertook adaptive domain 
initiatives.  The types of changes initiated by declining firms include the addition and 
deletion of technology (Ketchen and Palmer, 1999), the deletion of services (Ketchen and 
Palmer, 1999),  increases in  output (Witteloostuijn, 1998), the addition of personnel (Ford, 
1980a) and alliances with other organizations (Cummings, Blumenthal and Griener, 1983). 
Eighteen (of a total of fifty seven declining firms) even changed their primary industry in the 
five years prior to filing for bankruptcy (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988). Thietart (1988) 
reported that managers pursued growth to reverse decline, by initiating changes in sales.  
The behavioral theory of the firm predicts that failing organizations are likely to 
expand or shift their core areas of expertise in an effort to revive them.  Zajac and Kraatz 
(1993) confirmed this prediction in an empirical study of all US liberal arts colleges (1971 to 
1986). These authors found that the administrators of shrinking colleges launched several 
change initiatives such as new undergraduate and graduate program, and increased gender 
diversity in the student body.  
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 Do declining firms innovate? A behavioral theory of the firm predicts that managers 
within failing firms will innovate in order to improve their chances of survival. In a sample of 
all single product manufacturing firms from 1982 to 1984, Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt and 
Holcomb (2007) found that sixty percent of the firms took at least one strategic action, such 
as strategic alliances, new product introductions and acquisitions, in the year following 
declining market performance. Those firms that introduced new products improved their 
investors’ expectations.  
As is evident now from the discussion in this section on behavioral theory and the 
prior section on prospect theory, both behavioral theory and prospect theory predict similar 
adaptive behavior in declining firms. However, the basis of these predictions differs for these 
two theoretical perspectives. While the behavioral theory predictions are based on the gap 
between the aspiration level and the declining performance, the prospect theory prediction is 
based on individual decision maker’s risk seeking behavior when faced with the potential 
loss situation of bankruptcy in the near future. Overall, these two theories predict that 
managers of declining firms undertake adaptive change initiatives including domain change. 
They also foster innovation and become risk seekers. While there is empirical evidence for 
these two theories, the evidence within each perspective is mixed. When viewed in 
comparison to the threat-rigidity perspective, the number of contradictions in the evidence 
supports a call for better insights and integration.       
2.6 Common themes in different perspectives on organizational decline 
Variety is one common theme across this research. In many instances, declining firms 
exhibit rigidity, as suggested by the threat-rigidity perspective. In like manner, many 
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 declining firms exhibit risk seeking and innovation, as suggested by prospect theory and the 
behavioral theory of the firm.  
A second common theme is the efficacy of each form of response varies. Rigid 
responses appear to be effective in some instance, ineffective in others. Risk seeking and 
innovation can improve performance or hurt performance.  A guiding theme in this 
dissertation is the form of response and efficacy of response are each likely to vary across 
different contexts.  
Now, the question remains as to how do we know which declining firms will 
undertake adaptive change and which ones will become rigid? Also, is it a question of which 
or when? That is, are some declining firms always likely to exhibit adaptive behavior while 
some others always likely to exhibit threat rigidity in the face of failure? Or, can the same set 
of declining firms become either adaptive or rigid depending on certain contingencies? This 
last question has been addressed by several scholars (Cameron, 1983; Ketchen and Palmer, 
1999). I discuss them in detail in the next chapter, which is dedicated to studies that 
identified contingencies that guide adaptive or rigid behavior within declining firms.          
Table 2.2 lists prior studies that have empirically found contradicting evidence of 
rigid and non-rigid responses to decline.  
2.7 The relevance of this review for the central research problem of this study 
The unresolved questions in the literature on organizational decline may rely on the 
relationship between decline and organizational routines. Organizational routines are the 
building blocks of organizational capabilities (Nelson and Winter, 1982) that direct the 
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 internal processes of firms. An organizational routine is a “pattern of behavior that is 
followed repeatedly, but is subject to change if conditions change” (Winter, 1964:263).  
A suggested research issue is what conditions need to change, and at what rate? An 
interesting related question would address the relationship between different types of routine, 
and changing conditions. Different routines may change in different ways and/or at different 
rates. By focusing on an important routine, that is, the search routine, I hope to unpack some 
of the contextual conditions that influence the relationship between decline and the firms’ 
response to decline.
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 CHAPTER 3: ORGANIZATIONAL DECLINE: CONTINGENCY PERSPECTIVES 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the three main theoretical perspectives on 
organizational decline: the threat rigidity theory (Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981), the 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and the behavioral theory (Cyert and March, 
1963). To sum up each of these theoretical perspectives, the prospect theory and the 
behavioral theory predict adaptive change within declining firms. In contrast, the threat 
rigidity theory predicts rigidity (i.e. sticking to well-learned responses) within declining 
firms.        
In this chapter, I review studies that offer contingency perspectives on organizational 
decline, while recognizing the possibility of either rigid or adaptive responses. I focus on 
internal and external contingencies that guide the responses of declining firms.  I concentrate 
on the following specific contingencies: organizational slack, past firm financial performance 
and time.    
The chapter is organized as follows. At the very beginning of this chapter, first, I 
discuss the logic that guided the choice of this subset of contingencies. Next, I elaborate on 
prior empirical evidence of the contingencies. I then elaborate on the few studies that 
consider the role of time. Finally, I discuss the issues that remain unaddressed and how this 
study helps to resolve some of these issues.         
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 3.1 The contingencies that affect the behavior of failing firms 
Prior scholars have found contingencies that affect the behavior of failing firms which 
can be categorized as internal or external. Organizational slack (Barker and Duhaime, 1997), 
firms’ past financial performance (Boeker, 1997), and firm size (Wiseman and Bromiley, 
1996) are the most important internal contingencies. I focus here on organizational slack and 
the firms’ past financial performance. I include organizational slack because of its 
prominence in the literature on organizational decline. I also include reviews of the 
contingency effects of firms’ past financial performance on the responses of declining firms. 
I do so because evaluation of performance is at the heart of the behavioral theory of the firm 
(Cyert and March, 1963).  
I exclude firm size as an internal contingency from consideration in my analysis. 
While firm size is a relevant variable for decline, I control for firm size in my sample of 
declining firms and matched surviving firms. For each declining firm in my sample, I choose 
a matched surviving firm based on multiple criteria out of which firm size is one criterion. I 
measure firm size in terms of the total number of employees and also in terms of the total 
sales volume.      
Organizational slack is a key variable that affects the responses of declining firms 
(Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988; Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996). Organizational slack is “that 
cushion of actual or potential resources which allows an organization to adapt successfully to 
internal pressures for adjustment or to external pressures for change in policy, as well as to 
initiate changes in strategy with respect to the external environment” (Bourgeois, 1981:30). 
Examples of slack resources are excesses of inventory, personnel, retained earnings and 
working capital (Cyert and March, 1963; Love and Nohria, 2005).  
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 The behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963) promotes slack as 
“beneficial” for declining firms. Slack acts as a buffer for the technological core of the firm, 
especially in times of distress. Slack also stimulates search for new solutions. According to 
this perspective, more slack resources allow declining firms to initiate suitable change 
activities (Barker and Duhaime, 1997; D’Aveni, 1989a), increase their risk taking (Audia and 
Greve, 2006) and enhance innovation (Cameron, 1983; Mone, McKinley and Barker, 1998). 
In contrast, agency theory scholars promote slack as “inefficient” perspective (Jensen, 1986; 
Antle and Felingham, 1990; Brush, Bromiley and Hendrickx, 2000). In this view, managers 
become complacent in the presence of slack. They act towards their own interests rather than 
towards organizational interests. In tune with the agency theory view, Latham and Braun 
(2009) found that declining firms with higher levels of slack decreased their innovation 
spending.  
Some scholars bridge the two distinct perspectives on slack and propose an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between slack and risk-taking (Martinez and Artz, 2006), slack and 
innovation (Nohria and Gulati, 1996; Geiger and Cashen, 2002), and organizational success 
and slack (Bourgeois, 1981). They shift the focus from whether high levels or low levels of 
slack improve firm performance to what is the optimal level of slack that is beneficial. Cheng 
and Kesner (1997) and Latham and Braun (2008) present a more nuanced view, and argue 
that the impact of slack depends on the firm’s situation and strategy. Based on its relative 
ease of access, Bourgeois and Singh (1983) identified three different types of slack: available 
slack, recoverable slack and potential slack. Available slack consists of uncommitted 
resources that can be put to use immediately. Recoverable slack consists of extra resources 
that are already absorbed into the organization’s system but can be recovered if there is a 
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 need. Potential slack denotes the firm’s ability to raise extra resources from the environment 
through means such as equity capital or debt. Each of the three types of slack have different 
relationships with: risk-taking (Singh, 1986; Wiseman and Catanach, 1997), innovation 
(Geiger and Cashen, 2002; Greve, 2003), and change (Miller, Lant, Milliken and Korn, 
1996).  
While each of these three types of slack affects risk taking, the evidence about the 
form of the relationship between slack and risk-taking is mixed.  With respect to available 
slack, Singh (1986) and Wiseman and Bromiley (1996) found no relationship. In contrast, 
Martinez and Artz (2006) found a non-linear relationship. In assessing of recoverable slack, 
Singh (1986) found a positive relationship with risk taking while Wiseman and Bromiley 
(1996) uncovered a negative relationship. In an attempt to explain the mixed results for 
recoverable slack, Wiseman and Catanach (1997) proposed a convex relationship.   Potential 
slack positively influences risk-taking (Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996; Wiseman and 
Catanach, 1997), though the relationship appears to be non-linear in regulated environments 
(Martinez and Artz, 2006).  
Each type of slack also affects innovation. The results exhibit similar mixed findings.  
For available slack, Mone, Mckinley and Barker (1998) reported a positive relationship while 
Geiger and Cashen (2002) found a non-linear relationship. For recoverable slack, both a 
positive (Greve, 2003) and a non-linear relationship (Geiger and Cashen, 2002) have been 
presented. Unlike available and recoverable slack, the relationship between potential slack 
and innovation is consistently reported as positive.  Hence, the higher the level of potential 
slack, the greater is the amount of innovation (Geiger and Cashen, 2002).  
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 Each type of slack also affects the change initiatives within declining firms in two 
ways. First, more slack facilitates the use of more change initiatives. Second, longer term 
initiatives are generally linked to recoverable and potential slack, while available slack 
provides support for quicker, short term initiatives.  Table 3.1 summarizes the contingent 
effects of organizational slack on change initiatives, risk taking and innovation. This table 
also includes the separate effects of each of the three different kinds of slack (available, 
recoverable and potential) on change initiatives, innovation and risk-taking.      
The second internal contingency of interest is firms’ past financial performance. Past 
high performance is typically associated with complacence, inertia (Audia, Locke and Smith, 
2000; Miller and Chen, 1994), less risk taking (Denrell and March, 2001) and fewer changes 
(Boeker, 1997; Lant and Mezias, 1992). High past performance decreases the likelihood that 
managers will make any external attributions for any negative performance outcomes (Lant, 
Milliken and Batra, 1992). In contrast, low past performance increases the likelihood that 
managers will make external attributions for any negative performance outcomes (Lant, 
Milliken and Batra, 1992). Following the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 
1963), expectations and aspirations also play a role in guiding organizational responses 
especially when past performance is compared to them. Both expectations and aspirations 
positively affect risk taking (Bromiley, 1991). The difference between aspirations and 
expectations negatively influences risk taking (Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996).  
There are other financial aspects of a firm, such as the level of financial adversity, 
that play a crucial role in guiding the responses of declining firms. The level of financial 
adversity guides the use of constructive or dysfunctional changes within declining firms 
(Nelson, 1981). Firms make few adjustments when their financial adversity is low. Firms 
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 learn positively and undertake adaptive changes when their financial adversity is moderate. 
Firms hardly take any change activities i.e. they become threat rigid when their financial 
adversity is high (Nelson, 1981).  
Prior scholars have examined a wide range of factors that shape the responses of 
declining firms. Slack is the predominant factor identified. Cyert and March (1963) theorized 
that the amount of slack resources in declining firms is crucial because slack buffers the core 
technologies and processes of firms and stimulates search for suitable solutions. Hence, 
declining firms with greater levels of slack are likely to be at a relative advantage than 
declining firms with lower levels of slack. Greater levels of slack allow declining firms to 
undertake suitable change activities (Barker and Duhaime, 1997; D’Aveni, 1989a), engage in 
innovation (Cameron, 1983; Mone, McKinley and Barker, 1998) and actively seek risk 
(Audia and Greve, 2006). In contrast to this behavioral perspective that slack facilitates 
response to decline,   agency theory (Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) suggests that 
the presence of slack promotes conflict among organizational members and also fosters 
complacence among them. Therefore, according to agency theory, declining firms engage in 
fewer change initiatives (Latham and Braun, 2008), inhibit innovation (Latham and Braun, 
2009) and become risk averse. Interestingly, the contradictory propositions of the role of 
slack of the two schools: the behavioral theory and the agency theory can be bridged by 
proposing a non-linear relationship (an inverted U) between slack and change, between slack 
and innovation (Geiger and Cashen, 2002; Nohria and Gulati, 1996) and between slack and 
risk (Martinez and Artz, 2006). The relationship is complex as three different kinds of slack 
(available, recoverable and potential) affect change, innovation and risk differently.                 
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 While there are environmental characteristics considered in prior contingency 
research on organizational decline, I do not review them for this study. Rather, I control for 
these characteristics by creating a matched sample of bankrupt firms and survivor firms 
based on their industry, product-market, sales volume and firm size.  Therefore, industry 
level and market level characteristics are already controlled by the design of the sample.  
3.2 Time 
At present, the role of time in organizational decline is not well specified (Cummings, 
1988; Cameron, Sutton and Whetten, 1988; McKinley, 1993). Some studies on 
organizational decline used time-dependent models, such as, survival analyses and system 
dynamics (Masuch, 1985). D’Aveni (1989a) and Hambrick and D’Aveni (988) considered 
time as a contingency that affects organizational responses in declining firms. Along with a 
review of studies on the consequences of organizational decline that considered time in some 
form or the other (e.g. Khanna and Poulsen, 1995), I include studies that capture the role of 
time on change, risk-taking and innovation within poorly performing or financially distressed 
firms (Bromiley, 1991; Musso and Schiavo, 2008; Hundley, Jacobson and Park, 1996; Zajac 
and Kraatz, 1993). Table 3.2 lists the studies discussed in this section. I have categorized 
these studies into those that identified different temporal patterns of decline, those that 
discussed how time guided change initiatives or domain initiatives undertaken by declining 
firms, and those that discussed how time affected risk taking or innovation within declining 
firms. 
How are time and decline related?  Based on the timing of the consequences of 
decline, D’Aveni (1989a) identified three distinct patterns of firm decline prior to 
bankruptcy: sudden decline, gradual decline and lingering. Sudden decliners are the ones 
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 whose combined level of internal financial and managerial resources deteriorated all of a 
sudden in the last two years prior to bankruptcy. Gradual decliners are the firms whose 
internal resources deteriorated gradually in the five or six years prior to bankruptcy. Finally, 
lingerers are the firms that declined rapidly or gradually but delayed bankruptcy for about six 
years while remaining in a state with insufficient level of managerial and financial resources. 
In an event method study, Khanna and Poulsen (1995) examined managerial actions 
of declining firms and compared them with those of control firms. They found that in the last 
three years prior to bankruptcy, managers of declining firms engaged in asset sales, plant 
closings, personnel downsizing, acquisitions, expansions, new debt and equity issues, equity 
for debt swaps and debt restructuring. As compared to managers of surviving firms, 
managers of declining firms engaged in these activities more often. Zajac and Kraatz (1993) 
found evidence of organizational restructuring within declining American liberal arts 
colleges. They used discrete time event history analysis (Allison, 1995) and found that 
colleges undergo restructuring in response to changing environmental conditions. This 
method allows the independent variables to vary over time on the hazard of the event. Here, 
the event is any of the three modes of restructuring (addition of business program, addition of 
graduate program and change from a single sex institution to a coeducational institution).  
A study that is very different from the aforementioned empirical studies captured the 
temporal dimension of organizational decline using the principles of systems dynamics 
(Masuch, 1985). This dynamic model includes relations between several inter-dependent 
aspects of organizations. These relations are depicted in the form of: (a) reinforcing loops 
where an increase in the first element leads to a corresponding increase in the second 
element, and (b) balancing loops where an increase in the first element leads to a 
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 corresponding decrease in the second element. This dynamic model of organizational decline 
is depicted as a vicious circle where managers while trying to avoid decline take certain 
actions which aggravates decline. This downward spiral, once triggered, may not be 
reversible.  
In yet a different type of study, Musso and Schiavo (2008) developed a new time-
varying and continuous index that measures financial constraints faced by firms. This index 
captures the different levels of financial constraints of firms in different periods. Over time, 
firms are likely to switch between being constrained or unconstrained depending on overall 
credit conditions, investment opportunities and idiosyncratic shocks. In order to develop this 
index, the authors used the following seven variables: size, profitability, liquidity, cash flow 
generating ability, solvency, trade credit over total assets and repaying ability. The authors 
used a time-dependent empirical method (survival analysis) to examine the relation between 
size growth at different time horizons, initial financial constraints, and a set of standard 
control variables including time-industry dummies. They measured size growth in terms of 
output, employment, and capital stock. They captured the dynamic effect of financial 
constraint by computing growth over three different time spans: one, three and five years. 
This analysis revealed that financially constrained firms are likely to exit the market. 
Interestingly, they also found that financially constrained firms increase productivity growth 
in the short-run. The results suggest that some firms adapt to declines in their financial 
fortunes, with the possibility of success related to both time and context.  
Declining firms do try to enter or exit business domains over time. Hambrick and 
D’Aveni (1988) captured the effect of temporal dynamics on domain initiatives within 
declining firms. They examined four factors in the years preceding decline for large firms: 
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 domain initiatives, environmental carrying capacity, slack, and performance. Their model of 
decline represents a downward spiral. They found that declining firms showed signs of 
deterioration from as early as ten years prior to failure. Interestingly, when compared to firms 
that survived, firms that failed engaged in the same amount of average domain activities. 
They entered the same number of new domains on average and opened up the same number 
of new locations on average. However, the bankrupt firms had higher variations in the 
number of new domains. This suggests that the bankrupt firms either entered too many 
domains or too few domains. Overall, Hambrick and D’Aveni (1988) found that 
organizational decline follows a downward spiral with four phases. The earliest period of 
decline (before ten years prior to bankruptcy) showed early symptoms of deteriorating slack 
and profitability. The second stage of decline that lasts from about ten years prior to 
bankruptcy to about six years prior to bankruptcy, hastened the deteriorations of slack and 
profitability. In the third stage of decline (from about six years to about three years prior to 
bankruptcy), firms engaged in strategic vacillations with too many or too few activities. In 
the last stage of decline (the three years just before bankruptcy), firms continued to show 
strategic vacillations, and their environmental carrying capacity and organizational slack 
level declined abruptly. These results suggest that firms attempt to adapt to performance 
declines but the adaptive responses fail.                                    
In using a measure of risk-taking, Bromiley (1991) found that poorly performing 
firms engage in riskier initiatives and these risks lead to further poor performance. In 
observing investments in innovation (R&D intensity), Hundley, Jacobson and Park (1996) 
found that US firms fluctuated their innovation focus (i.e. R&D intensity) corresponding to 
fluctuations in their profitability and liquidity.  Again, firms do seem to attempt actions as the 
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 firm’s performance deteriorates, but the actions may represent too little, too late. This begs 
the question of how well firms do if they respond in the earlier stages of the decline phase.  
To sum up the review of the available literature on the contingent role of time in 
organizational decline, D’Aveni (1989a) identified patterns of decline based on the rate and 
the timing of decline. The time pacing of decline dictates the survival chances and the 
responses of declining firms. Therefore, the association between calendar time and 
deteriorating financial performance (i.e. decline) is not the same for all declining firms. For 
the gradual decliners, with the change in the annual calendar time, there is a gradual change 
in the financial conditions. However, that does not hold for the sudden decliners and the 
lingerers. Hambrick and D’Aveni (1988) examined further the effect of time on the domain 
initiatives undertaken by declining firms. They found that with change in the annual calendar 
time, the corresponding change in the average number of domain initiatives of bankrupts and 
survivors did not differ. Also, they found evidence of a downward spiral leading to 
bankruptcy. From ten years to six years prior to bankruptcy, the corresponding changes in the 
variations of domain initiatives undertaken by bankrupt firms and survivors did not differ. 
But, from five years to one year before bankruptcy, the corresponding changes in the 
variations of domain initiatives by bankrupts were much greater than those by survivors. All 
in all, we know little about the pattern and impact of variation of responses in early stages of 
organizational decline (McKinley, 1993).            
3.3 Common themes and gaps in the contingency literature on organizational 
decline 
To reiterate the prior contingency findings of scholars on organizational decline, 
whether or not declining organizations employ threat rigid or adaptive responses will depend 
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 on several contingency factors, such as: amount and type of slack resources, past financial 
firm performance, and time. Among all these factors studied, majority of the scholars 
considered slack as a crucial contingency variable that guide the behavior of declining firms. 
In my study, I focus on the following contingency categories: organizational slack and time.  
I seek insight into four questions: (1) What are the contingency conditions under 
which declining firms are likely to be more adaptive and less rigid (i.e. agree with the 
behavioral theory and the prospect theory perspectives on decline)?, (2) What are the 
contingency conditions under which declining firms are likely to be more rigid and less 
adaptive (i.e. agree with the threat rigidity theory perspective on decline)?, (3) Are the 
internal processes within declining firms dynamic i.e. is there a change in the pace and nature 
of change initiatives undertaken by declining firms?, and (4) Does the interaction of 
organizational slack and annual calendar time affect organizational responses of declining 
firms?   
3.4 The relevance of this review for the central research problem of this study 
In this study, I examine changes in search routines within declining firms and 
compare them with those within matched surviving firms. Each of the unresolved questions 
that I have mentioned in the above section is relevant for this study.  
Consider question 1: What are the contingencies that lead declining firms to engage in 
adaptive change? The most frequently discussed category of contingencies is slack. Slack 
buffers a firm’s technical core from environmental disturbances (Bourgeois, 1981). Slack 
also initiates search for alternative solutions (Cyert and March, 1963). Therefore, slack is 
important for aiding change in search routines of a firm irrespective of whether the firm is 
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 declining or not. Organizational slack is crucial for declining conditions. During declining 
performance, firms with greater levels of slack can engage in innovation, risky initiatives and 
adaptive change. Again, slack that is absorbed within existing organizational routines, such 
as, additional costs, additional personnel, and additional technology, can be removed as a part 
of efficiency improvement strategy within declining firms. This type of slack is called 
recoverable slack or absorbed slack (Bourgeois and Singh, 1983). 
Now, consider question 2: What are the contingencies that lead declining firms to 
become threat rigid? The contingency of organizational slack that leads to adaptive change 
can also lead to threat rigid responses under different conditions. Behavioral theory (Cyert 
and March, 1963) suggests that potential slack (e.g. a firm’s unused borrowing capacity) can 
guide the responses of declining firms and facilitate successful adaptation. Yet, slack as 
“inefficient” perspective of the agency theory (Jensen, 1986) suggests a different outcome. In 
declining firms, greater levels of slack are likely to increase conflict among employees. For 
example, research and development managers will confront sales managers while deciding 
on where to allocate slack resources. The conflict, in turn, will decrease chances for effective 
response.    
Consider question 3: Are the changes within declining firms dynamic i.e. do the 
internal processes within declining firms change with respect to time? In support of an 
affirmative answer to this question, Hambrick and D’Aveni (1988) found that the decline of 
firms involve a downward spiral with steeper deteriorations during the last few years prior to 
bankruptcy. This prompts an interesting question in terms of search routines. Do declining 
firms initiate (if they initiate at all) changes in their search routines just once? Or do 
declining firms change their search routines in sync with the changes in their changing slack 
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 levels? To rephrase this, is the change in search routines of declining firms a function of 
annual calendar time or is it a function of the interaction of annual calendar time and the level 
of organizational slack? This leads us to the final question. 
Does the interaction of organizational slack and annual calendar time affect 
organizational responses of declining firms?  D’Aveni (1989a) identified different types of 
decline (sudden decliners, gradual decliners and lingerers) based on the rates of decline of 
combined managerial and financial resources of the declining firms. In his study, the 
diminishing combined level of managerial and financial resources indicates firm decline. He 
mapped firm decline (in the y-axis) against annual calendar time (in the x-axis). Sudden 
decliners, gradual decliners and lingerers portrayed different shapes in the graph. Each of the 
lines for these three types of firms is not parallel to each other. Therefore, there is no 
conclusive evidence of exact correspondence between firm’s financial conditions and annual 
calendar time. Again, Hambrick and D’Aveni (1988) found that firm decline follows a 
downward spiral with sudden deteriorations in the bankrupt firms in the last two years 
immediately before bankruptcy. They considered changes in slack resources, environmental 
carrying capacity, domain initiatives and firm performance over the last ten years of bankrupt 
firms and their matched survivors. Therefore, their downward spiral model suggests that the 
deteriorations in firm performance and slack resources in the last ten years prior to 
bankruptcy are not necessarily linear. Since there is no conclusive evidence of an exact 
correspondence between the levels of organizational slack and annual calendar time, in this 
study, I examine the contingent effects of the interaction of organizational slack and the 
annual calendar time.
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 CHAPTER 4: ORGANIZATIONAL DECLINE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
In this chapter, I review the empirical findings of a wide variety of studies on 
organizational decline. The empirical findings that I consider include comparisons between: 
(1) bankrupt firms and non-bankrupt firms prior to bankruptcy; (2) well performing firms and 
poor performing firms; (3) financially constrained firms and financially unconstrained firms; 
and (4) successful turnaround firms and failed firms in the period before failure. While in this 
study my focus is only on bankrupt firms and non-bankrupt firms during the pre-bankruptcy 
period, the empirical findings of all four types of comparative studies support the research.  
After the review, I discuss what are the common themes, differences and gaps identified in 
the comparative empirical findings. Finally, I conclude by indicating how this study is 
relevant for resolving at least some of these gaps.  
4.1 Comparing bankrupt firms and surviving firms in the pre-bankruptcy period 
Scholars find significant differences between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms in the 
following areas:  (1) strategic changes; (2) financial conditions; and (3) market reactions to 
public announcements of management actions. I include a review of the strategic changes 
because any strategic change is likely to result from changes in search routines. I also include 
reviews of the differences in firms’ financial variables between bankrupt firms and non-
bankrupt firms, as firms file for bankruptcy due to deteriorating finances. I include a review 
of the market reactions to announcements in bankrupt firms and non-bankrupt firms because 
it shows that the market reacts similarly to major announcements by both groups of firms. 
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 This hints at the fact that the responses of bankrupt firms and non-bankrupt firms may 
include attempts to adapt to decline.  In turn, changes in search routines of bankrupt firms 
relative to the changes in search routines of non-bankrupt firms may provide important 
insights about the failed firms.           
When compared to surviving firms, failing firms have declining sales (Khanna and 
Poulsen, 1995; Moulton, Thomas and Pruett, 1996), accelerating cost problems (D’Aveni, 
1989a), more liquidation (D’Aveni, 1989a), more employee cutbacks (D’Aveni, 1989a), and 
reduced throughput activities (D’Aveni, 1989a). However, Hambrick and D’Aveni (1988) 
found that failing firms were generally no more inertial than surviving firms. Both failing and 
surviving firms undertook domain initiatives (i.e. changes in the number of wholly owned 
and partially owned subunits). But, failing firms vacillated more in their domain changes.  
Failing firms engaged in very low and very high levels of domain initiative.  Both groups 
changed their primary industry in the five year period prior to bankruptcy. Failing firms also 
did not differ from surviving firms in the absolute sales three years prior to filing (Khanna 
and Poulsen, 1995), their level of diversification (Sheppard, 1994), the number of joint 
ventures undertaken (Sheppard, 1994), the extent of plant closings, layoffs, asset sales or 
downsizing (Khanna and Poulsen, 1995) and growth in location (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 
1988). However, D’Aveni (1989a) found that failing retailers and transportation firms 
reduced the number of locations they served in the two years immediately prior to 
bankruptcy.                     
When compared to surviving firms  in terms of financial variables, failing firms have 
rapidly declining profitability (Daily, 1996; Daily and Dalton, 1994b; D’Aveni and 
MacMillan, 1990; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992), higher performance instability (D’Aveni 
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 and MacMillan, 1990),  declining net income (Daily and Dalton, 1994b), lower operating 
performance (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988), lower operating income to assets ratio (Khanna 
and Poulsen, 1995), and  declines of operating income to assets ratio (Khanna and Poulsen, 
1995). Relative to non-bankrupt firms, bankrupt firms increased their debt faster (Moulton, 
Thomas and Pruett, 1996), decreased their leverage rapidly (Daily and Dalton, 1994b), 
reduced firm equity (Daily and Dalton, 1994b) and decreased slack rapidly (Hambrick and 
D’Aveni, 1988). Failing firms have  high levels of long-term debt (D’Aveni, 1989a), more 
debt swaps (Khanna and Poulsen, 1995), lower unused borrowing capacity (D’Aveni, 1989a), 
lower turnover ratio (Beaver, 1966), lower current ratio (Beaver, 1966), lower working 
capital to total assets ratio (Beaver, 1966), higher debt-to-total assets ratio (Beaver, 1966), 
lower net income to total assets ratio (Beaver, 1966), lower cash flow to total debt (Beaver, 
1966) and lower amount of slack (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988). Therefore, bankrupt firms 
have lower levels of available financial resources (Sheppard, 1994) when compared with 
non-bankrupt firms in the years prior to their bankruptcy. In contrast, failing firms did not 
differ from surviving firms in the quantity of assets (Moulton, Thomas and Pruett, 1996) and 
the book value of assets (Khanna and Poulsen, 1995).         
The stock market does not differentiate between failing firms and surviving firms 
(Khanna and Poulsen, 1995) when reacting to announcements regarding restructuring or 
downsizing, changes in top management, debt financing, debt swaps, and issuance of 
common or preferred stock. The stock market reacts positively to announcements of plant 
closings, layoffs, asset sales or downsizings of both failing firms and surviving firms. 
Interestingly, the stock market reacts unfavorably to changes in top management of both 
failing and surviving firms (Khanna and Poulsen, 1995). Hence, investors generally do not 
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 consider managerial replacement to be a cure for financially distressed firms. The cumulative 
abnormal returns of debt financing announcements, such as new credit agreements, new debt 
issuances and loan extensions are insignificant for both Chapter 11 firms and surviving firms 
(Khanna and Poulsen, 1995). The market reacts slightly unfavorably to issuance of common 
or preferred stock by both failing and surviving firms (Khanna and Poulsen, 1995). In 
contrast, the stock market differentiates its response to announcements of acquisitions or 
expansions by the two groups. The market responds favorably to acquisitions and expansions 
of surviving firms, but not for failing firms. Overall, with the exception of acquisitions, these 
results indicate that investors view managers within both failing and surviving firms as 
capable and actively pursuing investment decisions in the best interests of stakeholders. 
These do not support the view that managers of failing firms are incompetent or that they 
make poor investment decisions (Khanna and Poulsen, 1995).        
In summary, bankrupt firms are worse off than surviving firms on some but not all of 
the dimensions of strategic change. Failing firms had more cost problems and declining sales 
when compared with surviving firms. However, failing firms and surviving firms did not 
differ in strategic change variables, such as the level of diversification, the extent of plant 
closings, location growth and entering new domains. Managers within both bankrupt and 
non-bankrupt firms made decisions that resulted in similar stock market reactions (e.g. 
restructuring, debt financing and issuance of stock).  While there are great differences in the 
financial performance of the two groups, the explanation seems to be related to differences in 
the pattern of action or differences in the results of similar actions, rather than rigidity, per se. 
I will argue later that the differences in outcomes are due to differences in search routines.    
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 4.2 Comparing poor performing firms and well performing firms: 
Not all poorly performing firms file for bankruptcy (Daily, 1996). Some firms 
continue to exist for a long time with poor performance (these firms are classified as lingerers 
by D’Aveni, 1989a; they are also classified as Type 3 failed firms by Argenti, 1976) while 
some other firms successfully turnaround from poor performance (Barker and Duhaime, 
1997). Several scholars have examined differences between well performing and poor 
performing firms in the following categories: (1) product characteristics, (2) business 
characteristics, (3) strategic change, and (4) internal firm characteristics, such as 
organizational structure, risk, aspirations, managerial characteristics and board 
characteristics.    
How do poor performing businesses and well performing businesses differ with 
respect to their product characteristics? Compared with well performing businesses, poor 
performing ones have older products, higher prices and lower average product quality (Woo, 
1983). Poorly performing businesses have higher direct costs than their competitors when 
compared to strong performers (Woo, 1983).          
Relative to well performing businesses, how do poor performing businesses differ in 
terms of their business characteristics? In a sample of seven hundred and four businesses 
from the Profit Impact of Market Strategies (PIMS) database, Woo (1983) found that about 
forty four percent of poor performing businesses gave importance to auxiliary services while 
only twenty percent of successful ones gave importance to auxiliary services. She also found 
that compared with well performing businesses, more poor performing businesses offered 
professional advice. Successful businesses in her sample are more oriented toward 
components and raw or semi-finished materials while the ones with substandard performance 
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 participate heavily in capital goods. Businesses with low performance are consistently 
associated with greater commitment to their organizations as indicated by their higher 
percent of internal purchases.       
How do poor performing firms differ from well performing firms in terms of strategic 
change? Firms that perform below their industry average undertake strategic reorientation 
when compared with firms that perform above their industry average (Lant, Milliken and 
Batra, 1992). Poor performing firms undertake more strategic change initiatives (Boeker, 
1997) and change their domain more often (Ketchen and Palmer, 1999) than other firms.     
In terms of their internal firm characteristics, when compared to well performing 
firms, poorly performing ones adopt more centralized decision making structure (Singh, 
1986), have lower slack  (Singh, 1986), are more likely to add high technologies (Ketchen 
and Palmer, 1999) are more likely to delete high technologies (Ketchen and Palmer, 1999) 
and take more risks (Bromiley, 1991; Singh, 1986). Among poor performers, the firms with 
greater expectations (Bromiley, 1991) and greater aspirations (Bromiley, 1991) increase their 
risk taking further.     
Despite the great differences between poor and strong performers, there are also 
similarities. Businesses with substandard performance and those with good performance do 
not differ in terms of market stability, buyer fragmentation, and supplier integration. Poorly 
performing businesses also do not differ from well performing businesses in terms of the 
percentage of internal sales, percentage of shared manufacturing facilities, percentage of 
shared marketing distribution channels and shared marketing programs (Woo, 1983). 
Contrary to expectations, the two groups of firms share some similarities in their strategic 
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 characteristics, such as relative new product emphasis, relative product breadth, percentage 
of revenue invested in process R&D, percentage of revenue invested in product R&D, 
relative backward vertical integration, relative forward vertical integration, relative 
advertising, and relative sales force (Woo, 1983).   
In summary, poorly performing businesses and well performing businesses vary in 
certain dimensions (e.g. focus on auxiliary services, domain change initiatives, product price, 
product quality and risk taking) and are similar in certain other dimensions (e.g. product 
focus and breadth, and product and process innovation). The finding that poor performing 
firms and businesses take more risks indicates that they are likely to change their search 
routines in order to respond to decline. However, the evidence that poor performing firms 
and businesses do not differ from their well performing counterparts in terms of product 
focus and breadth suggests that both declining firms and surviving firms might demonstrate 
inertia in their search routines.                                             
4.3 Comparing financially constrained firms and financially unconstrained firms 
Financially constrained firms are those that face problems in raising external capital 
(Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). A firm will be classified as financially constrained if it cannot 
make an investment because of the high cost of acquiring external funds or the lack of 
availability of external fund (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). Not all financially constrained 
firms are financially distressed. For example, a firm holding a high amount of cash on hand 
may be financially constrained but not financially distressed (Haldlock and Pierce, 2010). 
This is because a firm with a high amount of cash can use that cash to fund expansions, such 
as increase its existing search routines, at least in the short run. Therefore, this firm with a 
high amount of cash is not financially distressed. However, for major expansions, such as 
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 increasing the number of product lines and increasing the number of products developed, the 
same firm may need to borrow from external sources. If the firm is financially constrained, 
then it cannot borrow adequate finances from external sources.  
How differently do financially constrained firms and unconstrained firms behave? 
Financially constrained firms hoard cash (Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004). Cash 
hoarding is costly because holding cash leads to reduction in investments (Almeida et al., 
2004). These firms exhibit a positive cash flow sensitivity of cash; i.e., they show a 
systematic propensity to save cash inflows (Almeida et al., 2004). This cash flow sensitivity 
of cash increases during recession (Almeida et al., 2004). They do not undertake acquisitions 
and do not give out dividends (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). In contrast, financially 
unconstrained firms do not show a propensity to save cash and do not change their cash 
saving behavior in response to recession (Almeida et al., 2004). They invest to a greater 
extent on acquisitions (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). Relative to financially unconstrained 
firms, financially constrained firms have lower investments, less sales growth, lower interest 
coverage, higher debt as a proportion of total capital, lower unused line, lower value of slack 
as a proportion of capital, and lower change in debt as a proportion of capital (Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1997). Financially constrained and unconstrained firms are similar in terms of 
dividends as a proportion of capital and equity issue as a proportion of capital (Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1997).   
In summary, financially constrained and unconstrained firms differ mainly in their 
cash use and investment behavior. Financially constrained firms have a relatively 
disadvantaged position.   If declining firms are financially unconstrained, they might access 
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 external funds to increase their search routines, and are likely to be in an advantageous 
position than declining firms that cannot access external funds.   
4.4 Comparing non-turnarounds and successful turnaround firms 
Turnaround firms are those firms that exhibit “a substantial and sustained positive 
change” following a period of deteriorating financial performance (Bibeault, 1982:18). In 
contrast, non-turnarounds are those firms that do not exhibit improvement of their 
deteriorating financial performance. Prior scholars have examined the differences between 
non-turnarounds and successful turnaround firms. These firms differ from each other in the 
following broad categories: (1) strategic change variables, and (2) firms’ financial variables.    
Non-turnarounds differed from successfully turned around firms (or businesses) in 
terms of two broad categories: efficiency strategies, and recovery strategies. Efficiency 
strategies involve retrenchment or cutbacks in such areas as asset reduction, cost reduction, 
and investment reduction in marketing and research and development.  
Compared to successful turnarounds, non-turnarounds use cutback strategies to a 
greater extent (about seventy three percent of non-turnarounds versus about fifty eight 
percent of turnarounds) (Arogyaswamy and Yasai-Ardekani, 1997). The firms that fail to 
turnaround employ cutbacks in product development (Zimmerman, 1989) and R&D 
expenditures (Hambrick and Schecter, 1983). Relative to successful turnarounds, non-
turnarounds are less successful in improving employee productivity (Chowdhury and Lang, 
1996; Francis and Desai, 2005; Hambrick and Schecter, 1983) and capital productivity 
(Francis and Desai, 2005). Non-turnarounds do poorly in improving overall efficiency 
(Arogyaswamy and Yasai-Ardekani, 1997), inventory efficiency (Zimmerman, 1989) and 
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 factory efficiency (Zimmerman, 1989). Non-turnarounds carry out more divestitures 
especially of losing businesses (O’Neill, 1986a; Zimmerman, 1989), do not sustain their cost 
reductions (Zimmerman, 1989), and do not achieve low cost production (Zimmerman, 1989).  
Findings about the role of retrenchment in the process of turnaround are mixed.  A 
majority of scholars found that retrenchment (both asset and cost retrenchment) is central to 
effective turnaround (Bruton, Ahlstrom and Wan, 2003; Chowdhury and Lang, 1996; Francis 
and Desai, 2005; Hambrick and Schecter, 1983; Robbins and Pearce, 1992). However, a few 
scholars did not find evidence that retrenchment is central to turnaround (Fisher, Lee and 
Johns, 2004; Hambrick and Schecter, 1983). In fact, Barker and Mone (1994) and Smith and 
Graves (2005) even report that non-turnarounds adopted retrenchment strategies (asset and 
cost retrenchment) too aggressively.  
Relative to successfully turned around firms, non-turnarounds carry out more 
mergers, bring fewer differentiated products to the market, bring out fewer innovations, 
innovate less and ignore product quality (Zimmerman, 1989). Non-turnarounds also make 
frequent and abrupt changes in the positioning of their products in the market (Zimmerman, 
1989). When compared with turnarounds, non-turnarounds show reduced sales growth during 
the post-decline phase (Ramanujam, 1984), show fewer instances of increased investment in 
R&D expenditure (Arogyaswamy and Yasai-Ardekani, 1997), invest sporadically on 
expansion plans (Zimmerman, 1989), invest on new plant and equipment to a less extent 
(Hambrick and Schecter, 1983), and increase new products while at the same time decrease 
marketing expenses (Hambrick and Schecter, 1983).  
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 In terms of financial variables, when compared with turnaround firms, non-
turnaround firms have greater financial distress (Francis and Desai, 2005; Smith and Graves, 
2005), lower profitability (Smith and Graves, 2005) especially during the recovery period 
(Zimmerman, 1989), low levels of liquidity (Smith and Graves, 2005) and more urgent 
decline (i.e. more severe and more sudden decline) (Francis and Desai, 2005). During the 
pre-decline phase, non-turnarounds have lower levels of performance, lower rates of growth 
in net income and lower leverage (Ramanujam, 1984). The inventory characteristics of 
turnarounds and non-turnarounds differ. Non-turnarounds have higher levels of inventory as 
a proportion of sales (Poston, Harmon and Gramlich, 1994) and faster growth of inventory as 
a proportion of sales (Ramanujam, 1984) than successfully turned around firms. In addition, 
non-turnarounds have higher plant and equipment levels (Chowdhury and Lang, 1996) and 
lower operating profit margins (Pant, 1986). 
Relative to successful turnarounds, non-turnaround firms have greater non cost-of-
sales expense as a percentage of revenue (Zimmerman, 1989), a greater dependence on 
external finances during the decline phase (Ramanujam, 1984), faster growth of receivables 
as a proportion of sales (Ramanujam, 1984), high level of overhead as a proportion of 
earning assets (O’Neill, 1986b), higher loan income as a proportion of gross loans (O’Neill, 
1986b), lower levels of total liabilities as a proportion of total capital (Poston, Harmon and 
Gramlich, 1994) and lower levels of accounts payable (Chowdhury and Lang, 1996). The 
debt levels of turnaround firms grow at a faster rate than non-turnaround firms during the 
pre-decline and decline phases. However, during the turnaround phase the turnaround firms 
reduce their dependence on debt (Ramanujam, 1984). During the pre-decline, decline and 
post-decline phases, the capital intensity of the average turnaround firms remain more or less 
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 constant whereas that of the average non-turnarounds increase progressively (Ramanujam, 
1984). In the pre-decline phase, turnarounds and non-turnarounds have about the same ratio 
of retained earnings-to-equity. However, the value of this variable deteriorates faster for non-
turnarounds than successful turnarounds during the decline phase (Ramanujam, 1984). 
Turnaround firms as well as non-turnarounds reduce their losses but the turnaround firms’ 
reduction of losses is typically more pronounced, more internally focused and last much 
longer (Zimmerman, 1989).    
Turnarounds and non-turnarounds share similarities in the percentage of free assets 
(Smith and Graves, 2005), pre-decline sales growth (Ramanujam, 1984), growth rate of total 
assets (Ramanujam, 1984), growth rate of invested capital (Ramanujam, 1984), rate of 
growth of total assets as a proportion of total sales (Ramanujam, 1984), change in accounts 
receivables (Bruton, Ahlstrom and Wan, 2003), income as a proportion of total capital 
(Poston, Harmon and Gramlich, 1994), sales as a proportion of net plant (Poston, Harmon 
and Gramlich, 1994), receivables as a proportion of inventory (Poston, Harmon and 
Gramlich, 1994), quick ratio (Poston, Harmon and Gramlich, 1994) and cash as a proportion 
of total assets (Poston, Harmon and Gramlich, 1994).     
In this section, I have mentioned previous findings that identified the differences 
between non-turnaround and turnaround firms. Non-turnarounds are worse than turnaround 
firms in several aspects, including efficiency improvement, innovation, productivity 
improvement and cost reduction. Surprisingly, non-turnarounds are similar to turnarounds in 
several aspects, such as the volatility and concentration of their industries, and available slack 
(as measured by quick ratio). Scholars do not agree whether retrenchment is central to 
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 turnaround, whether acquisitions facilitate turnaround, and whether turnaround firms 
undertake financial restructurings to a greater extent than non-turnarounds.        
4.5 Common themes and differences in the comparative literature on organizational 
decline 
In this chapter, I have reviewed four sets of comparative studies on organizational 
decline. These include comparisons between: (1) bankrupt firms and non-bankrupts, (2) poor 
performing firms (or businesses) and well performing ones, (3) financially constrained firms 
and financially unconstrained ones, and (4) non-turnarounds and successful turnarounds. The 
review confirms typical expectations that bankrupt firms are worse off than non-bankrupts, 
poor performing firms (or businesses) are worse off than well performing ones, financially 
constrained firms are worse off than financially unconstrained ones and non-turnarounds are 
worse off than successful turnarounds. Given these stark contrasts, we might expect that 
declining firms exhibit rigid behaviors consistently. 
Somewhat surprisingly, there are many similarities between these sets of firms 
(Refer: Table 4.1). Given the similarities, organizational decline, poor performance and 
financial constraints need not lead to threat rigidity. Instead, these adverse conditions can 
prove to be opportunities for firms to rejuvenate themselves. Declining firms engage in 
strategic change initiatives as do surviving firms (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988).  Managers 
within declining firms do take strategic actions that are valued identically to those taken by 
surviving firms. Declining firms do try to adapt.      
More specifically, both bankrupts and non-bankrupts have similar average number of 
domain initiatives in the ten years prior to bankruptcy (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988). Both 
sets of firms change their primary industry in the last five years prior to bankruptcy 
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 (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988). Declining and surviving firms also engage in similar levels 
of diversification (Sheppard, 1994), joint ventures (Sheppard, 1994), and plant closings, 
layoffs and downsizing of assets (Khanna and Poulsen, 1995). Declining firms are not always 
threat rigid. Hence, these findings support behavioral theory and the prospect theory 
predictions regarding organizational decline. Managers become risk seeking and undertake 
suitable change initiatives. This suggests that the search routines within declining firms are 
likely to be changed in order to improve the deteriorating conditions within the firms.         
Rather than managerial rigidity, contextual conditions may explain firm failure. My 
review of financial characteristics, as they relate to the difference between good and poor 
performance or survival and failure, point to the key role that slack plays. Relative to 
surviving firms, declining firms have low levels of potential slack and similar levels of 
available slack. Potential slack allows a firm to borrow money from external sources to fund 
expansions in resource-crunched search routines. Potential slack also allows a firm to access 
external finances to increase search routines. Because declining firms have low levels of 
potential slack, they are likely to get restricted access to expand their search routines. 
However, available slack in the form of cash and excess personnel can be used in the short-
term to enhance search routines.     
4.6 The gaps in this literature and the central research problem in this study 
If both declining and surviving firms engage in change initiatives, then why do some 
declining firms end up in bankruptcy? What are the underlying factors that prior scholars 
have not captured that may answer this question? My contention is that firm adaptation 
requires a change in search routines. The form of change in search routines will be affected 
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 by the amount and type of slack resources in the firm’s possession, the time phases in the 
decline period, and the interaction between time and slack.
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 CHAPTER 5: ORGANIZATIONAL ROUTINES AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
DECLINE 
This dissertation is a study of how organizations change (or fail to change) during 
conditions of organizational decline. Here, in this chapter, I briefly review the concept of 
routines. I describe research and development as search routine which might lead to effective 
responses to decline. The effective response may not occur if the search routine is rigid (as 
suggested by threat-rigidity theory).  As will be noted, even when search occurs (as proposed 
by behavioral theories of the firm), successful adaptation might not occur, due to the nature 
of selection pressures. 
5.1 Definitions and classification of organizational routines 
While organizational routines have been defined in a variety of ways, three 
definitions stand out: (1) organizational routines as recurrent behavioral patterns (Pentland 
and Rueter, 1994), (2) organizational routines as productive ways of doing specific activities 
(March and Simon, 1958), and (3) organizational routines as dispositions stored within 
organizations that allow specific actions to be carried out when triggered by the same stimuli 
(Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010). Interestingly, these definitions need not be mutually 
exclusive. Especially, the first two definitions (behavioral regularities and productive 
techniques) are complementary (Nelson, 2009).   
Nelson and Winter (1982) identified three main types of routines: operating routines, 
investment routines and search routines. Operating routines represent the day-to-day 
activities within the firms. Such routines are relatively stable. Examples of operating routines 
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 are hiring routines and purchasing routines. Investment routines involve decision making 
about the firm’s capital stock. Such routines change when the decision making environment 
changes. Examples of investment routines are price setting routines and routines for raising 
debt. Search routines foster change in the existing routines. Such routines lead to forms of 
change. Examples of search routines include bench-marking best practices and exploration 
(i.e. searching for new knowledge that can help improve the current routine). 
Dosi, Teece and Winter (1992) define routines as static or dynamic routines. Static 
routines are the ones that are relatively stable. However, static routines can improve with 
repetition if learning occurs. In contrast, dynamic routines are the ones that are created to 
promote change. They are directed towards learning, new product development and new 
process development. The search routines that I examine in this study are dynamic routines 
that should enable change in the organization.   
Search routines may be meta-routines, a hierarchy of nested operating routines. Meta-
routines create dynamic capabilities that extend, modify or create ordinary capabilities and 
allow firms to respond to changing conditions (Winter, 2003). The search routines that I 
examine in this study may be capable of creating new capabilities for declining 
organizations.  
5.2 Stability and/or change in organizational routines  
While organizational routines may be stable and rarely change (Gersick and 
Hackman, 1990; Gilbert, 2005), they may also change if and when required (Becker, Lazaric, 
Nelson and Winter, 2005; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Organizational routines are stable 
because routines are like genes (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Routines are like genes because 
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 they are inherited over generations of the same firm. They are also like genes, because when 
organizations expand either organically or by acquiring other firms, current routines are 
inherited in the expanded parts of the firm.  
Routines represent truces among the organization members. Therefore, attempts at 
changing routines may create conflicts among the organization members. Because conflicts 
are often difficult to solve without time and money, they are best avoided by preserving the 
current routines. Additionally, organizational routines constitute organizational memory. 
Since the concept of memory enables continuity, reliability and persistence, organizational 
routines are stable. Managers try to control organizational routines and minimize their 
disruptions. Hence, an organization continues with its existing repertoire of organizational 
routines.  
Organizational routines create generative structures of specific activities by groups of 
people (Pentland and Feldman, 2005). Such activities are embedded within a network of the 
overall organizational structure. Therefore, agency (i.e. the role of each individual actor) and 
structure are central to the construct of organizational routines. Agency can inhibit change in 
routines because any change by one routine actor requires the approval of other routine 
actors. Organizational structure is typically inertial (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Therefore, 
routines embedded within structures tend to be stable.            
Yet organizational routines may change when the external or the internal 
organizational environment changes. An example of external environmental change is the 
birth of a new allied industry, such as the birth of biotechnology firms within the 
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 pharmaceutical industry. An example of internal environmental change is change in the 
power equation within a firm.     
According to evolutionary theory (Nelson and Winter, 1982), organizational routines 
change mainly through the mechanisms of variation, selection, retention, mutation and 
adaptation. The first three mechanisms of: variation, selection and retention can be explained 
together. An organization contains a repertory of organizational routines. Selection 
mechanisms work on the variety of organizational routines performed in an organization. 
Selection mechanisms include both external and internal selection mechanisms. The routines 
that are selected are retained in the organization. In contrast, the routines that are not selected 
are not retained in the organizational repertory. Hence, these routines are less likely to be 
used in the future. The fourth mechanism: mutation of routines occurs either through 
imperfect replication or imperfect imitation. Replication is the process of copying 
organizational routines from one part of the organization to another part of the organization 
(Szulanski, 1996). However, exact replication is often very difficult, especially when 
organization members do not get to see a working version of the original routine (Szulanski 
and Winter, 2002). Therefore, most replicated routines are altered versions of the original 
routine. Just like replication, imitation involves copying of an organizational routine. 
However, imitation is the process of copying an organizational routine of another firm. In the 
absence of direct cooperation between two firms, most imitation lacks a working template of 
the original routine (Nelson and Winter, 1982:123). Therefore, imitation of an organizational 
routine also results in an altered version of the original routine. And, finally the fifth 
mechanism: adaptation occurs in organizational routines when there is a recognized need for 
minor adjustments to the original routine in the new context. Adaptation typically involves 
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 local adaptation of the original routine (Winter, Szulanski, Ringov and Jensen, 2012), as 
contrasted to the creation of a new routine.  
Organizational routines change mainly through the mechanisms of learning, ad-hoc 
problem solving and search (Cyert and March, 1963). The first mechanism learning occurs 
when organization members receive feedback about the performance of the current routines 
(Levitt and March, 1988). If the performance outcome of a routine falls below the aspired 
level of performance, then the routine is likely to be changed. Therefore, learning typically 
leads to incremental changes in current routines. The second mechanism, ad-hoc problem 
solving occurs when organization members attempt to cater to the short-term need to change 
a routine (Winter, 2003). This involves investing minimal amount of time and energy to fix 
the troubled routine to make it run. The final mechanism, search, involves guided effort by 
organization members to look for a suitable replacement of the current routine or for suitable 
replacements for sub-routines of the current routine. Search is typically of the satisficing 
variety rather than of the optimizing variety. Search also tends to be local. This implies that 
organization members search for suitable alternative routines in the neighborhood of the 
existing routines. They, then adopt the alternative routine that is merely sufficient for their 
needs (Cyert and March, 1963).  
What triggers the variation or adaptation of routines? What creates learning and 
problem solving? Does variation or learning occur in failing firms? Conditions that are 
internal to the firm and foster change in routines include a collapse of the truce between 
organizational coalitions, changes in management or power, changes in the top management 
team, turnover of key personnel and losses incurred from the sale of outputs of routines.  
Each of these conditions is relevant in the discussion of organizational routines within 
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 declining firms. First, declining firms often have conflicts between different organizational 
coalitions (Cameron, Whetten and Kim, 1987) that lead to collapse of truces. Second, 
declining firms often experience the exit of top management team (Boeker, 1997; Hambrick 
and D’Aveni, 1992). Finally, declining firms have many loss-making routines that impact 
their overall financial performance.  
When truces collapse, the organizational hierarchy tries to impose an order to 
establish coherence and improve profitability. Profitability drops because conflict leads to 
increase in coordination costs. In such conditions of high conflict, motivation and 
performance are hampered (Lazaric and Raybaut, 2005). Resolution of the conflict may 
require the creation of a new routine (Zbaracki and Bergen, 2010). 
Organizational routines also represent the power dynamics of firms. Organizational 
context and agency interact because some individuals have more power than others (Howard-
Grenville, 2005). In such conditions, groups can play a prominent role in the selection 
process of routines by politically struggling for managerial attention and favorable resource 
allocation. Conflicts are likely to emerge in such situations (Lazaric and Raybaut, 2005). 
Typically, powerful groups play the role of a selection mechanism. They tend to 
differentially select organizational routines based on their own perceptions of what is good 
for the organization (Loch, Sengupta and Ahmad, 2013).  
Changes in the top management team include hiring of new managers and reshuffling 
of existing managers. New managers question established routines because they are not 
socialized into the existing ways of thinking and acting within the firm. New managers bring 
in different sets of routinized activities because of their prior professional training (Strang 
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 and Soule, 1998), association with professional networking organizations and their academic 
training. The reshuffling of managers within a firm extends the manager’s legacy routines 
into novel areas, leading to some forms of mutation and adaptation.  
Memory loss due to turnover of key personnel (Becker, 2005a) with valuable 
idiosyncratic and tacit knowledge (e.g. effective customer relations and understanding of key 
customer needs) may result in routine contraction. When a new employee is hired to replace 
the key personnel, she or he may take some time to acquire relevant knowledge (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982:115). In many cases, the replacement may never acquire the same level of 
knowledge as the old employee. In such cases, routine actors may change their respective 
roles in order to accommodate the replacement and to bring the organizational routine to a 
suitable level of performance. Such changes represent mutation of the existing routine 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982:115-116). Such a loss of valuable personnel may even reduce the 
competitive advantage gained from the skilled use of the existing organizational routine 
(Aime, Johnson, Ridge and Hill, 2010).  
When an organizational routine incurs losses, the organization is not likely to 
continue performing the routine, at least not in the same scale. Typically, the organization 
then searches for a suitable replacement routine. But, if the organization perceives the 
adverse circumstances as temporary, then it shrinks or contracts the routine. A series of such 
contractions can ultimately lead to the death of the routine. If the adversity continues, then 
the organization either halts the routine or looks for a suitable replacement routine (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982:122). 
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 5.3 Search routines: stable or dynamic?  
Search routines are higher-level organizational routines that are intended to bring 
about change in other organizational routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). These routines are 
dynamic routines in the sense that they change often (Dosi, Teece and Winter, 1992). Using 
these search routines, firms search over a knowledge space (Katila, 2002). The search 
routines result in finding of alternative solutions to the existing routines of the firm.  
Firms engage in search routines only when conditions are unsatisfactory, such as 
firms are not sufficiently profitable (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
Search is satisficing. This means that a search for alternatives is stopped the moment a 
reasonable solution is found (Knudsen, 2008). Typically, a search solution is accepted when 
the general cost and return constraints are satisfied and key people in management support 
the alternative (Cyert and March, 1963). Decision makers within firms satisfice because of 
limited human capacity to process information. They start searching for an alternative 
solution when only a significant problem appears else they continue with their existing 
routines. They consider choice alternatives in a sequential manner. However, the process of 
sequential evaluation of alternatives stops short of an optimal solution (Knudsen and 
Levinthal, 2007). There is a hierarchy of search activities. If one search fails, the firm then 
proceeds to the next (Cyert and March, 1963). Search is guided by the existing routines of the 
firm (Cyert and March, 1963:224). 
There are three fundamental characteristics of search. First, search is irreversible i.e. 
whatever is found by search is found. Second, search is contingent i.e. search can find only 
whatever is available to find. Third, search involves fundamental uncertainty i.e. it is very 
difficult to deterministically predict the solutions of search a priori.    
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 There are many classifications of search, such as problemistic search, and slack 
search; local search and distant search; and experiential search and cognitive search. 
Problemistic search is stimulated by a specific problem and it is directed toward finding a 
solution to that problem (Cyert and March, 1963:169). Typically problemistic search happens 
when the firm’s actual performance falls below its aspiration (Chen, 2008). Chen and Miller 
(2007) found that search intensity increases when firm’s performance falls below its 
aspiration level.  Chen (2008) found that a firm’s problem-driven search activity increases 
when it feels unlikely to achieve the performance target for another year. A firm’s search 
activity decreases when it expects to improve its performance from an underperforming 
situation to an outperforming situation.  
Problemistic search is motivated by a specific problem. A problem is realized when 
the firm fails to satisfy one or more of its goals. Such a specific problem is solved either by 
finding an alternative that satisfies the goals or by revising the goals in order to make a 
solution acceptable. Search continues as long as the problem is not solved (Cyert and March, 
1963). 
Problemistic search is guided by simple heuristics, such as “search near the symptoms 
and search near the existing set of organizational routines” (Greve, 2008). When these 
heuristics do not lead to a satisfying outcome of search, then decision makers engage in more 
complex search. They then employ the differing heuristic: “search in the organizationally 
vulnerable areas” (Cyert and March, 1963). Problemistic search is also biased because search 
is based on the training, experience and goals of decision makers of the firm (Cyert and 
March, 1963).     
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 Slack search occurs when organizational slack exists (Levinthal and March, 1981; 
Greve, 2008). Organizational slack consists of excess resources within an organization 
(Singh, 1986). Slack relaxes the managers’ control of research and development projects and 
encourages experimentation and exploration (Bourgeois, 1981). Chen and Miller (2007) 
found that slack is positively related to search. 
Local search leads to solutions that are nearest to the current routines (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). Through local search, a firm seeks to incrementally improve its current 
routines. Local search indicates that current research activities are closely related to prior 
research activities (Fleming and Sorenson, 2004). For example, in drug discovery, 
researchers identify a potential drug candidate by luck or by screening. They, then, use local 
search to find commercially viable drug candidates by slightly altering the new drug 
candidate (Fleming and Sorenson, 2004). Local search is most commonly seen because 
managerial attention is scarce (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972; Ocasio, 1997). Hence, firms 
search in a limited number of domains that are near to the existing routines (Miller and 
Arikan, 2004). Local search starts from where past searches left off (Stuart and Podolny, 
1996). This allows firms to save a lot of up-front investments (Winter, Cattani and Dorsch, 
2007). Search is most often local because firms tend to be more successful in areas where 
they already have experience (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989).     
Distant search involves more complex search. Distant search yields to solutions that 
are far away from the current routines (March, 1991). The returns from distant search are 
more uncertain than the results from local search (March, 1991). For example, an inventor 
engages in distant search when he or she tries completely new combinations or components 
(Fleming, 2001).      
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 Experiential search is mainly based on the prior experience of organizational 
members (Narduzzo and Warglien, 2008). The rules that guide experiential search are based 
on the experience of decision makers. These rules are revised based on the feedback received 
of earlier rules and their search outcomes. This is why experiential search reflects 
incremental trial-and-error learning. Experiential search is also called backward looking 
search (Chen, 2008; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Organizational 
structure, processes and personnel shape the context for resource allocation decisions. 
Reallocations for search are made by revising previous allocations (Miller and Arikan, 2004). 
Cognitive search is mainly based on the decision makers’ understanding about the 
future (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). For example, in the case of Polaroid, though 
management invested heavily in digital technologies, their belief in the “razor/blade” 
business model delayed commercialization of a stand-alone digital camera product (Tripsas 
and Gavetti, 2000). Cognitive search is also called forward-looking search. This is because 
the alternatives identified through search are evaluated based on the decision makers’ 
cognitive maps about the future (Chen, 2008). To illustrate, in drug discovery, the discovery 
of a new molecule with the required characteristics is based on the cognitive understanding 
about the characteristics of the molecule that will aid in treating a specific disease (Dosi, 
Faillo and Marengo, 2008). Cognitive search allows search to be guided toward a preferred 
direction. The preferred direction can be a combination of cognitive representations, such as 
prior information, foresight, causal understanding, and heuristic principles (Winter, Cattani 
and Dorsch, 2007). 
Frequently, organizations adopt a form of institutionalized search within a department 
or an organizational unit, such as a research and development (R&D) department. This is 
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 institutionalized search (Greve, 2008), which refers to the ongoing routinized search of firms. 
Search by organizational sub-units such as R&D and marketing may respond to ongoing 
mandates of the firm. R&D resource allocation can be routinized. For example, R&D 
expenditures may be decided on a fixed percentage of sales (Chen and Miller, 2007; Greve, 
2003).  
In this dissertation, I study institutionalized forms of search, that is, research and 
development, in an attempt to learn whether this routine, often described as a dynamic 
routine, responds in a stable or dynamic way in a declining firm. 
5.4 Gaps that remain unaddressed 
Do organizational routines change? If they change, then under what conditions do 
they change? In this study, I attempt to answer this question in the context of failing firms.  I 
examine changes in search routines in declining firms and compare them with changes in 
search routines of surviving firms. Prior research suggests that declining firms can exhibit 
either threat rigidity or adaptive change.  In Chapter 2, I have discussed about that body of 
literature in details. In my empirical examination, I compare and contrast threat rigidity 
(Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981) and the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 
1963), which make different predictions about the actions of managers or firms.      
I suggest that the search activity can be stable (in keeping with threat rigidity theory) 
and it can be dynamic (in keeping with the behavioral theory of the firm). The variance in 
response is dependent on the context of the decline, where context is measured as time, slack, 
and the interaction of time and slack. With respect to routines, the time and slack provide the 
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 means for the search routine to move through its legacy heuristics before engaging in forms 
of distant search.  
An important related question is whether the learning reflects effective managerial 
adaptation or random variation and selection. While this second question cannot be answered 
directly, a finding of a high correlation between adaptive responses and survival or between 
rigid responses and failure might be evidence of the possibility of effective managerial 
adaptation.
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 CHAPTER 6: HYPOTHESES 
In this chapter, I develop a set of hypotheses that compare and contrast two key 
theories on organizational decline: (1) The threat rigidity theory (Staw, Sandelands and 
Dutton, 1981), and (2) The behavioral theory of a firm (Cyert and March, 1963). Here, I 
examine the search routines, using R&D expenditures and patent counts as measures of 
search, of failed firms and surviving matched-pairs.  I, further, examine how the passage of 
time towards bankruptcy (that is, the five year period preceding the point of bankruptcy) 
affects the search routines of the failed firms. In addition, I examine how organizational slack 
affects the changes in the search routines of these firms. Finally, I  examine how the 
interaction of organizational slack and time affects the search routine of these firms. The two 
theories compete to explain some of the micro-foundations of routines (Devinney, 2013). In 
effect, the theories suggest opposite responses to perceptions of decline. While there are 
many different explanations for the different predictions, two explanations are relevant to this 
dissertation.  First, the two theories differ in their assumptions about decision maker’s 
response to decline. The threat-rigidity school builds on the assumption of an automated, 
instinctive response, while the behavioral theory of the firms describes a choice based 
response. Different individuals may respond in different ways to the same signal. Put 
differently, decline signals trigger interpretive responses that vary with the decision maker. 
Second, the size of the threat matters, relative to the resources that a firm has to respond to 
the threat. The presence of slack will influence the interpretive process.  
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 The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. At the beginning, I develop the 
argument for hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 compares the search routines of failed firms with the 
search routines of surviving firms in each of the five years immediately preceding bankruptcy 
filing. This hypothesis is based on the arguments and research drawn from the threat rigidity 
school of scholars. At the end of this discussion, I state Hypothesis 1.  
Next, I develop the argument for Hypothesis 2.  Hypothesis 2 also examines the 
differences in search routines of failed firms and surviving firms in each of the five years 
prior to bankruptcy filing. However, this hypothesis offers a contrasting perspective to 
Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 is based on insights from scholars following the behavioral 
theory of a firm school.  
Next, I formally develop the argument for Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4, which 
examine how search routines of declining firms change over the five years prior to 
bankruptcy filing. I base these hypotheses on the discussions of the threat rigidity school of 
scholars (Hypothesis 3) and the behavioral theory of the firm (Hypothesis 4). Where the first 
two hypotheses contrast the patterns of routine change for failed and surviving firms, these 
two subsequent hypotheses test the relationship between the failing firms’ performance in the 
years prior to bankruptcy and change in the subsequent year of the search routines.  
Then, Hypothesis 5 examines the effect of organizational slack on the search routines 
of all firms (both declining and surviving firms). Basing my discussion on prior scholars on 
organizational slack, I examine the effect of total slack, available slack, absorbed slack and 
potential slack on search routines within the two groups of firms: declining firms and 
surviving firms. Finally, I offer Hypothesis 5.  
       74
 Last but not the least, I develop the logical argument for Hypothesis 6. Hypothesis 6 
examines the effect of the interaction of organizational slack and annual calendar time on the 
search routines of all firms (declining as well as surviving). Again, I base my discussion on 
the prior evidences of scholars of organizational slack. At the end of this discussion, I state 
Hypothesis 6. 
6.1 Contrasting threat rigidity and behavioral theory perspectives 
Firms that file for bankruptcy are likely to differ from firms that survive.  There are at 
least two key theories that discuss firm or decision maker responses to decline: the threat 
rigidity theory (Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981) and the behavioral theory of a firm 
(Cyert and March, 1963). Threat rigidity theory (Staw et al., 1981) suggests that managers 
within declining firms either continue with their well-learned responses or engage in forms of 
withdrawal. In contrast, the behavioral theory of a firm (Cyert and March, 1963) suggests 
that managers within declining firms undertake change initiatives in order to bridge the gaps 
between their aspirations and their actual performances. Put differently, threat-rigidity theory 
implies that aspirations are revised downward to match performance, while behavioral theory 
suggests that managers act to change performance to refit past aspiration levels. In chapters 
2, 3 and 4, I review extensively the available studies on organizational decline. In all the 
studies that I have reviewed from the 1980s to the 2010s there is not an identifiable pattern of 
evidence supporting either the threat-rigidity perspective or the behavioral theory of the firm. 
The industry context, firm type (public organizations, for-profit organizations and 
universities) and time period do not indicate whether firms will be threat rigid or whether 
firms will engage in search for remedy. Given the equivocal findings,  it may be useful  to 
contrast the two perspectives of threat rigidity (Staw et al., 1981) and behavioral theory of the 
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 firm (Cyert and March, 1963) in the US Chemical and Allied Products Industry (SIC: 2800), 
and attempt to identify contextual  variables that might explain the differences in results. The 
contextual variables I use include slack and time.  
The two contrasting theories of threat rigidity (Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981) 
and behavioral theory of a firm (Cyert and March, 1963) mainly uses different levels of 
analyses. The threat rigidity theory (Staw et al., 1981) is based on individual psychological 
reasoning. In contrast, the behavioral theory of a firm (Cyert and March, 1963) mainly 
includes business-level or firm-level analysis and is based on early administrative science 
(Barnard, 1938) and economics (Alchian, 1950; Schumpeter, 1934; Schumpeter, 1942). Here, 
however, I focus on developing hypotheses at the level of organizational routines. I examine 
the changes (or no change) in search routines of declining firms relative to those of surviving 
firms by contrasting the propositions of the two key theories. I use routines because a focus 
on individual decision making may be too reductionist (Winter, 2013), while a focus on the 
firm level may aggregate decisions across heterogeneous routines. The specific routines 
studied are research and patenting. Research is a measure of a general set of routines, while 
patenting is a measure of a related but narrower set of routines.      
6.2 Threat rigidity in failed firms and surviving firms 
Declining firms face the threat of failure and therefore, rely on its habituated ways of 
action and on existing organizational routines (Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981). Under 
the conditions of impending bankruptcy, managers of declining firms reduce the number of 
alternatives considered. Such reduction in alternatives leads to restriction in information 
processing, and conservation of resources.  
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 Prior scholars found evidence of the following three types of threat rigidity within 
declining organizations: (1) Restriction in information processing: by reducing newer paths 
of search and by sticking to existing ways of doing things, (2) Constriction of control: by 
increasing centralization within the organization, which in turn introduces hurdles for making 
changes if, when and where needed, and (3) Conservation of resources: cost cutting and 
efforts to not increase spending in new developments (Sutton and D’Aunno, 1989). Each of 
these seems to suggest that search routines of declining firms will be less than those of 
surviving firms. Confirming their theory, D'Aunno and Sutton (1992) found evidence of 
threat rigidity in seventy two randomly selected drug abuse treatment organizations when 
these organizations faced financial adversity. They found that these declining organizations 
used existing procedures more rigidly and conserved their resources. Such rigid use of 
procedures led to restriction of information processing.    
Many organizational decline studies seem to suggest that declining firms inhibit 
innovation and instead concentrate on efficiency improvement (Cameron, 1983; Hambrick 
and Schecter, 1983).  Declining firms show signs of strategic paralysis (D’Aveni, 1989a) and 
maladaptation (Greenhalgh, 1983). They take few domain initiatives. For example: they 
engage in few mergers and acquisitions (D’Aveni, 1989a). They also downsize their 
operations by liquidations and divestitures (D’Aveni, 1989a). Cameron, Whetten and Kim 
(1987) found that declining organizations reduce their innovation and they resist change by 
rejecting new alternatives. They also found that declining organizations cater to short-term 
needs and avoid long-term planning. Perceived threats of failure lead managers of firms to be 
more conservative and to take more internally directed actions (Chattopadhyay, Glick and 
Huber, 2001). Managers of declining firms then act in domains in which their organizations 
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 have greatest control. Managers within declining firms try to stick to their well-learned 
responses and avoid change in their organizational routines. We can expect, then, that 
declining firms have fewer search routines when compared to surviving firms.    
Many early studies of organizational decline discuss about the necessity of 
retrenchment or cut-back within declining organizations. Effective management of decline 
necessarily involves management of the process of retrenchment (Behn, 1988; Hardy, 1988).  
Cutback management involves reduction in the current scale of operations, such as: 
downsizing of units and terminating programs (Hardy, 1990; Levine, 1978). Such cutback 
strategies allow many declining firms to improve their operational efficiencies (Levine, 1979; 
Levine, 1985; McKinley, Cheng and Schick, 1986). Efficiency improvement strategies work 
because declining firms have declining sales compared to surviving firms (D’Aveni, 1989b; 
Moulton, Thomas and Pruett, 1996). Declining firms also have accelerating cost problems 
compared to surviving firms (D’Aveni, 1989b; Zimmerman, 1989).  
Managers of declining firms tend to engage in asset retrenchment, such as: 
liquidations of a few plants, and divestiture of some production divisions (Bruton, Ahlstrom 
and Wan, 2003; Chowdhury and Lang, 1996; Robbins and Pearce, 1992). Some declining 
firms engage in liquidations and divestitures (D’Aveni, 1989a; O’Neill, 1986a; Zimmerman, 
1989). Declining firms even shrink their current domains of expertise (Bozeman and Slusher, 
1979). In order to improve operational efficiency, some managers of declining firms rely 
more on routinized procedures (Cameron, 1983; Sutton and D’Aunno, 1989). These 
efficiency improvement measures are often directed by short-term goals (Cameron, Whetten 
and Kim, 1987).  
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 With specific reference to research routines, declining firms have fewer people with 
R&D background in their top management team (D’Aveni, 1989a). Further, declining firms 
reduce their R&D spending (Hambrick and Schecter, 1983).  
In sum, managers of declining firms stick to learned responses or reduce their 
organizational routines. Therefore, I offer the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: The investment in search routines of declining firms will be less than 
the investment in search routines of surviving firms in each of the five years immediately 
preceding bankruptcy of failed firms, therefore:  
1a: The research and development (R&D) expenditure of declining firms will be less 
than the research and development expenditure of surviving firms in each of the five years 
immediately preceding bankruptcy of the failed firms.  
1b: The patent count of declining firms will be less than the patent counts of 
surviving firms in each of the five years immediately preceding bankruptcy of the failed 
firms. 
6.3 Adaptive change initiatives in failed firms and surviving firms 
In this study, failed firms are bankrupt firms.  I observe firm performance for five 
years prior to bankruptcy. During this period, if the behavioral theory of the firm holds, the 
soon-to-be bankrupt firms perform below their aspired performance level. These firms 
become aware of the survival point (also called the ruin point) beyond which they cannot 
sustain (March, 1988). Since these firms perform below their aspiration levels, managers 
within these firms proactively engage in adaptive change in order to improve their 
deteriorating firm finances.  
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 In this perspective, managers and operational level employees monitor and evaluate 
the current performances of their routines (Adler, Goldoftas and Levine, 1999; de Leeuw and 
van den Berg, 2011; Feldman, 2000). When a routine of a firm does not meet its aspired 
performance, the organization either incrementally improves the current routine through 
experiential learning (Denrell and March, 2001; Levitt and March, 1988) or the organization 
revises the current routine by trying out a new routine from the set of routines that exists in 
its environment. This implies that search activities are increased within declining firms. The 
organization continues the trial-and-error until it finds a routine that gives a solution that 
meets the aspiration level (Rerup and Feldman, 2011). For example: managers of declining 
firms may stop an existing loss-making routine, but they may also choose to install another 
routine that is profitable in the short-run. For example: a contraction of the routine may 
involve reduction in the research and development (R&D) spending on one project and 
another R&D project is added into the existing set of R&D projects conducted by the firm.      
Managers of declining firms may undertake more strategic change initiatives (Lant, 
Milliken and Batra, 1992), such as: diversification of their product market domains (Boeker, 
1997; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990) and increase in the variety of 
products (Manns and March, 1978; Zajac and Kraatz, 1993). Diversification entails adding 
products and product lines (Bailey, Kobayashi and MacNeill, 2008) beyond their existing 
capabilities. Such addition of products and product lines indicate that declining firms change 
their organizational routines through enhanced search activities. Some of these declining 
firms even change their primary industry (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988). Some of these 
declining firms also increase their production volume (Witteloostuijn, 1998). A few declining 
firms also add technologies (Ketchen and Palmer, 1999). Again, managers of some declining 
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 firms engage in acquisitions and expansions (Khanna and Poulsen, 1995). Similar to Khanna 
and Poulsen’s (1995) findings, Moulton, Thomas and Pruett (1996) found that some 
declining firms move to growing industries. Further, declining firms engage in enhanced 
exploitative search (Walrave, van Oorschot and Romme, 2011). Managers of declining firms 
increase their search routines in order to be better adjusted to their decline conditions. 
Therefore, I propose that relative to their matched surviving counterparts, failed firms will 
increase their search routines in each of the five years prior to their bankruptcy filing.          
With respect to specific search routines, firms under decline do engage in a greater 
extent of innovation than their matched surviving counterparts (Hundley, Jacobson and Park, 
1996; Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt and Holcomb, 2007), though the patterns may differ across 
industries (Nassimbeni, 2003; Tang, 2006). Some declining firms expand beyond their 
industry and enter new domains (Boeker, 1997), and entering the new domain enhances 
innovation.         
In sum, this perspective suggests that the search routines within declining firms will 
be more than the search routines within surviving firms in each of the five years immediately 
preceding bankruptcy filing by the declining firms. Therefore I offer the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: The investment in search routines of failed firms will be more than the 
investment in search routines of surviving firms in each of the five years immediately 
preceding bankruptcy of declining firms. 
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 2a: The research and development (R&D) expenditure of failed firms will be more 
than the research and development expenditure of surviving firms in each of the five years 
immediately preceding bankruptcy of declining firms. 
2b: The patent count of failed firms will be more than the patent counts of surviving 
firms in each of the five years immediately preceding bankruptcy of declining firms. 
Now that I have compared the search routines of the failed firms with the search 
routines of matched surviving firms, it is essential to compare how the search routines of 
failed firms change over the time of the decline. This comparison allows examination of the 
predominant notion that decline is associated with a period of deteriorating conditions (Daily, 
1996; Moulton, Thomas and Pruett, 1996). This comparison reflects the role of passage of 
time towards bankruptcy (Chen and Miller, 2007). In Hypotheses 1 and 2, I examine the 
differences in search routines of failed firms and those of matched surviving firms. In 
Hypotheses 3 and 4, I examine the differences in search routines of the failed firms from each 
year to the next during the five years immediately preceding their bankruptcy. These 
(Hypotheses 3 and 4) attempt to answer the question: Do declining firms become threat rigid 
or do they become adaptive as they move towards bankruptcy?       
6.4 Effect of time on changes in search routines of declining firms and surviving 
firms 
A firm’s response to decline is likely to vary based on the passage of time as these 
firms move closer to bankruptcy filing. Prior scholars have found that organizational routines 
follow a pace or rhythm that is based on the passage of time towards a deadline (Gersick, 
1989; Kelly and McGrath, 1985) or the mid-point of the routine (Gersick, 1989) or the end of 
a routine (Gersick and Hackman, 1990). Applying these evidences in the context of declining 
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 manufacturing firms that finally file for bankruptcy, changes in search routines of declining 
firms may follow a rhythm as the firms move toward bankruptcy, and the threat becomes 
more salient. The actions taken by managers of declining firms is based on the time at which 
they became aware of declining conditions within their firms (Furrer, Pandian and Thomas, 
2007; Pajunen, 2006). This seems to suggest that how managers vary in their interpretations 
across time is likely to trigger managerial action directed towards promoting or inhibiting 
search routines, resulting in different rhythms.    
Similar to Gersick and colleagues’ findings about the pacing of routines, D’Aveni 
(1989a) found that declining firms have different paces of depletion of their combined levels 
of managerial and financial resources. He identified three categories of declining firms: the 
sudden decliners, the gradual decliners and the lingerers. The sudden decliners depleted their 
managerial and financial resources abruptly in the two years immediately before bankruptcy. 
The gradual decliners gradually depleted their managerial and financial resources in the five 
years before bankruptcy. Finally, the lingerers delayed their bankruptcy for about six years 
while they remained with insufficient levels of managerial and financial resources. Therefore, 
D’Aveni’s (1989a) findings suggest that the association between annual calendar time and 
the combined level of managerial and financial resources is not the same for all declining 
firms.  The level of slack resources available to the firm may influence managerial reactions 
and the directions of changes in routines. And as Upton (1994) showed, routines adapt at 
different paces.                
 I propose that changes in search routines of declining firms will also have a rhythm 
as each year passes and the declining firms move toward bankruptcy. However, I offer a 
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 comparison of two contrasting perspectives (the threat rigidity theory and the behavioral 
theory of a firm) on the effect of time on the search routines of declining firms.   
6.4.1 A threat rigidity perspective on the effect of time 
According to the threat rigidity theory (Staw et al., 1981) declining firms perceive 
bankruptcy as a threat. Therefore, the closer in time to bankruptcy that the declining firms 
are, the greater is the threat of bankruptcy. Therefore, managers of declining firms are likely 
to respond differently with the passage of time towards bankruptcy.  
A wide variety of prior scholars have found evidence of increased rigidity in 
declining firms (Mone, McKinley and Barker, 1998). Such firms usually resist any kind of 
change (Denrell and March, 2001). Managers of declining firms adopt weathering-the-storm 
strategies by sticking to prior responses and routines that worked well (Nystrom and 
Starbuck, 1984). Declining public organizations restricted domain definition (Bozeman and 
Slusher, 1979). Further, declining firms reduced their R&D search intensity (Johnson, 1996) 
when they came close to bankruptcy (Chen and Miller, 2007). 
Deterioration increases over time in declining firms. Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992) 
found that the declining firms deteriorated at a non-linear, accelerating rate. They also found 
that declining firms have fewer top managers with core function expertise than surviving 
firms. They mainly measure deterioration in terms of top management characteristics of these 
firms. They found that such top management team deficiencies aggravate corporate 
deterioration. D'Aveni (1989b) found that over time declining firms worsen in terms of 
prestige, liquidity and leverage.    
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 In keeping with the threat-rigidity perspective, I propose that the declining firms will 
decrease their search routines over the last five years prior to their bankruptcy filing.  
Hypothesis 3: The investment in search routines of declining firms will decrease 
from each year to the next in the last five years prior to bankruptcy filing. 
3a: The R&D expenditure of declining firms will decrease from each year to the next 
in the last five years prior to bankruptcy filing.  
3b: The patent count of declining firms will decrease from each year to the next in the 
last five years prior to bankruptcy filing. 
6.4.2 A behavioral theory perspective on the effect of time   
By contrast, the behavioral theory school of scholars (Cyert and March, 1963; Lant 
and Mezias, 1992) discuss that poor performance creates a gap between an organization's 
actual performance and its aspirations. In order to cater to this gap, managers within such 
declining firms will initiate search routines to find solutions to organizational problems 
(Mone, McKinley and Barker, 1998). 
Based on the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963), Nelson (1981) 
suggested that declining firms produce few adjustments and respond little under small 
amounts of adversity, such as: under declining profits. However, declining firms engage in 
constructive actions and learn productively under moderate adversity, such as: under 
conditions of real losses without the threat of bankruptcy. And, finally, declining firms decay 
by responding in inappropriate ways under extreme adversity, such as: under conditions of 
the threat of bankruptcy. Over the last five years immediately preceding bankruptcy, firms 
are likely to undergo changes in the levels of adversity. Hence, over the last five years prior 
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 to bankruptcy filing, declining firms are likely to change their search behavior in an attempt 
to improve their deteriorating conditions. Nelson (1981) found that some firms reorganized 
their organizational routine. Firms searched for solutions in areas close to what they perceive 
to be the essence of the problem. For example: a sample company that manufactures 
electrical and mechanical parts adjusted its markup pricing rules. These evidences suggest 
that declining firms are likely to undertake change by increasing their search routines in the 
last five years prior to their bankruptcy filing.  
Many prior scholars found evidence of change initiatives within declining firms in the 
few years before bankruptcy filing (Boeker, 1997; Miller and Friesen, 1983). Declining 
schools undertake organizational change. Such organizational change involves an 
incremental or successive change in a wide range of activities (Koberg, 1987). Just like 
declining schools, declining liberal arts colleges lead to strategic restructuring (Zajac and 
Kraatz, 1993). Even declining departments within universities increase variety in course 
offerings, provide more attractive packaging, make courses more accessible and increase 
course benefits to a greater extent than the same departments under conditions of abundance 
(Manns and March, 1978). In addition to schools and universities, there are firms that show 
evidences of attempts at change under decline conditions. The airline industry (Miller and 
Chen, 1994) and the furniture industry (Lant, Milliken and Batra, 1992) showed evidence of 
strategic adjustments within declining firms.   
Over and above the prior evidences of adaptive change within declining firms, there 
are evidences of increased risk-taking within declining firms (Singh, 1986). Poorly 
performing savings and loan firms are more willing to take risks by expanding into risky 
markets than such firms that performed well (Haveman, 1993). Declining firms engage in 
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 riskier initiatives when they decrease slack and decrease organizational size (Wiseman and 
Bromiley, 1996). Also, large firms increased their risk-taking when their financial 
performance deteriorated (Audia and Greve, 2006; Greve, 2011). This supports the view that 
when faced with organizational decline, firms increase their risk-taking.  
With respect to research and development, scholars have found evidence in support of 
the fact that organizational decline stimulates innovation (Mone, McKinley and Barker, 
1998). Organizational decline is found to stimulate innovation in the big six tobacco 
companies (Cameron, 1983). Bolton (1993) found that poor performing US high technology 
firms joined R&D consortia early on. After such early joining, a distinct institutionalization 
effect occurred as R&D consortia became a commonly accepted method of conducting 
certain types of R&D projects. In a sample of Japanese firms, Hundley, Jacobson and Park 
(1996) found that profitability declines lead to increased R&D intensity. These evidences 
imply that declining firms will have increased search routines. 
All in all, the above prior evidences seem to suggest that declining firms will increase 
their search routines in the last five years prior to their bankruptcy filing. Therefore, I 
propose the following hypothesis and break it up into two testable empirical hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 4: The investment in search routines of declining firms will increase from 
each year to the next in the last five years prior to bankruptcy filing.  
4a: The R&D expenditure of declining firms will increase from each year to the next 
in the last five years prior to bankruptcy filing. 
4b: The patent count of declining firms will increase from each year to the next in the 
last five years prior to bankruptcy filing. 
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 Now, that I have examined the question: do declining firms in the US Chemical and 
allied products industry exhibit threat rigidity or do they exhibit adaptive change in the last 
five years prior to bankruptcy? I stretch this question further and ask: under what conditions 
declining firms exhibit rigidity (if they exhibit rigidity)? And, under what conditions 
declining firms exhibit adaptive change (if they exhibit adaptive change)? These are the few 
key questions that I have identified in the end of chapter 2. In Hypotheses 5 and 6, I examine 
the effects of two conditions: (1) organizational slack, and (2) the interaction of 
organizational slack and calendar time on the search routines of both declining firms and 
surviving firms.   
6.5 Organizational slack in declining firms and surviving firms 
Organizational slack represents the excess resources that a firm maintains to buffer its 
technical core from external pressures (Cyert and March, 1963). It also aids a firm to search 
for suitable solutions when its existing routines do not meet their expected performance level. 
There are studies that suggest that declining firms have less slack relative to surviving firms 
(Beaver, 1966; Sheppard, 1994; Singh, 1986). However, there is also evidence that counter 
the above-mentioned findings. Some research indicates that the amount of organizational 
slack in declining firms and stable firms are more or less the same (Cameron, Whetten and 
Kim, 1987). However, the amount of organizational slack in declining firms is lower than 
that in growing firms (Cameron, Whetten and Kim, 1987). Some declining firms increase 
organizational slack by freeing up assets and human resources (Meyer, 1988). Such firms 
therefore do not have low levels of organizational slack. Those declining firms that have 
sufficient financial slack, such as: excess cash and excess borrowing capacity can delay 
bankruptcy for some years (D’Aveni, 1989b; D’Aveni, 1990). This seems to suggest that the 
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 extent of organizational slack in declining firms when compared with that in surviving firms 
need not always differ.                      
As noted earlier, there are three types of organizational slack: available slack, 
absorbed slack (also called recoverable slack) and potential slack. Available slack includes 
the resources that are in excess of the current operations of the firm. Such uncommitted 
resources can be employed immediately for some specific purposes (Singh, 1986). An 
example of available slack is cash. Absorbed slack includes excess resources that are 
absorbed in the current operations of the firm. These resources can be made available by 
freeing them up if there is a need (Bourgeois and Singh, 1983). An example of absorbed 
slack is excess inventory. Finally, potential slack represents the ability of firms to borrow 
funds from external sources (Geiger and Cashen, 2002). An example of potential slack is 
unused borrowing capacity.     
Similar to the mixed evidences of the relative amounts of total organizational slack in 
surviving firms and declining firms, there are mixed evidences of the amount of each type of 
organizational slack in declining firms relative to surviving firms. Typically, declining firms 
have low levels of available slack compared with surviving firms (Beaver, 1966; Hambrick 
and D’Aveni, 1988; Singh, 1986). However, some declining firms do not differ in their 
amount of available slack when compared with surviving firms (Poston, Harmon and 
Gramlich, 1994). 
Absorbed slack has special relevance in the context of manufacturing industries. This 
is because absorbed slack may include excess inventory. There are certain principles of 
manufacturing, such as: lean production and just-in-time manufacturing that recommends 
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 elimination or minimization of inventory i.e. absorbed slack (Shah and Ward, 2003). Such 
principles are employed in both declining and surviving firms. Therefore, there are declining 
manufacturing firms that have about the same level of absorbed slack as surviving 
manufacturing firms (Eroglu and Hofer, 2011). However, some other manufacturing 
practices recommend maintaining at least moderate levels of inventory in order to help 
overcome disruptions in supply chain and to better respond to environmental disturbances 
(Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Hendricks, Singhal and Zhang, 2009). Such practices are also 
employed in both declining firms and surviving firms. Therefore, these results indicate that 
absorbed slack when measured in terms of excess inventory do not differ in surviving firms 
and declining firms. In contrast to these evidences, some other evidences suggest that 
declining firms have low levels of absorbed slack when compared with surviving firms 
(Singh, 1986; Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996).  
In contrast to the mixed evidences of the amount of available and absorbed slack 
resources within declining firms when compared with the corresponding amounts within 
surviving firms, prior evidences suggest that the amount of potential slack in declining firms 
is low compared with that in surviving firms (Daily and Dalton, 1994b; D’Aveni, 1989a; 
D’Aveni, 1989b; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988; Moulton, Thomas and Pruett, 1996). 
Overall, majority of evidence suggests that declining firms have low levels of overall 
organizational slack when compared with surviving firms. All prior evidences indicate that 
declining firms have low levels of potential slack when compared with surviving firms. 
However, there are mixed evidences on the amount of available slack and absorbed slack in 
declining firms when compared with surviving firms.    
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 6.5.1 Effects of organizational slack on the change initiatives in declining firms and 
surviving firms 
As per the behavioral theory of a firm (Cyert and March, 1963), organizational slack 
enhances adaptive change within both declining firms and surviving firms. This is because 
high levels of organizational slack allows a firm to employ that slack in order to explore, to 
search for suitable alternative solutions and to expand their current operations. When firms 
perform below their aspiration levels, they engage in problemistic-search (Chen, 2008). 
Problemistic search is “stimulated by a problem (usually a rather specific one) and is directed 
toward finding a solution to that problem” (Cyert and March, 1963:169). And, when firms 
have adequate levels of slack resources, they engage in slack-search (Levinthal and March, 
1981). Slack search is stimulated because the excess resources in the form of organizational 
slack can be devoted to search (Cyert and March, 1963). Since declining firms have large 
gaps between their aspiration levels and the actual performance levels, they are likely to 
engage in problemistic search routines. In addition, if some declining firms have slack 
resources then they can also engage in slack-stimulated search. However, as majority of prior 
scholars (Daily and Dalton, 1994b; Moulton, Thomas and Pruett, 1996) have found evidence 
of low levels of slack within declining firms, problemistic-search is more likely to be evident 
in declining organizations. 
There is a positive and linear relationship between slack and change initiatives 
(Barker and Duhaime, 1997; D’Aveni, 1989a). Each of the types of slack: available, absorbed 
and potential also affect change initiatives positively and linearly. Available slack, such as: 
excess cash allows firms to use that slack in the short-term while attempting to improve firm 
performances. High levels of available slack within firms increase change initiatives (Iyer 
and Miller, 2008; Majumdar and Venkataraman, 1993; Voss, Sirdeshmukh and Voss, 2008). 
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 Similar to available slack, high levels of absorbed slack enhances adaptive change within 
firms (Miller, Lant, Milliken and Korn, 1996). Again, high levels of potential slack increases 
change initiatives within firms (Bergh and Lawless, 1998; Iyer and Miller, 2008).  
Slack positively affects change initiatives in declining as well as in surviving 
manufacturing firms. Change initiatives affected by slack include domain offense, domain 
defense, domain creation and domain substitution (Cameron and Zammuto, 1983). Domain 
offense involves expanding the current domain of expertise. Domain defense reduces the size 
of the existing domain. Domain creation involves identifying new domains. Domain 
substitution involves replacing the current domain with another domain. 
6.5.2 Effects of organizational slack on innovation in declining firms and surviving 
firms 
Organizational slack, in general, has mixed effects on innovation in firms. Some 
researchers report a positive, linear relationship (Cameron, 1983; Mone, McKinley and 
Barker, 1998); others find a negative, linear effect (Latham and Braun, 2009), and finally, 
some studies show an inverted U-shaped relationship between organizational slack and 
innovation (Geiger and Cashen, 2002; Nohria and Gulati, 1996).    
The presence of organizational slack is especially helpful for declining firms because 
such slack can be employed in the short-term and the long-term while attempting to improve 
firm performances. Available slack, such as: excess cash can be used in the short-term to 
expand their current domains of expertise by increasing R&D spending. Absorbed slack, 
such as: excess resources employed in performing a routine, can be freed up to be suitably 
used elsewhere in the firm. Potential slack, such as: unused borrowing capacity can be used 
to access external funds to fund fees involved in patenting. All in all, the more the amount of 
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 overall slack and each type of slack, the better are a declining firm’s chances of improving its 
deteriorating firm performance. Therefore, I propose that overall slack and each type of slack 
is beneficial to declining firms as well as surviving firms. However, slack is extra precious to 
declining firms when compared to surviving firms because it allows declining firms to last 
out their deteriorating firm conditions at least temporarily. At the same time, declining firms 
are not likely to have very high levels of organizational slack. Therefore, in an inverted U-
shaped relationship between slack and innovation (Geiger and Cashen, 2002), the portion of 
the curve that indicates the harmful effects of too-much of slack is not likely to be evident in 
the context of declining firms. Therefore, I propose that organizational slack will affect the 
search routines of declining firms non-linearly (i.e. logarithmically). I formally state the 
following hypothesis.            
Hypothesis 5: The search routines of all firms will have a logarithmic relationship 
with organizational slack. 
5a: The R&D expenditure of all firms will have a logarithmic relationship with 
organizational slack (total slack, available slack, recoverable slack and potential slack). 
5b: The patent count of all firms will have a logarithmic relationship with 
organizational slack (total slack, available slack, recoverable slack and potential slack). 
6.6 The effect of the interaction of time and organizational slack 
Organizational slack allows firms to adapt to changing environments (March, 1981). 
Organizational decline implies some form of change in the environment. Compared to 
surviving firms, declining firms reduce their slack resources at an accelerating rate as they 
move towards bankruptcy (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988). This suggests that organizational 
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 slack amounts may change in declining firms over the last five years prior to bankruptcy. 
Declining firms that can engage in efficiency improvements by cutting down slack can 
reverse their decline or at least delay bankruptcy (D'Aveni, 1989a). Also, declining firms that 
disband assets can delay their bankruptcy (D'Aveni, 1989a). This implies that the presence of 
organizational slack may allow some firms to delay bankruptcy. The freedom of action 
afforded by slack, though, decreases as a firm gets close to bankruptcy.   
D'Aveni (1989a) found that declining firms follow different patterns of decline. 
Declining firms following these different patterns of decline face the consequences of decline 
at different times. The presence of organizational slack may be one factor that differentiates 
the declining firms following each of these decline patterns.  
Here, I propose that the combined effect of the amount of organizational slack and the 
annual calendar time will affect the search routines of all firms. This is especially important 
for declining firms. For example: a declining firm that reduces potential slack fast over the 
last five years before bankruptcy will have different extent of search routines than a declining 
firm that reduces potential slack slowly over the last five years before bankruptcy. Therefore, 
here, I propose that the search routines of all firms (declining as well as surviving firms) will 
be a function of the interaction of the time to bankruptcy and the organizational slack 
amount. Here, I state the hypotheses formally, based on threat-rigidity theory (6a) and the 
behavioral theory of the firm (6b).  
Hypothesis 6: The search routines of all firms will be a function of the interaction of 
the amount of organizational slack of the firms and time. Even after controlling for these 
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 interaction effects, the search routines of declining firms will differ from those of surviving 
firms. 
6a: The R&D expenditure and patent counts of firms will be a function of the 
interaction of the amount of organizational slack of the firms and the annual calendar time. 
Even after controlling for these interaction effects, the R&D expenditure and patent counts of 
declining firms will be lower than those of surviving firms. 
6b: The R&D expenditure and patent count of all firms will be a function of the 
interaction of the amount of organizational slack of the firms and the annual calendar time. 
Even after controlling for these interaction effects, the R&D expenditure and patent count of 
declining firms will be higher than those of surviving firms. 
To sum up the hypothesized relationships, I offer two contrasting theoretical 
perspectives on organizational decline: (1) the threat rigidity theory, and (2) the behavioral 
theory of a firm. According to the threat rigidity perspective, I propose that compared to their 
matched surviving firms, declining firms will engage in fewer search routines in each of the 
five years prior to bankruptcy filing. Further, I propose that the search routines of declining 
firms will decrease over the last five years prior to their bankruptcy filing. In contrast, 
according to the behavioral theory of a firm perspective, I propose that relative to their 
matched surviving firms, declining firms will engage in more search routines in each of the 
five years immediately preceding their bankruptcy filing. In addition, I propose that search 
routines of declining firms will increase over the last five years immediately preceding their 
bankruptcy filing. Finally, I examine the moderating effect of organizational slack on the 
search routines of all firms (declining as well as surviving). I propose that the search routines 
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 of all firms will have a non-linear relationship with organizational slack. Again, I propose 
that the search routines of all firms will be influenced by the interaction of organizational 
slack and annual calendar time. Even after controlling for these effects, the search routines of 
declining firms will differ from the search routines of surviving firms.       
Refer: Figure 6.1 for a look at the total contingency model of this study and the 
hypothesized relationships.
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 CHAPTER 7: METHODS 
In this chapter, I discuss about the sample dataset, the methods that I apply in 
analyzing the hypotheses and the measures that I use in order to empirically test the 
hypotheses. 
7.1 Preparing the sample 
I used two distinct stages to prepare the final sample of firms that includes declining 
firms as well as surviving firms. In stage 1, I collected the set of bankrupt firms by using the 
following steps. First, I found out all bankruptcy filings (this includes both Chapter 11 and 
Chapter 7 filings) between January 1, 1980 and January 1, 2012 (the time of data collection). 
I chose this time period based on the specific laws and regulations related to bankruptcy in 
the US. I also chose this time period in order to get a sufficiently large sample size of 
bankrupt firms. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 went into effect on October 1, 1979. A 
majority of the provisions for Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 filings by organizations in the US 
court as incorporated in the 1978 Act continued under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005. The 2005 Act heavily affected consumer (i.e. 
personal) bankruptcies (Altman and Hotchkiss, 2006).  Therefore, this longer time frame is 
suitable for the purpose of my study where I consider US manufacturing firms that file for 
bankruptcy (Chapter 7 for liquidation and Chapter 11 for reorganization).  
In addition, I included only publicly listed firms. This is for the convenience of 
collecting all financial data. Further, I included only firms that filed in the US bankruptcy 
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98 
courts as the bankruptcy laws differ from nation to nation. Additionally, I included firms that 
are large sized (i.e. have more than hundred employees). This allowed me to control for “the 
liability of smallness” which is one of the main reasons for firm failure. Also, I included only 
manufacturing firms. Finally, I tried to focus on a single industry. However, I did not get 
sufficient number of bankrupt firms for any of the four-digit SIC levels. Finally, I found a 
sufficient number of bankrupt firms in the Chemical and allied products industry (two-digit 
SIC of 2800). Out of the total number of bankrupt firms, I excluded firms that do not have 
publicly available financial data (10-K reports) for the six years prior to the year of 
bankruptcy filing. Additionally, I excluded firms that filed for bankruptcy a second time, a 
third time or a fourth time. Firms that file for bankruptcies multiple times may have traits that 
differ from firms that file for bankruptcy only once. Further, I excluded firms that filed for 
bankruptcy “intentionally”. Intentional bankruptcies are called “strategic bankruptcies” 
(Delaney, 1992).  Such firms can be the focal theme of a different research paper. For each of 
the included firms, I listed down the primary and the secondary NAICS1 and SIC codes. 
After completing stage 1, I created the comparison sample of matched surviving firms 
by following these steps. First, for each bankrupt firm, I identified a single matched surviving 
firm. In the fifth year before bankruptcy (i.e. for year t-5 where t is the year of bankruptcy 
filing), I used the matching criteria of: (1) the same 4-digit SIC code, (2) the same product-
market presence, (3) roughly the same sales volume as the bankrupt firm, and (4) firm size 
(measured by the total number of employees). These criteria are mainly based on prior 
studies on organizational decline that have used a matched pair design (Hambrick and 
__________________ 
1 NAICS stands for North American Industry Classification System. 
 D’Aveni, 1988; D’Aveni, 1989a; Daily, 1996; Daily and Dalton, 1994a). In addition, I also 
ensured that financial data are available for each of these firms in available and established 
databases. For the matching process, I wrote a simple computer program in Microsoft Visual 
Basic 6.0 using a Microsoft Excel Macro (Refer Appendix 1 for the detailed algorithm of this 
program). Finally, I arrived at the dataset that includes thirty six bankrupt firms and thirty six 
surviving firms in the US chemical and allied products industry (SIC: 2800). This dataset 
includes data on each firm for each of the five years immediately preceding the bankruptcy 
filing by the bankrupt firms. In other words, the dataset includes data from t-5 to t-1 where t0 
is the year of bankruptcy filing. 
Many prior scholars have used a matched pair sample design (D’Aveni, 1990, 
Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992, Daily and Dalton, 1994a). The main advantage of such a 
matched pair design is that the sample provides controls for confounding factors, such as: 
industry conditions and positions of the firms within the industry (D’Aveni, 1989a). Also, in 
many cases, such as bankruptcy studies, it makes sense to use a matched pair sample design 
because bankruptcy is a rare phenomenon (Daily, 1996). The costs and availability of data 
prohibit large random samples in these cases (Zmijewski, 1984). One disadvantage of the 
matching design is that it involves sampling on the dependent variable (Berk, 1983 as cited in 
D’Aveni and MacMillan, 1990: 641). However, in this study, the matched pair design does 
not involve sampling on the dependent variable. Here, I am not predicting bankruptcy. The 
dependent variables in this study are the total research and development (R&D) spending of 
each firm and the number of patents applied by each firm in the US Patent and Trademarks 
Office (USPTO). Therefore, in this study, the matched pair design allows to conveniently 
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 create two comparative groups for analyses: the group of bankrupt firms and the group of 
surviving firms that are similar. 
7.2 Context 
All the firms in the dataset belong to the Chemical and allied products industry (SIC 
2800). At the four digit SIC level, this dataset includes fifteen bankrupt firms and fifteen 
matched surviving firms in SIC 2834 (Pharmaceutical preparations), three bankrupt firms and 
three matched surviving firms in SIC 2835 (Diagnostic substances), eight bankrupt firms and 
eight matched surviving firms in SIC 2836 (Biological Products, Except Diagnostic 
Substances), three bankrupt firms and three matched surviving firms in SIC 2810 (Industrial 
inorganic chemicals), three bankrupt firms and three matched surviving firms in SIC 2820 
(Plastic materials, synthetic resins, synthetic rubber, cellulose, and other manmade fibers, 
except glass), two bankrupt firms and two matched surviving firms in SIC 2840 (Soap, 
detergents, cleaning preparations, perfumes, cosmetics, and other toilet preparations), one 
bankrupt firm and one matched surviving firm in SIC 2860 (Industrial organic chemicals) and 
one bankrupt firm and one matched surviving firm in SIC 2890 (Miscellaneous chemical 
products). For a detailed look at the declining or failing firms in this dataset, refer: Appendix 2. 
All the industries included are mature. They are also heavily regulated. The 
pharmaceutical industry has the maximum number of firms in the dataset. This industry is 
highly research-intensive (PhRMA, 2013, www.phrma.org) and very strictly regulated by the 
US Food and Drug Administration (USFDA). It takes on average nine to sixteen years to 
discover a new drug. There are at least five distinct stages in the drug development process 
(LaMattina, 2009): (1) candidate identification (three to five years), (2) preclinical studies 
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 (one year), (3) Phase 1 (one year), (4) Phase 2 (twelve months to thirty months), and (5) 
Phase 3 (two to five years).  
While the complexity and time demands of the research cycle indicate that changes in 
R&D investments might exhibit strong inertia over a five year period, there have been trends 
in the industry that have influenced shifts in R&D regimes. 
First, there has been a large scale shift to generics over the period of the study. By 
2012, 84% of all prescriptions were filled with generics (PhRMA, 2013). The shift towards 
generic drugs began with passage of the Waxman-Hatch Act (1984). This act (1984) changed 
the entry requirements for generic drugs. This act permitted introduction of generic 
substitutes more quickly, and therefore drastically reduced the time period during which a 
drug is protected by patent and can command premium pricing (Jacob and Kwak, 2003).     
Second, there has been a shift towards biological products. New technological 
advancements in the pharmaceutical industry are increasingly driven by advances in biology, 
and nanotechnology (Allarakhia and Walsh, 2011). The pharmaceutical industry experienced 
a radical technological transformation with the advent of biotechnology based on genetic 
engineering, genomics, and other novel research (Rothaermel and Hess, 2007). The first new 
biotechnology drugs reached the market in the 1980s (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010). As a 
result, there has been a shift from traditional chemistry-based drug discovery to drug 
discovery based on multiple disciplines especially the interaction of biology and chemistry 
(Athreye and Godley, 2009).      
In sum, this industry provided an opportunity to study firm decline and failure in a 
mature industry that has a strong tradition of research and development, and faces pressures 
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 for change in both the political/economic domain (the desire for cheaper, generic drugs) and 
in the technological domain (the shifts away from chemical formulations to biological 
formulation). 
7.3 Measures           
In this study, the two dependent variables are: (1) a natural logarithm of the research 
and development (R&D) expenditure2 of each firm in each of the five years in the sample, 
and (2) the patent count of each firm in each of the five years in the sample. I collected data 
on the R&D expenditure in US dollars from the annual reports and the COMPUSTAT files. 
And, I collected data on patent count from the website of the US Patents and Trademarks 
Office.   
The independent variables in this study are: (1) firm type (bankrupt or survivor), (2) 
time (measured by the number of years before bankruptcy), (3) organizational slack, and (4) 
the interaction of time to bankruptcy (measured in years) and organizational slack.  
For the first independent variable: firm type, I used a categorical variable that acts as 
an indicator of the firm type. It takes a value of 1 if the firm is a survivor. And, it takes a 
value of 0 if the firm is a bankrupt. I measured the second independent variable, time by 
using a dummy variable for four of the five years (t-5 to t-2 where t0 is the year of 
bankruptcy filing) included in the dataset3. And, I created the following dummy variables: (1) 
__________________ 
2 I use a natural logarithm of R&D spending because this has commonly been used by prior scholars (Leiponen, 
2012). I also use a logged value of R&D spending because when a variable is a positive large integer dollar 
amount, the log is often taken. Also, taking logs narrows the range of the variable. This makes estimates less 
sensitive to extreme observations (Woolridge, 2006). 
3 I do not include a dummy variable for the year t-1 because that will make the regression model perfectly 
collinear (Woolridge, 2006). 
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 a dummy variable for year t-5 where t is the year of bankruptcy filing. This variable takes a 
value of 1 when the year is t-5. For all other years, it takes a value of 0; (2) a dummy variable 
for year t-4; (3) a dummy variable for year t-3; and a (4) a dummy variable for year t-24.   
For organizational slack, I used the total slack and each of the three types of slack: 
available, absorbed and potential. Here, I measured unabsorbed or available slack as quick 
assets (i.e. cash and marketable securities)/liabilities (Singh, 1986; Greve, 2003). 
Additionally, I measured absorbed or recoverable slack as Selling, general and administrative 
expenses/Total revenues (Chen and Hambrick, 1995; Smith, Grimm, Gannon and Chen, 
1991). I, then, measured potential slack as price-to-earnings ratio (Combs and Ketchen, 
1999). This ratio is an indicator of a firm’s ability to raise capital in equity markets. When 
investors share optimism concerning a firm’s future, share prices are bid up, making capital 
easier to raise. Finally, I summed up the values of the three different types of organizational 
slack in order to arrive at the total slack. The units of each of these variables are US dollars. 
Again, I collected these data from COMPUSTAT files and from the annual (10-K) reports of 
these firms. For each of these slack types (total, available, absorbed and potential), I used a 
natural logarithm of the original values5.  
__________________ 
4 I create a separate dummy variable for each of the years because this will then allow each year to have a 
different effect on the dependent variable. Therefore, the difference in effect of year t-5 and the year t-4 need 
not be the same as the difference in effect of year t-4 and t-3 where t0 is the year of bankruptcy filing 
(Woolridge, 2006). 
5 I use a natural logarithm of the total organizational slack and each of the three types of organizational slack 
because we can then ignore the units of measurement of the variables. Additionally, taking a natural logarithm 
narrows the range of the variables. This increases the sensitivity of the regression models toward extreme 
observations (Woolridge, 2006:199).  
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 Finally, for the interaction variables, I just created variables that are the interaction of 
logged values of total slack, available slack, absorbed slack and potential slack and the 
dummy variables for each year. In addition, I controlled for the large study period by 
including a categorical variable for each decade. This variable takes a value of 1 where the 
calendar year is the 1990s. It takes a value of 2 where the calendar year is the 2000s. And it 
takes a value of 3 where the calendar year is the 2010s6.  
7.4 Methods    
Hypothesis 1a proposes that the R&D expenditure of declining firms will be less than 
the R&D expenditure of matched surviving firms in each of the five years immediately 
preceding bankruptcy of declining firms. In contrast, Hypothesis 2a proposes that the 
research and development (R&D) expenditure of declining firms will be more than the 
research and development expenditure of surviving firms in each of the five years 
immediately preceding bankruptcy of declining firms. In order to empirically examine these 
two hypotheses, for each of the years: t-5, t-4, t-3, t-2 and t-1, I conducted t-tests to check for 
the differences in the mean values of: R&D expenditure. I used the Stata 12 command ttest 
[var], by(firm type) unequal. Here firm type is of two categories: (1) bankrupts, and (2) 
survivors. I used the unequal option because the two groups of firms: bankrupts and 
survivors have unequal variances of R&D expenditure7.  
__________________ 
6 This variable controls for the macro effects of the decades, such as the economic conditions. It takes into 
consideration the aggregation of the fixed year effects for each decade. 
7 I tested for the equality of the variances of R&D expenditures of the two groups of firms: bankrupts and 
survivors. I conducted variance ratio tests using the Stata 12 command sdtest [variable name], by [group 
variable name]. I found that for each of the five years in the sample (from t-5 to t-1), the variance of R&D 
expenditure of bankrupt firms is less than the variance of R&D expenditure of survivor firms.  
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 Hypothesis 1b proposes that the patent count of declining firms will be less than the 
patent counts of surviving firms in each of the five years immediately preceding bankruptcy 
of declining firms. In contrast, Hypothesis 2b proposes that the patent count of declining 
firms will be more than the patent counts of surviving firms in each of the five years 
immediately preceding bankruptcy of declining firms. I empirically tested these two 
hypotheses by running two-sample t-tests with unequal variances. I used the unequal variance 
option because the two groups of firms: bankrupts and survivors have unequal variances.  
Over and above the empirical testing for Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b, I also 
performed two-sample t-tests with unequal variances on total slack, available slack, 
recoverable or absorbed slack and potential slack. I conducted these additional tests in order 
to examine the amounts of total slack and each type of slack in declining firms relative to the 
amounts of total slack and each type of slack in surviving firms.   
Hypothesis 3a proposes that the R&D expenditure of declining firms will decrease 
from each year to the next in the last five years prior to bankruptcy filing. In contrast, 
Hypothesis 4a proposes that the R&D expenditure of declining firms will increase from each 
year to the next in the last five years prior to bankruptcy filing. In order to empirically 
examine these two hypotheses, I conducted two-sample t-tests only for bankrupt firms 
comparing the mean R&D expenditure of two consecutive years. There are four sets of 
comparisons involved here: (1) the mean R&D expenditure of bankrupt firms in the year t-5 
versus the mean R&D expenditure of bankrupt firms in the year t-4, (2) the mean R&D 
expenditure of bankrupt firms in the year t-4 versus the mean R&D expenditure of bankrupt 
firms in the year t-3, (3) the mean R&D expenditure of bankrupt firms in the year t-3 versus 
the mean R&D expenditure of bankrupt firms in the year t-2, and (4) the mean R&D 
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 expenditure of bankrupt firms in the year t-2 versus the mean R&D expenditure of bankrupt 
firms in the year t-1.    
Hypothesis 3b proposes that the patent count of declining firms will decrease from 
each year to the next in the last five years prior to bankruptcy filing. Hypothesis 4b offers a 
contrasting perspective to Hypothesis 3b. Hypothesis 4b proposes that the patent count of 
declining firms will increase from each year to the next in the last five years prior to 
bankruptcy filing. Similarly as in the case of testing Hypotheses 3a and 4a, I conducted two 
sample t-tests with the unequal variance option to compare the mean patent counts of 
bankrupt firms from each year to the next. As before, there are four sets of comparisons: 
from year t-5 to t-4, t-4 to t-3, t-3 to t-2 and t-2 to t-1 where t0 is the year of bankruptcy 
filing. 
In addition to these, I also conducted exploratory analyses to empirically examine the 
effect of time to bankruptcy on the search routines of declining firms versus the search 
routines of surviving firms. I conducted regression analyses using mixed models on panel 
data using the xtmixed command in Stata 12. In this model, time (i.e. t-5, t-4 t-3, t-2 and t-1) 
is treated as an independent categorical variable. I used the raw values of R&D expenditure 
as the dependent variable. I then computed the predicted mean of R&D expenditure for each 
calendar year. Next, I tested for the overall null hypothesis that the average R&D expenditure 
is not the same across all years. I tested this using the contrast [variable] command in Stata 
12. I also conducted tests of year-to-year comparison of the average predicted R&D 
expenditure using the contrast ar.[variable name] command in Stata 12. Using the same set of 
commands I tested for the interaction effect of annual calendar time and the type of the firm, 
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 bankrupt or survivor. However, I added the interaction of firm type and time to bankruptcy as 
an independent variable in the above set of Stata 12 commands.   
Hypothesis 5a proposes that the R&D expenditure of all firms will have a non-linear 
(i.e. logarithmic) relationship with organizational slack (total slack, available slack, 
recoverable slack and potential slack). In order to empirically examine this hypothesis, I 
performed panel regressions with random effects. The final dataset is a strongly balanced 
panel. The panel variable is the firm’s unique serial number (i.e. identifier) and the time 
variable is the year relative to bankruptcy filing (i.e. t-5, t-4, t-3, t-2 and t-1). The random 
effects model is suitable here because it uses a weighted matrix of the between effect and the 
fixed effect models. It allows this model to account for variables that do not vary over time 
(for e.g. firm type is a bankrupt or a survivor) as well as variables that do not vary within the 
same firm (for e.g. in some cases the levels of slack do not vary over time in the same firm). 
In order to run the panel regression models, I used the following Stata command: xtreg 
[dependent var] [independent var1 independent var2 ….], re vce (cluster [cluster id]). I tested 
for the suitability of random effects by using the following postestimation command in Stata: 
xttest0. I tested for serial correlation using the user written Stata 12 command: xtserial. I 
tested for heteroskedasticity by first running xtgls [dependent var] [independent var1 
independent var2 ….], igls panels(heteroskedastic). Then I ran a normal xtgls [dependent var] 
[independent var1 independent var2 ….]  i.e. without the panel option. Then, I conducted a 
likelihood ratio test (using the Stata command lrtest) comparing the heteroskedastic model 
with the homoskedastic model. Finally, I ran a panel regression with random effects with the 
vce(cluster) option in order to correct the standard errors for hetroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. I also used the vce(cluster) option by using the clustering on a pair of a 
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 single bankrupt and its single matched surviving firm. This allows for the comparison to be a 
matched pair comparison. I performed separate regression analyses for total slack, available 
slack, absorbed slack and potential slack. 
The first part of Hypothesis 6a proposes that the R&D expenditure of all firms will be 
a function of the interaction of the amount of organizational slack of the firms and the time to 
bankruptcy. Even after controlling for these interaction effects, the R&D expenditure of 
declining firms will be lower than those of surviving firms. Again, I ran panel regression 
models with the vce(cluster option). I checked for serial correlation using the xtserial 
command in Stata 12. And I checked for heteroskedasticity using the xtgls heteroskedastic 
model and the xtgls normal model. Then, I compared these two models using the lrtest in 
Stata 12. In these models, the dependent variable is the logged value of R&D expenditure and 
the independent variables are: dummy variables for years (t-5 to t-2), organizational slack 
and the interaction of organizational slack and year dummies. As before, I ran separate 
models for total slack, available slack, absorbed slack and potential slack. 
The second part of Hypothesis 6a proposes that the patent count of all firms will be a 
function of the interaction of the amount of organizational slack of the firms and the annual 
calendar time. Even after controlling for these interaction effects, the patent count of 
declining firms will be lower than those of surviving firms. In order to empirically test this 
hypothesis, I used the Stata 12 command of xtnbreg [dependent variable] [independent 
variable1, independent variable2, ….].  
Hypothesis 5b proposes that the patent count of all firms will have a non-linear (i.e. 
logarithmic) relationship with organizational slack (total slack, available slack, recoverable 
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 slack and potential slack). In order to empirically examine this hypothesis, I conducted a 
panel count regression model with random effects. Since the dependent variable (patent 
count) is a non-negative, integer count variable, the traditional choices of methods are the 
Poisson regression and the negative binomial regression (Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 
1984). Here, I conducted negative binomial regression using the Stata command of xtnbreg. I 
performed negative binomial regression because there is overdispersion in the data (i.e. 
variance/mean of patent count is about 14.65). The standard errors of Poisson quasi 
maximum likelihood estimates (QMLE) are robust to arbitrary patterns of serial correlation 
(Woolridge, 1997; Wu, 2012). The negative binomial QMLE has the same robustness 
properties of the Poisson QMLE (Woolridge, 2002:737). Therefore, the standard errors of the 
regression models that I conducted are robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity 
(Czarnitzki, Hussinger and Schneider, 2011:1422; Woolridge, 2002).    
The first part of Hypothesis 6b proposes that the R&D expenditure of all firms will be 
a function of the interaction of the amount of organizational slack of the firms and the time to 
bankruptcy. Even after controlling for these interaction effects, the R&D expenditure of 
declining firms will be higher than those of surviving firms. I, test this part of the hypothesis 
in exactly the same way as I have tested the first part of Hypothesis 6a. 
The second part of Hypothesis 6b proposes that the patent count of all firms will be a 
function of the interaction of the amount of organizational slack of the firms and the annual 
calendar time. Even after controlling for these interaction effects, the patent count of 
declining firms will be higher than those of surviving firms. I, empirically examine this part 
of the hypothesis using the same commands that I have used for testing the second part of 
Hypothesis 6a.
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 CHAPTER 8: ANALYSES AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I discuss about the results of the hypothesis tests. I also report results 
from additional exploratory analyses. Next, I conclude from these analyses. I specifically 
identify the contributions of this study to the two bodies of literature, organizational decline 
and organizational routines. At the end, I highlight a few limitations of this study that can be 
overcome by future researchers.   
8.1 Descriptive statistics 
Refer Table 8.1 for the descriptive statistics of the main variables of this study. Here, 
recoverable slack has a very high correlation (0.97) with total slack. This is probably because 
total slack is a summed up value of available slack, recoverable slack and potential slack. 
Again, log value of potential slack has a high correlation (0.81) with log value of total slack. 
This is again probably because of the fact that potential slack measure is included while 
computing total slack. Even when there is high correlation between the slack types, I test for 
the effects of total slack and each type of slack because prior researchers have reported 
different effects of each type of slack on change initiatives, innovation and search (Voss, 
Sirdeshmukh and Voss, 2008; Geiger and Cashen, 2002; Iyer and Miller, 2008).   
8.2 Analyses of Hypotheses 1a and 2a 
Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 2a offers contrasting propositions. Based on the threat 
rigidity perspective (Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981), Hypothesis 1a proposes that the 
research and development (R&D) expenditure of declining firms will be less than the 
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 research and development expenditure of surviving firms in each of the five years 
immediately preceding bankruptcy of declining firms. Based on the behavioral theory of a 
firm (Cyert and March, 1963), Hypothesis 2a proposes that the research and development 
(R&D) expenditure of declining firms will be more than the research and development 
expenditure of surviving firms in each of the five years immediately preceding bankruptcy of 
declining firms.  
The results of the two sample t-tests with unequal variances indicate that in all the 
five years considered here (from t-5 to t-1), bankrupt firms have lower amounts of R&D 
expenditure than their corresponding surviving firms (Table 8.2). However, for the years t-5, 
t-4 and t-3, this difference is weakly statistically significant (i.e. significant only at the 10% 
level). For the years, t-2 and t-1, this difference is strongly statistically significant (i.e. 
significant at the 5% level). Therefore, Hypothesis 1a is supported. But, Hypothesis 2a is not 
supported. This indicates that confirming the predictions of the threat rigidity perspective, 
declining firms within this dataset engage in fewer search routines than their matched 
surviving counterparts.   
According to the threat rigidity theory, the threat of bankruptcy leads managers of 
declining firms to narrow their field of attention and decrease search routines (Staw, 
Sandelands and Dutton, 1981). The results of this study support Hypothesis 1a and agree 
with the threat rigidity hypothesis.  
The results of this test support previous studies which find that declining firms 
employ cutback strategies in R&D expenditures (Arogyaswamy and Yasai-Ardekani, 1997; 
Hambrick and Schecter, 1983). Declining firms spend less on R&D because they have 
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 accelerating cost problems (D'Aveni, 1989a). Organizational decline leads managers of 
declining firms to increase job standardization and to increasingly use existing routines 
(Cameron, 1983; Sutton and D'Aunno, 1989; D'Aunno and Sutton, 1992). Turnover of 
personnel is a common phenomenon within declining firms (Greenhalgh, 1983; Greenhalgh 
and Rosenblatt, 1984) and such turnover of key personnel (Aime, Johnson, Ridge and Hill, 
2010) may lead to contraction of existing organizational routines.  
8.3 Analyses of Hypotheses 1b and 2b 
Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 2b use patent counts to test the two contrasting 
theories. Based on the threat rigidity perspective (Staw et al., 1981), Hypothesis 1b proposes 
that the patent count of declining firms will be less than the patent counts of surviving firms 
in each of the five years immediately preceding bankruptcy of declining firms. In contrast, 
based on the behavioral theory of a firm perspective (Cyert and March, 1963), Hypothesis 2b 
proposes that the patent count of declining firms will be more than the patent counts of 
surviving firms in each of the five years immediately preceding bankruptcy of declining 
firms. 
The results of the t-tests indicate that the number of patents  for bankrupt firms is less 
than that for surviving firms in the years t-2 and t-1 i.e. in the two years immediately prior to 
bankruptcy filing (Refer: Table 8.3). However, in the years t-5, t-4 and t-3, there is no 
statistically significant difference in the number of patents for bankrupt firms and that for 
surviving firms. This provides partial support for Hypothesis 1b and no support for 
Hypothesis 2b. Hence, these results also support the threat rigidity hypothesis. This implies 
that relative to their matched surviving firms, declining firms patent less in the two years 
immediately prior to their bankruptcy filing. 
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 One of the probable reasons why declining firms patent less in the two years 
immediately preceding bankruptcy is that declining firms employ cutback management by 
terminating patenting programs and scaling down operations (Levine, 1979). Under decline 
conditions, the focus is more on efficiency improvement and less on trying out new things, 
such as: new patents, new products and new processes (Flynn and Farid, 1991). Also, 
declining firms conserve on their resources by employing cost-cutting strategies (Sutton and 
D'Aunno, 1989). Since patenting is a costly activity, managers of declining firms reduce their 
patenting in the two years immediately preceding their bankruptcy filing.  
The results for both measures of search routine (research and development 
expenditures and patents counts) suggest that the threat-rigidity hypothesis has its strongest 
effect in the two years immediately preceding bankruptcy. The tests for the earlier phase are 
equivocal, in that they are only weakly significant for R&D and they are not significant for 
patent count data.  
8.4 Analyses of Hypotheses 3a and 4a 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 offer propositions about the changes in search routines during the 
five years preceding bankruptcy for the failed firms.  Hypothesis 3a proposes, in fit with  the 
threat rigidity theory perspective (Staw et al. 1981), the R&D expenditure of declining firms 
will decrease from each year to the next in the last five years prior to bankruptcy filing. In 
contrast, Hypothesis 4a proposes that as suggested by the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert 
and March, 1963), the R&D expenditure of declining firms will increase from each year to 
the next in the last five years prior to bankruptcy filing.  
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 The results of the t-tests indicate that the averages of R&D expenditure of bankrupt 
firms do not statistically significantly differ from each other in the consecutive years (Table 
8.4). In other words, the average R&D expenditure of bankrupt firms in the year t-5 does not 
statistically significantly differ from the average R&D expenditure of bankrupt firms in the 
year t-4. Again, the average R&D expenditure of bankrupt firms in the year t-4 does not 
statistically significantly differ from the average R&D expenditure of bankrupt firms in the 
year t-3. Similarly, the average R&D expenditure of bankrupt firms in the year t-3 does not 
statistically significantly differ from the average R&D expenditure of bankrupt firms in the 
year t-2. Finally, the average R&D expenditure of bankrupt firms in the year t-2 does not 
statistically significantly differ from the average R&D expenditure of bankrupt firms in the 
year t-1. These results indicate no support for both the hypotheses. Neither Hypothesis 3a nor 
Hypothesis 4a is supported, though the results do signal inertia in research and development, 
which is in keeping with some descriptions of rigidity.  
Interestingly, the lack of significant change in R&D expenditure of declining firms 
seems to suggest that the passage of time towards bankruptcy filing does not accelerate 
deterioration in research routines within these firms. This is contrary to the evidences found 
by prior scholars of accelerating deterioration within declining firms (Daily, 1996; Hambrick 
and D’Aveni, 1988). As noted, though, the threat rigidity theory does suggest that managers 
within declining firms stick to their existing routines and to their well-learned dominant 
responses. This seems to indicate that such declining firms need not change their search 
routines at all. Helfat (1994) found that some of the R&D activities in petroleum refinery 
involve incremental change in R&D spending while some other R&D activities have fixed 
R&D with hardly any change over the years. The results of no change in search routines of 
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 declining firms seem to support the perspective that organizational search routines are stable 
(Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon, 1958). 
D'Aveni (1989a) identified three distinct patterns of firm decline: sudden decline, 
gradual decline and lingering. Firms following each pattern of decline failed at a different 
pace. The results here do not show a pattern of sudden decline or gradual decline in the 
research routine. The results are more in keeping with the “lingering” process. The firms 
maintain research and development to the final year.  
Hambrick and D'Aveni (1988) found that declining firms follow a downward spiral. 
In the last stage of decline, just three years before bankruptcy filing, the environmental 
carrying capacity and slack amounts declined abruptly (Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1988). 
However, contrary to Hambrick and D'Aveni's (1988) findings, I do not find any faster 
deterioration in search routines within declining firms in the three years immediately 
preceding their bankruptcy filing. The non-support of accelerating deterioration within 
declining firms seems to support the viewpoint that organizational search routines are 
relatively resistant to change (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994).  
Some prior evidences indicate that declining firms have fewer top managers with 
R&D expertise (D'Aveni, 1989a). Typically powerful groups in declining firms play the role 
of a selection mechanism (Loch, Sengupta and Ahmad, 2013). As we might expect that 
researchers have status and power in the organizations within the chemical and allied 
products industry (especially in pharmaceutical organizations that constitute the majority of 
the sample), the persistence of R&D expenditure may be an industry effect here.  
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 8.5 Analyses of Hypotheses 3b and 4b 
Hypothesis 3b and 4b rely on the patent count of declining firms to test the alternate 
predictions of the threat-rigidity perspective and the behavioral theory of the firms. 
Hypothesis 3b proposes a decrease in the patent count from each year to the next in the last 
five years prior to bankruptcy filing while Hypothesis 4b proposes an increase in the patent 
count.  
The results of the t-tests do not support Hypothesis 3b (Table 8.5). These results also 
do not support Hypothesis 4b. There are no statistically significant differences in the average 
number of patents applied by the bankrupt firms in the comparison from each year to the next 
year of the five years included in the dataset. As with the results reported for R&D, the 
results of patent count comparisons across time suggest inertia, which could be taken as 
support for the threat rigidity perspective (Staw et al., 1981). Managers of declining firms 
seem to undertake no change in their patenting activities even when failure is imminent. As 
again, the passage of time in the last five years prior to bankruptcy filing do not seem to have 
any effect on the search routines of declining firms.     
No change in existing activities and organizational routines are indications of the 
presence of rigidity behavior. Prior scholars (Greenhalgh, 1983; Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt, 
1984) have found that managers within declining firms are resistant to change. Yet, these 
results, when viewed in concert with the previous results, give some reasons to wonder if 
threat is the cause of the inertia (recall that, in comparison to matched pairs of surviving 
firms, the failed firms were quite similar in the early years of the decline process).  The tests 
of the role of slack and the interaction of time and slack may give further insight into the 
failure process. 
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 8.6 Analysis of Hypothesis 5a 
 Hypothesis 5a proposes that the R&D expenditure of all firms will have a non-linear 
(i.e. logarithmic) relationship with four measures of organizational slack: total slack, 
available slack, recoverable slack and potential slack. The results differ for the types of slack. 
The results of the panel regression model (model 1 in Table 8.6) indicates that log 
value of total slack does not significantly affect the log value of R&D expenditure of all 
firms. However, the log value of available slack statistically significantly affects the log 
value of R&D expenditure of all firms (model 2 in Table 8.6). The coefficient on the 
variable: log value of available slack indicates that a 1% increase in available slack leads to a 
0.111% increase in R&D expenditure even after controlling for other factors. But, the log 
value of absorbed slack does not statistically significantly affect the log value of R&D 
expenditure of all firms (model 3 in Table 8.6). Again, the log value of potential slack 
statistically significantly affects the log value of R&D expenditure of all firms (model 4 in 
Table 8.6). The coefficient on the variable: log value of potential slack indicates that a 1% 
increase in potential slack results in a 0.102% increase in R&D expenditure even after 
controlling for other factors. However, this effect is weakly statistically significant (i.e. 
significant only at the 10% level). Therefore, overall Hypothesis 5a is partially supported. 
This hypothesis is supported for available slack and potential slack.  
The first three regression models (models 1 to 3 in Table 8.6) suggest that when 
controlling for total organizational slack, the R&D expenditure of declining firms 
significantly differs from the R&D expenditure of matched surviving firms. The coefficient 
on the variable: survivor indicator in model 1 suggests that compared to a declining firm, a 
matched surviving firm will lead to an increase of 98.6% of R&D expenditure, after 
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 controlling for the presence of total slack. Similarly, the coefficient on the variable: survivor 
indicator in model 2 suggests that relative to a declining firm, a matched surviving firm will 
lead to an increase of 87.1% of R&D expenditure, after controlling for the presence of 
available slack. Finally, the coefficient on the variable: survivor indicator in model 3 suggests 
that compared to a declining firm, a matched surviving firm will lead to an increase of 
103.8% of R&D expenditure, after controlling for the presence of absorbed slack. However, 
after controlling for potential slack (model 4 in Table 8.6), the R&D expenditure of declining 
firms and that of matched surviving firms do not significantly differ from each other. The 
results of these tests indicate that at least available slack and potential slack stimulates search 
in declining firms as well as in surviving firms. However, the differences in search routines 
between declining firms and surviving firms remain significant when controlling for 
available slack. This implies that even when available slack stimulates search in declining 
firms and in surviving firms, it cannot account for the differences in search routines of these 
two groups of firms. This may be because available slack levels differ in these two groups of 
firms. In additional exploratory analyses that I present in this chapter (after the section on 
hypotheses testing), I found that available slack is significantly less in declining firms when 
compared to surviving firms in the last year before bankruptcy. The results of this study may 
also be because available slack is used differently in declining firms and in surviving firms. 
However, this issue needs further examination in the future.       
The first type of slack: available slack can be put to use immediately because it 
includes uncommitted resources (Bourgeois and Singh, 1983). The second type of slack, 
absorbed slack (also called recoverable slack) requires time and effort in order to be 
recovered (Bourgeois and Singh, 1983). And, the third type of slack: potential slack refers to 
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 the ability of the firm to raise extra resources from the environment, such as through 
borrowing (Bourgeois and Singh, 1983). 
Prior evidences on the effects of organizational slack are mixed. Some evidences 
point to the beneficial effects of organizational slack (Barker and Duhaime, 1997; Audia and 
Greve, 2006). In contrast, some evidences point to the negative effects of slack (Latham and 
Braun, 2009). Finally, some evidences bridge the two "slack as beneficial" and "slack as 
inefficient" perspectives by suggesting a non-linear (typically an inverted U-shaped 
relationship) between slack and change activities, slack and innovation and slack and risk-
taking (Nohria and Gulati, 1996; Wiseman and Catanach, 1997).     
The results presented here provide a complex picture. Available slack does help firms 
increase R&D, especially in the early years of decline. These results, combined with the 
earlier analysis of R&D, suggest that generally firms do have slack early on, but the 
surviving firms make more productive use of that slack. 
Though I do not test directly to learn how slack is used, I suspect that available slack 
can be employed for local search activities. For example: available cash can be used to 
improve upon the existing organizational routines. Potential slack can be used to increase 
search activities. For example, funds borrowed from the external market can be used to 
support R&D initiatives that will tap into new markets. Also funds borrowed from the 
external market may be used to feed into research projects that are financially hard pressed. 
Funds borrowed from the external market can also be used to feed into projects that take long 
time to recover their costs.  
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 8.7 Analysis of Hypothesis 5b 
Hypothesis 5b proposes that the patent count of all firms will have a non-linear (i.e. 
logarithmic) relationship with organizational slack (total slack, available slack, absorbed 
slack and potential slack). 
The results of the patent count regression indicate that the log value of total slack 
statistically significantly affects the patent count of all firms (model 5 in Table 8.7). Again, 
the results indicate that the log value of available slack statistically significantly affects the 
patent count of all firms (model 6 in Table 8.7). But, the log value of absorbed slack does not 
significantly affect the patent count of all firms (model 7 in Table 8.7). Again, the log value 
of potential slack statistically significantly affects the patent count of all firms (model 8 in 
Table 8.7). Therefore, Hypothesis 5b is partially supported. This hypothesis is not supported 
for absorbed slack. However, it is supported for all other types of slack and total slack. These 
results are similar to those reported for R&D.  
Specifically, the coefficient on the log value of total slack (model 5) suggests that if 
total slack increases by 1% then the number of patents will increase by 0.157%. The 
coefficient on the log value of available slack (model 6) suggests that if available slack 
increases by 1% then the number of patents will increase by 0.154%. And, the coefficient on 
log value of potential slack (model 8) suggests that if potential slack increases by 1% then the 
number of patents will increase by 0.282%. The coefficient on survival indicator in Model 5 
in Table 8.7 indicates that a surviving firm patents 2.94 times that of a bankrupt firm when 
controlling for total slack. However, after controlling for available slack, recoverable slack 
and potential slack the patenting behavior of bankrupt firms do not significantly differ from 
that of surviving firms. This seems to suggest that slack-induced search offers a suitable 
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 explanation of patenting activities. Here (Table 8.7), I have also presented the model fit 
statistics Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
values. Lower values of AIC and BIC indicate better model fit (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). 
As per the AIC and the BIC values, the model with the log value of potential slack (Refer: 
model 8) is the best fit among these models.   
These results might imply that available slack, such as excess cash, can be used to 
cover for patenting fees. Potential slack, such as external funds, can be used to feed into 
projects that take a longer time to patent. The results here support the behavioral theory 
argument that organizational slack buffers the core of the organization. Such slack can be 
used to stimulate search for new products through patenting. 
8.8 Analyses of Hypothesis 6a and 6b 
 Hypothesis 6a proposes the interaction effect of organizational slack and the passage 
of time to be significant on the R&D expenditure of all firms. It further proposes that even 
after controlling for these interaction effects, the R&D expenditure of declining firms will be 
lower than those of surviving firms. In contrast, Hypothesis 6b proposes that there will be 
significant interaction effect of organizational slack and the passage of time on the R&D 
expenditure of all firms, but after controlling for these interaction effects, the R&D 
expenditure of declining firms will be higher than those of surviving firms.  
The results of the panel regression models indicate that the log value of total slack 
interacts with the year t-4 (model 9 in Table 8.8). This interaction effect statistically 
significantly affects the log value of R&D expenditure of all firms. However, the interactions 
of the other years in the sample with the total slack do not statistically significantly affect the 
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 log value of R&D expenditure. Even after controlling for the interaction effects, the log value 
of R&D expenditure significantly differs in declining firms and surviving firms. The 
coefficient on the variable: survivor indicator (model 9) suggests that compared to a 
declining firm, a surviving firm increases the R&D expenditure by about 96.3% even after 
controlling for total slack and its interaction with each calendar year. Therefore, the first part 
of hypothesis 6a is partially supported for total slack.  
The results of the panel regression models suggest that the interaction of the log value 
of available slack and any of the years in the sample are not statistically significant (model 10 
in Table 8.8). However, after controlling for these interaction effects, the log value of R&D 
differs significantly in declining firms and surviving firms. The coefficient on the variable: 
survivor indicator suggests that compared to a declining firm, a matched surviving firm 
increases R&D expenditure by about 86.5% even after controlling for the presence of 
available slack and the interaction of available slack with each calendar year.   
The results of the panel regression models indicate that the interaction effects of the 
log value of absorbed slack and the years in the sample are not statistically significant (model 
11 in Table 8.8). But, even after controlling for these interaction effects, the log value of 
R&D expenditure significantly differs in declining firms and their matched survivors. The 
coefficient on the variable: survivor indicator suggests that compared to a declining firm, a 
surviving firm leads to an increase in R&D expenditure by about 102.2%.   
Additionally, the panel regression results indicate that the interaction effects of 
potential slack and each of the years t-5, t-4 and t-3 statistically significantly affect the log 
R&D expenditure of all firms (model 12 in Table 8.8). Interestingly, after controlling for 
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 these interaction effects, the log R&D expenditure of declining firms do not seem to 
significantly differ from the log R&D expenditure of matched surviving firms. The 
regression coefficients in model 12 (Table 8.8) indicates that in year t-5, 1% increase in 
potential slack leads to 0.573% increase in R&D expenditure. In year t-4, 1% increase in 
potential slack leads to 0.684% increase in R&D expenditure. And, in year t-3, 1% increase 
in potential slack leads to 0.602% increase in R&D expenditure. Therefore, the first part of 
Hypothesis 6a is partially supported for potential slack.     
The passage of time towards bankruptcy is significant, in the presence of some forms 
of slack; for example, potential slack, such as access to external sources of fund is significant 
in expanding R&D activities. Therefore, the results seem to suggest here that potential slack 
is especially important in the years t-5, t-4 and t-3. In the years t-2 and t-1, the bankruptcy 
may be too near. Managers of declining firms are then not likely to tap into external funds 
anymore. However, managers of declining firms still retain hope of improving their 
deteriorating conditions in the years t-5, t-4 and t-3. That is why, in those years they may be 
relying more on potential slack for their R&D activities. Put differently, threat does not 
appear to be an issue in early years. Given this finding, the explanation for less change in 
years t-2 and t-1 might be attributed to fewer resources (a contextual cause) rather than threat 
(a psychological cause). In additional exploratory analyses, I found that the available slack 
levels of declining firms are significantly lower than those of surviving firms in the year 
before bankruptcy.  
High level of potential slack allows declining firms to delay their bankruptcy 
(Balcaen, Manigart and Ooghe, 2011). D'Aveni (1989b) found that unused borrowing 
capacity (i.e. potential slack) is very important because unused borrowing capacity and the 
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 prestige of top level managers together allows declining firms to delay bankruptcy. Loss of 
potential slack often leads firms to file for bankruptcy (Donoher, 2004). The results of this 
study support these findings. 
D'Aveni and MacMillan (1990) found that managers of declining firms pay more 
attention to internal resources and internal environment. At the same time they neglect the 
external resources and the external environment. Contrary to D'Aveni and MacMillan (1990), 
I find that managers of firms (including declining firms) place importance on potential slack. 
Since potential slack involves access to external funds, managers of declining firms pay 
attention to their external environment as well. 
High level of available slack also allows declining firms to delay their bankruptcy 
(Balcaen, Manigart and Ooghe, 2011; Flynn and Farid, 1991). However, the results of this 
study here do not support the significant effect of the interaction of available slack and the 
passage of time towards bankruptcy. 
 Hypothesis 6a also proposes that the patent count of all firms will be a function of the 
interaction of the amount of organizational slack of the firms and the annual calendar time. 
When controlling for these interaction effects, the patent count of declining firms will be 
lower than those of surviving firms.  Hypothesis 6b proposes the patent count of all firms 
will be a function of the interaction of the amount of organizational slack of the firms and the 
annual calendar time. When controlling for these interaction effects, the patent count of 
declining firms will be higher than those of surviving firms.   
The panel count regression model results indicate that the interaction of the year t-5 
and the log value of total slack statistically significantly affects the patent count of all firms 
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 (model 13 in Table 8.9). However, the interaction of the log value of total slack and any of 
the other years do not statistically significantly affect the patent count of all firms. Even after 
controlling for these interaction effects, the patent counts of declining firms significantly 
differ from the patent counts of surviving firms. A matched surviving firm patents about 2.85 
times that of a declining firm. Therefore, the second part of Hypothesis 6a is partially 
supported for total slack.   
The panel count regression model results indicate that the interaction of the years and 
the log value of available slack do not statistically significantly affect the patent count of all 
firms (model 14 in Table 8.9). However, after controlling for these interaction effects, the 
patent count of declining firms do not differ from the patent counts of surviving firms. 
The results of the panel count regression model indicate that the interaction of the 
years and the log value of absorbed slack do not significantly affect the patent count of all 
firms (model 15 in Table 8.9). However, after controlling for these interaction effects, the 
patent counts of declining firms do not differ from the patent counts of surviving firms. 
The panel count regression model results indicate that the interaction of the year t-5 
and the log value of potential slack significantly affects the patent count of all firms (model 
16 in Table 8.9). However, the interaction of all other years and the log value of potential 
slack do not significantly affect the patent count of all firms. Additionally, after controlling 
for these interaction effects, the patent counts of declining firms do not differ from the patent 
counts of surviving firms. Considering the model fit statistics (AIC and BIC values), the 
model with potential slack and its interaction (model 16) is the best fit among these models.  
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 As I have already found before, the patent counts of declining and surviving firms 
differ significantly only in the years t-2 and t-1. This is one of the reasons why I do not find 
support for the proposition that the patent counts of declining firms and surviving firms will 
differ even after controlling for the interaction effects of organizational slack and the annual 
calendar time. Successful patenting takes years. In the pharmaceutical industry where 
majority of the firms in the sample come from, it takes about nine to sixteen years to patent. 
Therefore, only in the year t-5, we still see that managers of firms tap into potential slack, 
such as external fund sources, in order to patent. 
8.9 Summing up the analyses 
To sum up the analyses of the hypotheses (Table 8.10), the results of this study offer 
more support for the threat rigidity perspective (Staw et al., 1981) than the alternative 
behavioral theory of firm but the results are equivocal, in that the declining firms are 
somewhat like the surviving firms early on in their decline. The differences become strongly 
significant in the last two years before failure. Relative to surviving firms, they have less 
search (R&D and patents) in each of the two years immediately preceding bankruptcy. 
Interestingly, declining firms do not show evidences of accelerating deteriorations of R&D 
and patenting over the last five years before bankruptcy. From each year to the next, the 
R&D expenditure and the patent count does not change within declining firms in the study 
period (i.e. five years before bankruptcy). This confirms a rigidity perspective of sticking to 
existing organizational routines and undergoing no change where rigidity is defined as 
inertia. This is not rigidity as cutback. 
The results of this study further suggest that the search routines of all firms have a 
non-linear (i.e. logarithmic) relationship with available slack and potential slack. However, 
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 no significant relationship is found between recoverable or absorbed slack and the search 
routines of all firms. This indicates support for the behavioral theory argument of slack-
induced search (Cyert and March, 1963). The results of this study also indicate that the 
search routines of all firms is a function of the interaction of total slack and the early years in 
the sample (t-4 for R&D expenditure and t-5 for patent counts). Even after controlling for the 
interaction effects of total slack and the calendar years, the search routines significantly differ 
in declining firms and surviving firms. Finally, the results of this study indicate that the R&D 
expenditure of declining firms is a function of the interaction of potential slack and the early 
years in the sample (t-5, t-4 and t-3). However, after controlling for these interaction effects 
between potential slack and the calendar years, the search routines of declining firms do not 
significantly differ from the search routines of their matched surviving counterparts. This 
seems to imply that use of potential slack is crucial in stimulating search in the early years of 
decline.          
8.10 Examination of the differences in organizational slack 
In addition to the empirical examination of the hypotheses, I conducted some 
exploratory analyses to test for the differences in the amounts of organizational slack in 
declining firms and surviving firms. The results of the two sample t-tests with unequal 
variances indicate that the total slack levels of bankrupt firms are weakly statistically 
significantly lower than those of surviving firms in the years t-4 and t-3 (Table 8.11). The 
available slack levels of bankrupts are statistically significantly less than those of surviving 
firms only in the years t-4 and t-1 (Table 8.12). However, the difference is weakly 
statistically significant in the year: t-4 (i.e. significant only at the 10% level). The amounts of 
absorbed or recoverable slack of bankrupts do not statistically significantly differ from the 
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 amounts of absorbed slack of survivors for each of the five years preceding bankruptcy 
(Table 8.13). The potential slack levels of bankrupt firms statistically significantly differ 
from those of surviving firms in the years t-4 and t-3 (Refer: Table 8.14). However, for the 
rest of the years included in the database, the potential slack levels of the two groups of 
firms: bankrupts and survivors do not differ. These differences in the levels of each type of 
slack might lead to the lack of change in search routines in declining firms in the five years 
before their bankruptcy filing.  
Many prior scholars have found evidences of the presence of low levels of slack 
within declining firms (Cameron, Whetten and Kim, 1987; Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1988; 
Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996). The results of this study indicate the presence of lower levels 
of slack in declining firms than in surviving firms in the years t-4 and t-3 where t0 is the year 
of bankruptcy filing. Therefore, the results partially agree with the evidences of these prior 
scholars. At least during the initial years of decline, slack amounts are increased because 
people and assets involved in some jobs are freed up (Meyer, 1988). This may be one reason 
why I do not find significant differences in the slack amounts of declining firms and 
surviving firms in each of the five years in the sample. 
The presence of low levels of available slack within declining firms lead managers of 
such firms to exhibit threat rigidity (Cameron, 1983). In my sample, the presence of low level 
of available slack in the year t-1 may be leading to the threat rigidity findings. High levels of 
available slack increase search routines (Geiger and Cashen, 2002; Majumdar and 
Venkataraman, 1993; Voss, Sirdeshmukh and Voss, 2008). Since surviving firms in my 
sample have higher amount of available slack in the last year before bankruptcy, I find that 
the search routines of surviving firms are more than those of declining firms.  
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 Singh (1986) found that well performing firms have increased level of absorbed slack 
(also called recoverable slack). Contrary to Singh (1986), I do not find any difference in the 
absorbed slack levels of declining firms and surviving firms. High levels of absorbed slack 
enhance search routines (Miller, Lant, Milliken and Korn, 1996). However, even in the 
absence of evidence of differences in the levels of absorbed slack in declining firms and 
surviving firms, I find that declining firms engage in fewer search routines than surviving 
firms in the two years before bankruptcy. This might hint at the fact that absorbed slack being 
difficult to recover is not very useful during the last five years before bankruptcy.  
Some prior scholars found that compared to matched surviving firms, declining firms 
have low levels of potential slack (Beaver, 1966; D'Aveni, 1989a). The results of this study 
partially support D'Aveni's (1989a) and Beaver's (1966) findings. The differences in potential 
slack are especially important during the early years of decline when firms are found to be 
employing potential slack more productively toward search routines. 
8.11 Additional analyses on the effects of time 
In addition to hypotheses testing, I conducted some exploratory analyses to examine 
the effects of time on the R&D expenditure of all firms. Further, I conducted empirical tests 
to examine the effects of the interaction of the time to bankruptcy and firm type (i.e. 
declining or surviving) on the R&D expenditure of firms. The result of the overall effect of 
annual calendar year on R&D expenditure is statistically insignificant (for 4 degrees of 
freedom, the chi-square value is 2.83 and the corresponding p-value is 0.5872).  I also tested 
for the effect of (1) year t-5 versus year t-4 (the z-value is -1.09 and the corresponding p-
value is 0.278), (2) year t-4 versus year t-3 (the z-value is 0.38 and the corresponding p-value 
is 0.706), (3) year t-3 versus year t-2 (the z-value is 0.31 and the corresponding p-value is 
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 0.76), and (4) year t-2 versus year t-1 (the z-value is -1.15 and the corresponding p-value is 
0.251). Overall, these results indicate that there is no statistically significant effect of the 
annual calendar time on the R&D expenditure of all firms. 
The result of the overall effect of the interaction of the time to bankruptcy and firm 
type (i.e. declining or surviving) is weakly significant (for 4 degrees of freedom, the chi-
square value is 8.95 and the corresponding p-value is 0.0623). I also tested for the effect of 
(1) (year t-5 versus year t-4)(declining firm versus surviving firm) – the z-value is 1.46 and 
the corresponding p-value is 0.144, (2) (year t-4 versus year t-3) (declining firm versus 
surviving firm) – the z-value is -0.45 and the corresponding p-value is 0.656, (3) (year t-3 
versus year t-2) (declining firm versus surviving firm) – the z-value is 0.3 and the 
corresponding p-value is 0.761, and (4) (year t-2 versus year t-1) (declining firm versus 
surviving firm) – the z-value is 1.14 and the corresponding p-value is 0.253. These results 
indicate that there is no significant effect of the interaction of each calendar year and the firm 
type (declining or surviving) on the R&D expenditure of firms. 
These results are contrary to the evidences of a few prior scholars who found that the 
decline of firms with respect to time differs in firms (D’Aveni, 1989a) and decline 
accelerates at a faster pace with the passage of time (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988). These 
findings are also contrary to the findings of prior scholars (Gersick and Hackman, 1990; 
Kelly and McGrath, 1985; Upton, 1994) who found that organizational routines follow a pace 
or rhythm as time passes by.          
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 8.12 Conclusion 
Declining firms that finally file for bankruptcy are likely to have taken different 
responses than other firms that do not file for bankruptcy. Among many others, there are two 
distinct schools of researchers who talk differently about what are the differential responses 
taken by declining firms relative to the responses taken by surviving firms. The first school 
of researchers subscribe to the threat rigidity theory (Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981). 
The second school of researchers subscribe to the behavioral theory of a firm (Cyert and 
March, 1963). As per this school, firms have goals, aspirations and expectations. The 
aspirations of firms are based on the firms’ historical past performances and the 
performances of peer firms. When firms have actual performances that are below their 
aspirations, then decision makers within these firms undertake adaptive change initiatives to 
reduce the gap between the aspirations and the actual performances. In this study, I compare 
and contrast the propositions offered by these two schools of researchers in the context of the 
US Chemical and Allied Products Industry (SIC 2800).    
The results indicate support for the threat rigidity perspective (Staw et al., 1981). In 
each of the two years prior to bankruptcy, declining firms engage in less search (less research 
as well as less patenting) than their matched surviving counterparts. Therefore, in declining 
firms in the US Chemical and Allied Products industry, declining firms exhibit threat rigidity 
when compared with other similar firms that survive. Interestingly, all the firms in the sample 
dataset of this study belong to mature industries at the four-digit SIC code level. This 
suggests that among the several definitions of organizational decline that I discussed in 
Chapter 2, the “decline-as-stagnation” (Whetten, 1980) is the more applicable one in this 
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 context. Declining firms appear passive and show a decrease in the rate of increase of the 
current activities of the firms.  
The results of this study also indicate that there are no changes in search routines in 
declining firms over the five years immediately preceding bankruptcy. This no change is 
again evidence of rigidity within the declining firms. Further, this again fits into the 
definition “decline-as-stagnation”. However, it is interesting to note that all the firms in the 
sample dataset of this study are publicly-listed firms. Therefore, the declining firms in this 
sample pay heed to shareholders. Institutional shareholders among the many shareholders 
that these firms have are often found to focus on short-term goals at the cost of long-term 
goals such as investing in search routines (Wu, 2012). This may be one of the reasons why 
the declining firms in this sample do not increase their search routine activities.  
What is interesting about these findings is the fact that the focal routines that I study 
here, search routines, are dynamic (Dosi, Teece and Winter, 1992). These routines 
themselves change often and they also bring change in other operating routines (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). However, the results of this study indicate that the search routines of the 
declining firms do not change over the last five years before bankruptcy. Therefore, the 
dynamic routines that are supposed to be dynamic are showing indications of being static. 
Future research can examine when static routines change, and when dynamic routines 
change. The first question (when static routines change) has been studied by prior 
researchers. Some researchers found that static routines are stable (Aime, Johnson, Ridge and 
Hill, 2010). Some other researchers found that static routines change if and when required 
(Turner and Fern, 2012). Further, some more researchers found that static routines change 
continuously (Anand, Gray and Siemsen, 2012). However, the second question (when 
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 dynamic routines change) needs to be examined in different contexts. This study’s results 
seem to suggest that dynamic routines tend to remain static in matured industries and also in 
large, publicly-listed firms.  
The results of this study indicate that the search routines of declining firms are 
smaller than those in surviving firms. However, the search routines of declining firms do not 
shrink as time progresses towards bankruptcy.  This is good news in one sense that decline 
conditions do not indicate continued deteriorations of search routines within the declining 
firms. This is again surprising because prior scholars (D’Aveni, 1989a; Hambrick and 
D’Aveni, 1988; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992) have found that declining firms are associated 
with accelerating deteriorations in many aspects, such as, the top management team, unused 
borrowing capacity, resource conditions and profitability conditions. However, this study’s 
results do not find any continued deterioration of search routines within declining firms. 
Also, many organizational routine scholars have found evidence of changes in routines 
(including search routines) with respect to time pressures (Betsch, Fiedler and Brinkmann, 
1998; Lehman, Hahn, Ramanujam and Alge, 2011). However, the time to bankruptcy did not 
affect the declining firms in this sample dataset in any significant way. This finding suggests 
that these firms do not sense threat. When rigidity does occur, it might be because the firm 
lacks resources to correct problems, or the firm management lacks the ability to perceive or 
correct the problems. These causes, though, are quite different than threat, and deserve 
further consideration.  
The results of this study also indicate that excess resources in the form of 
organizational slack matters. When declining firms have excess available slack and potential 
slack, they employ those in order to increase their search routines. This supports the 
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 behavioral theory (Cyert and March, 1963) argument of slack-induced search. Finally, the 
interaction of potential slack and the time to bankruptcy matters. Potential slack is extra 
crucial in the fifth year, the fourth year and the third year before bankruptcy. This is likely to 
indicate that managers within these declining firms use potential slack in these years to 
immediately enhance search routines. However, when bankruptcy is too near, then the 
managers stop trying to employ potential slack toward search routines.  It is not clear why the 
firms could not find solutions in the earlier years of the process. The time periods from five 
to three years before the decline appear to be critically important, and require further direct 
study.     
Overall, this study contributes to the understanding of organizational decline and 
organizational routines. It contributes to the current literature on organizational decline by 
suggesting that it is important to examine organizational routines within the context of 
declining firms. It also suggests that it is difficult to tell a-priori which contexts are going to 
exhibit rigidity and which contexts are going to exhibit adaptive change. The results of this 
study seem to hint at the fact that declining firms in a mature industry like the US Chemical 
and allied products industry are likely to be  rigid. The results further suggest that large 
publicly listed firms are likely to be rigid. Also, this study questions the dominant assumption 
in the decline literature that decline is associated with deteriorating conditions within the 
firm. There is a lack of evidence of deterioration of search routines over time in this sample 
of firms. Finally, the concept that threat becomes larger as time to bankruptcy approaches 
thereby leading to accelerating deteriorations within declining firms is also to be questioned. 
This study’s results find that the time to bankruptcy does  not affect the search routines of 
declining firms.  
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 This study contributes to the literature on organizational routines by suggesting that 
dynamic routines that are expected to be changing often can also be unchanging. The search 
routines examined here do not change within declining firms in the five years immediately 
preceding bankruptcy. Again, this study seems to question the dominant wisdom in the 
routines literature that routine shrinkage is a mandatory response to failure (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). However, even under conditions of decline, the firms in this sample do not 
exhibit routine shrinkage.   
8.13 The limitations of this study 
The main limitation of this study is that the major part of the work is based on 
publicly available secondary data. Therefore, this study cannot explicitly identify all the 
probable reasons of the resulting differences in search routines between declining firms and 
surviving firms. However, it examines the role of organizational slack and time to bankruptcy 
as probable factors that result in differences in the search routines of the two groups of firms: 
declining and surviving. Such secondary data examination limits the possibility of rich and 
fine grained analysis (Becker, Lazaric, Nelson and Winter, 2005). The firms may be 
changing the direction of their search. For example, instead of focusing on research drug A, a 
firm may shift its focus to research drug B that caters to a less researched disease.  Such fine 
grained analysis is not present here. In the future, researchers can focus on a finer level of 
analysis, such as individual therapeutic areas. Future researchers can compare and contrast 
the differences in search routines of publicly listed firms and private firms to examine 
whether one set of firms promotes rigidity while another set of firms promotes adaptive 
change.  
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 A second limitation of this study is that it examines firms in mature industries. 
Declining firms in younger industries might not exhibit the rigidity that these firms show. In 
the future, researchers can compare and contrast changes (or no changes) in search routines 
of declining firms in mature industries and younger industries.  
A third limitation of this study is that it examines higher-level search routines (Dosi, 
Teece and Winter, 1992). Instead of focusing on higher-level routines, future researchers can 
focus on operating level routines or investment routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982) within 
declining firms. Further, researchers can empirically examine when do higher-level routines 
remain dynamic and when they become static. They can ask a similar set of questions for 
operating routines and investment routines.  
A final limitation of this study is that it examines large publicly listed bankrupt firms 
at the two-digit SIC level of 2800 (the US Chemical and allied products industry). Since 
there are few bankruptcies of large publicly-listed firms, to get a sufficient number of firms I 
had to focus at the two-digit SIC level. In the future, researchers can focus on a single 
industry at the four-digit SIC level by considering declining firms as those firms that have 
declining profitability for many years, such as three years.   




Figure 1.1: A contingency model of search routines in declining firms  
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Figure 6.1: Hypotheses in the contingency model of search routines in declining firms  
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Davidson, Worrell and Dutia, 1993 
Evans and Green, 2000 
Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988 
Ketchen and Palmer, 1999 
Khanna and Poulsen, 1995 
Miller, 1977 (Failure syndromes: F1 and 
F4) 
Miller and Friesen, 1977 (Failure 
archetypes: F1 and F4) 
Miller and Friesen, 1983 
Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt and Holcomb, 
2007 
Moulton, Thomas and Pruett, 1996 




Willard and Cooper, 1985 
Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996 
Daily, 1995 
Daily and Dalton, 1994b 
Daily and Dalton, 1995 
D’Aunno and Sutton, 1992 
D’Aveni, 1989a 
D’Aveni and MacMillan, 1990 
Dowell, Shackell and Stuart, 2011 
Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992 
Latham and Braun, 2009 
McKinley, 1987 
Miller, 1977 (Failure syndromes: 
F2 and F3) 
Miller and Friesen, 1977 (Failure 
archetypes: F2 and F3) 
Moulton, Thomas and Pruett, 1996 
(Failure type 2: Market 




 Table continued on next page..
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  Adaptive behavior Threat rigidity responses 
Theoretical / 
normative studies 
Argenti, 1976 (Failure Type 2 and 3) 
Cameron and Zammuto, 1983 
Castrogiovanni, Baliga and Kidwell, 
1992 
Cummings, Blumenthal and Greiner, 
1983 
Makridakis, 1991 
Mohrman and Worley, 2009  
Meyer, 1988 
Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984 




Argenti, 1976 (Failure Type 1) 
Flynn and Farid, 1991 
Greenhalgh, 1983 
Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt, 1984 
Gilmore and Hirschhorn, 1983 
Sutton and Callahan, 1987 
Sutton and D’Aunno, 1989 
Sutton, Eisenhardt and Jucker, 1986 
 







Manns and March, 1978 
Zajac and Kraatz, 1993 
Bozeman and Slusher, 1979 
Cameron, 1983 
Cameron, Kim and Whetten, 1987 
Cameron, Whetten and Kim, 1987 
Hardy, 1990 
Krantz, 1985 
Levine, 1978, 1979, 1985 
Ludwig, 1993 
McKinley, Cheng and Schick, 1986 
Rubin, 1979 
 
Table 2.1:  Prior studies on adaptive or rigid responses in declining organizations 
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  Yes / Increase No / Decrease 
Adaptive change Boeker and Goodstein, 1991 




Ketchen and Palmer, 1999 
Khanna and Poulsen, 1995 
Koberg, 1987 




Willard and Cooper, 1985 
Cameron, 1983 
Cameron, Kim and Whetten, 
1987 
Cameron, Whetten and Kim, 
1987 
D’Aveni, 1989a 
Daily and Dalton, 1994b 
D’Aunno and Sutton, 1992 
Krantz, 1985 
Sutton and Callahan, 1987 
Sutton and D’Aunno, 1989 
 
Domain initiatives Boeker, 1997 
Cameron and Zammuto, 1983 
Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988 
Khanna and Poulsen, 1995 
Miller and Friesen, 1983 
Zajac and Kraatz, 1993 
Bozeman and Slusher, 1979 
Hardy, 1990 
Levine, 1978, 1979, 1985 
McKinley, Cheng and Schick, 
1986 
Innovation Bolton, 1993 
Evans and Green, 2000 
Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt and 
Holcomb, 2007 
Sutton, 1983 
Cameron, Kim and Whetten, 
1987 
Latham and Braun, 2009 




Davidson, Worrell and Dutia, 
1993 
Miller and Friesen, 1983, 
Organizational Studies 
Singh, 1986 
Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996 
Greenhalgh, 1983 
Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt, 
1984 
 
Table 2.2:  Prior studies regarding change, innovation and risk in declining organizations 
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 The contingent effect of Authors and year Relationship 
Slack on Change initiatives Barker and Duhaime, 1997 
Cheng and Kesner, 1997 (when the firm allocates 
more resources toward activities which enhance 
external market effectiveness) 
D’Aveni, 1989a 
Latham and Braun, 2008 (as recession lingered) 
+ 
Slack on Change initiatives Cheng and Kesner, 1997 (when the firm allocates 
more resources to activities that enhance internal 
operational efficiency) 
Latham and Braun, 2008 (at the beginning of 
downturn or recession) 
- 
Slack on Innovation  Cameron, 1983 
Mone, McKinley and Barker, 1998 
+ 
Slack on Innovation  Latham and Braun, 2009 - 
Slack on Innovation  Geiger and Cashen, 2002 
Nohria and Gulati, 1995, 1996 
U-inverted 
Slack on Risk taking Audia and Greve, 2006 + 
Slack on Risk taking Bromiley, 1991 (a non-linear relationship but not a 
full U-shaped because high values of slack have 
almost no influence on risk) 
U 
Slack on Risk taking Martinez and Artz, 2006 U-inverted 
 
 
Table continued on next page..
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143 
The contingent effect of Authors and year Relationship 
Available slack on Change 
initiatives 
Cameron, 1983 
Iyer and Miller, 2008 
Majumdar and Venkataraman, 1993 
Voss, Sirdeshmukh and Voss, 2008 
+ 
Available slack on Innovation  Mone, McKinley and Barker, 1998 + 
Available slack on Innovation  Geiger and Cashen, 2002 U-inverted 
Available slack on Risk 
taking 
Martinez and Artz, 2006 (nearly U-shaped – in a 
deregulated environment) 
U 
Available slack on Risk 
taking 
Martinez and Artz, 2006 (in a regulated 
environment) 
Singh, 1986 
Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996 
0 
Recoverable slack on Change 
initiatives 
Miller, Lant, Milliken and Korn, 1996 + 
Recoverable slack on 
Innovation  
Greve, 2003 + 
Recoverable slack on 
Innovation  
Geiger and Cashen, 2002 U-inverted 
Recoverable slack on Risk 
taking 
Singh, 1986 + 
Recoverable slack on Risk 
taking 
Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996 - 
 Table continued on next page..
 The contingent effect of Authors and year Relationship 
Recoverable slack on Risk 
taking Wiseman and Catanach, 1997 U-inverted 
Potential slack on Change 
initiatives 
Bergh and Lawless, 1998 
Iyer and Miller, 2008 
+ 
Potential slack on Innovation  Geiger and Cashen, 2002 + 
Potential slack on Risk taking Martinez and Artz, 2006 (in a deregulated 
environment) 
Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996 
Wiseman and Catanach, 1997 
+ 





Table 3.1: Prior studies on the effect of slack 
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  Time-dependent empirical 
models 
Time as a contingency 
variable 
Patterns of decline  D’Aveni, 1989a 
Change initiatives Khanna and Poulsen, 1995 
Masuch, 1985 
Musso and Schiavo, 2008 
Zajac and Kraatz, 1993 
Musso and Schiavo, 2008 
Domain initiatives  Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988 
Risk taking Bromiley, 1991  




Table 3.2:  Prior studies on the role of time in declining organizations
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 Author, year Class of variables Type of paired comparison 
Khanna and Poulsen, 1995 Stock market reactions1 Bankrupts and non-bankrupts 
Khanna and Poulsen, 1995 
Moulton, Thomas and Pruett, 
1996 
Financial variables Bankrupts and non-bankrupts 
Bruton, Ahlstrom and Wan, 
2003 
O’Neill, 1986b 
Poston, Harmon and Gramlich, 
1994 
Ramanujam, 1984 
Smith and Graves, 2005 
Financial variables2 Non-turnarounds and 
turnarounds 
Kaplan and Zingales, 1997 Financial variables Financially constrained and 
financially unconstrained 
Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988 
Khanna and Poulsen, 1995 
Sheppard, 1994 
Strategic changes3 Bankrupts and non-bankrupts 
Pant, 1986 
Poston, Harmon and Gramlich, 
1994 
Ramanujam, 1984 
Strategic changes Non-turnarounds and 
turnarounds 
Woo, 1983 Strategic changes Poor performing and well 
performing  
 
Table 4.1:  Prior matched pair comparison studies on similarities between different firm types 
__________________ 
1 Examples are reactions to debt swaps and top management changes. 
2 Examples are cash as a proportion of total assets and available slack. 
3 Examples are change in domain initiatives and level of diversification. 
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   Mean Std. dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Logged value of R&D expenditure  15.68 2.12 1.00          
2 Count of patents 2.48 6.03 0.51 1.00         
3 Total slack 21.60 181.20 0.02 0.05 1.00        
4 Logged value of total slack 2.35 1.67 0.20 0.26 0.38 1.00       
5 Available slack 1.43 2.51 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.09 1.00      
6 Logged value of available slack -1.14 2.16 0.18 0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.65 1.00     
7 Recoverable slack 18.62 171.97 -0.01 -0.04 0.97 0.31 -0.02 -0.04 1.00    
8 Logged value of recoverable slack 0.17 1.99 -0.18 -0.17 0.30 0.21 0.15 0.03 0.32 1.00     
9 Potential slack 0.75 47.18 0.13 0.33 0.25 0.38 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09 1.00   
10 Logged value of potential slack 3.07 1.01 0.12 0.32 0.59 0.81 0.08 0.15 -0.09 -0.05 0.61 1.00 
 
Table 8.1:  Descriptive statistics of the variables of interest
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 Variable: R&D 
expenditure in 
US dollars 
t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 
Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Bankrupt 34 13600000 18400000 36 12700000 16800000 35 12900000 17500000 31 12300000 18000000 24 14800000 21100000
  (3156815)  (2792273)  (2958043)   (3232361)  (4304809)
Survivor 35 111000000 361000000 35 117000000 385000000 35 115000000 363000000 35 115000000 346000000 35 120000000 360000000
   (61100000)   (65000000)   (61400000)    (58400000)   (60800000)  
Combined 69 62800000 260000000 71 64300000 274000000 70 63900000 260000000 66 66500000 256000000 59 77500000 281000000
   (31300000)   (32500000)   (31100000)    (31500000)   (36500000)  
Difference  -96900000   -105000000   -102000000    -102000000   -106000000  
   (61100000)   (65100000)   (61500000)    (58500000)   (60900000)  
t-value  -1.58   -1.61   -1.66    -1.75   -1.73  
Satterthwaite's 
degrees of freedom  34   34   34    34   34  
p-value for Ha: 
mean(bankrupt) < 
mean(survivor) 
 0.06 ƚ  0.06 ƚ  0.05 ƚ  0.04 **  0.05 ** 
p-value for Ha: 
mean(bankrupt)!= 
mean(survivor) 
 0.12   0.12   0.11    0.09 ƚ   0.09 ƚ 
p-value for Ha: 
mean(bankrupt) > 
mean(survivor) 
 0.94   0.94   0.95    0.96   0.95  
Standard errors are within parentheses just below each 
mean 
ƚ p-value < 0.1 
** p-value < 0.05 
*** p-value < 0.001 
 
Table 8.2:  Tests of Hypotheses 1a and 2a – t-tests 
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 Variable: Patent count t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 









Bankrupt 36 1.75 4.08 36 2.31 4.60 36 1.64 4.17 36 0.83 2.70 36 1.17 3.68
  (0.68)  (0.77)  (0.69)  (0.45)  (0.61)
Survivor 36 3.28 7.06 36 3.22 7.62 36 3.86 9.36 36 3.28 6.65 36 3.44 6.78
  (1.18)  (1.27)  (1.56)  (1.11)  (1.13)
Combined 72 2.51 5.78 72 2.76 6.26 72 2.75 7.28 72 2.06 5.19 72 2.31 5.54
  (0.68)  (0.74)  (0.86)  (0.61)  (0.65)
Difference  -1.53  -0.92  -2.22  -2.44  -2.28
  (1.36)  (1.48)  (1.71)  (1.20)  (1.29)
t-value  -1.12  -0.62  -1.30  -2.04  -1.77
Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom  56  58  48  46  54
p-value for Ha: mean(bankrupt) < 
mean(survivor)  0.13  0.27  0.10 ƚ  0.02 **  0.04 ** 
p-value for Ha: mean(bankrupt)!= 
mean(survivor)  0.27  0.54  0.20  0.05 **  0.08 ƚ 
p-value for Ha: mean(bankrupt) > 
mean(survivor)  0.87  0.73  0.90  0.98  0.96
Standard errors are within parentheses just below each mean 
ƚ p-value < 0.1 
** p-value < 0.05 
*** p-value < 0.001 
 
Table 8.3:  Tests of Hypotheses 1b and 2b – t-tests 
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 Variable: R&D expenditure        
in US dollars t-4 to t-5 t-3 to t-4 t-2 to t-3 t-1 to t-2 
Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Group 1 (succeeding year i.e. in the case 
of t-4 to t-5 comparison, Group 1 is t-4) 36 12700000 16800000 35 12900000 17500000 31 12300000 18000000 24 14800000 21100000 
    (2792273)   (2958043)    (3232361)    (4304809)  
Group 2 (preceding year i.e. in the case 
of t-4 to t-5 comparison, Group 2 is t-5) 34 13600000 18400000 36 12700000 16800000 35 12900000 17500000 31 12300000 18000000 
    (3156815)   (2792273)    (2958043)    (3232361)  
Combined 70 13100000 17500000 71 12800000 17000000 66 12600000 17600000 55 13400000 19300000 
    (2086188)    (2017878)    (2166444)    (2597210)  
Difference   -950801.70    173391.30    -590022.20    2550897  
    (4214530)    (4067776)    (4381573)    (5383265)  
t-value   -0.23    0.04    -0.13    0.47  
Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom   66.47    68.64    62.57    45.22  
p-value for Ha: mean(Group 1) < 
mean(Group 2)   0.41    0.52    0.45    0.68  
p-value for Ha: mean(Group 1)!= 
mean(Group 2)   0.82    0.97    0.89    0.64  
p-value for Ha: mean(Group 1) > 
mean(Group 2)   0.59    0.48    0.55    0.32  
Standard errors are within parentheses just below each mean 
ƚ p-value < 0.1 
** p-value < 0.05 
*** p-value < 0.001 
 
Table 8.4:  Tests of Hypotheses 3a and 4a – t-tests 
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 Variable: Patent count t-4 to t-5 t-3 to t-4 t-2 to t-3 t-1 to t-2 
Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Group 1 (succeeding year i.e. in the 
case of t-4 to t-5 comparison, Group 
1 is t-4) 
36 2.31 4.60 36 1.64 4.17 36 0.83 2.70 36 1.17 3.68 
   (0.77)    (0.69)    (0.45)    (0.61)   
Group 2 (preceding year i.e. in the 
case of t-4 to t-5 comparison, Group 
2 is t-5) 
36 1.75 4.08 36 2.31 4.60 36 1.64 4.17 36 0.83 2.70 
   (0.68)    (0.77)    (0.69)    (0.45)   
Combined 72 2.03 4.32 72 1.97 4.37 72 1.24 3.51 72 1.00 3.21 
   (0.51)    (0.52)    (0.41)    (0.38)   
Difference  0.56    -0.67    -0.81    0.33   
   (1.02)    (1.03)    (0.83)    (0.76)   
t-value  0.54    -0.64    -0.97    0.44   
Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom  69.03    69.34    59.96    64.17   
p-value for Ha: mean(Group 1) < 
mean(Group 2)  0.71    0.26    0.17    0.67   
p-value for Ha: mean(Group 1)!= 
mean(Group 2)  0.59    0.52    0.33    0.66   
p-value for Ha: mean(Group 1) > 
mean(Group 2)  0.29    0.74    0.83    0.33   
Standard errors are within parentheses just below each mean 
ƚ p-value < 0.1 
** p-value < 0.05 
*** p-value < 0.001 
 
Table 8.5:  Tests of Hypotheses 3b and 4b – t-tests
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 Variable name Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dummy for year t-2 -0.017   -0.184   -0.114   -0.093   
  (0.102)   (0.154)   (0.141)   (0.091)   
Dummy for year t-3 0.070   -0.014   0.051   -0.142   
  (0.133)   (0.101)   (0.089)   (0.140)   
Dummy for year t-4 0.061   -0.155   -0.026   -0.279   
  (0.167)   (0.152)   (0.124)   (0.182)   
Dummy for year t-5 0.132   -0.241 ƚ -0.113   -0.300 ƚ 
  (0.157)   (0.138)   (0.126)   (0.160)   
Decade of 2000s -0.239   -0.296   -0.288   -0.175   
  (0.209)   (0.213)   (0.219)   (0.109)   
Decade of 2010s -0.552 * -1.005 ** -0.851 ** -0.534 *
  (0.266)   (0.316)   (0.290)   (0.187)   
Survival indicator 0.986 * 0.871 * 1.038 * 1.340   
  (0.482)   (0.416)   (0.415)   (0.838)   
Logged value of total slack 0.034               
  (0.035)               
Logged value of available slack     0.111 **         
      (0.040)           
Logged value of recoverable slack         0.041       
          (0.039)       
Logged value of potential slack             0.102 ƚ 
              (0.060)   
Constant 15.171   15.662 ** 15.341   15.393   
  (0.399)   (0.423)   (0.397)   (0.679)   
ƚ  Significant at the 10% level                 
* Significant at the 5% level                 
** Significant at the 1% level                 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses               
 





       152
 Variable name Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Dummy for year t-2 -0.402 ƚ -0.232  -0.277  -0.386  
 (0.232)  (0.181)  (0.183)  (0.247)  
Dummy for year t-3 -0.142  0.046  0.035  -0.324  
 (0.215)  (0.171)  (0.172)  (0.252)  
Dummy for year t-4 -0.049  -0.038  0.041  -0.143  
 (0.230)  (0.193)  (0.189)  (0.266)  
Dummy for year t-5 0.031  -0.171  -0.084  -0.143  
 (0.249)  (0.208)  (0.203)  (0.298)  
Decade of 2000s 0.091  -0.118  -0.153  0.037  
 (0.258)  (0.193)  (0.194)  (0.282)  
Decade of 2010s -0.797  -1.450  -1.401  -0.332  
 (1.132)  (1.078)  (1.076)  (1.197)  
Survival indicator 1.080 * 0.471  0.625  0.073  
 (0.533)  (0.487)  (0.455)  (0.800)  
Logged value of total slack 0.157 *       
 (0.073)        
Logged value of available slack   0.154 *     
   (0.063)      
Logged value of recoverable slack     -0.096    
     (0.066)    
Logged value of potential slack       0.282 *
       (0.119)  
Constant 0.879  1.913 ** 1.571 ** 1.760 ƚ 
 (0.645)  (0.513)  (0.470)  (0.979)  
AIC 651.220  956.628  965.649  391.520  
BIC 688.348  998.583  1007.768  419.140  
ƚ  Significant at the 10% level         
* Significant at the 5% level         
** Significant at the 1% level         
Standard errors are in parentheses        
 
Table 8.7:  Tests of Hypothesis 5b – panel negative binomial regressions with dependent 
variable: patent count. 
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 Variable name Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Dummy for year t-2 -0.145  -0.099  -0.117  0.230  
 (0.268)  (0.111)  (0.146)  (0.465)  
Dummy for year t-3 0.105  -0.028  0.056  0.964  
 (0.256)  (0.102)  (0.093)  (0.694)  
Dummy for year t-4 0.580 * -0.181  -0.038  1.154  
 (0.266)  (0.149)  (0.128)  (0.737)  
Dummy for year t-5 0.418  -0.263 ƚ -0.138  0.956  
 (0.349)  (0.150)  (0.133)  (0.679)  
Decade of 2000s -0.286  -0.319  -0.306  -0.238 * 
 (0.201)  (0.219)  (0.229)  (0.102)  
Decade of 2010s -0.652 ** -1.034 ** -0.859 ** -0.494 ** 
 (0.237)  (0.321)  (0.303)  (0.185)  
Survival indicator 0.963 * 0.865 * 1.022 * 1.190  
 (0.484)  (0.418)  (0.413)  (0.913)  
Logged value of total slack 0.087        
 (0.087)        
Logged value of total slack* 
Dummy for year t-2 0.060        
 (0.095)        
Logged value of total slack* 
Dummy for year t-3 -0.020        
 (0.089)        
Logged value of total slack* 
Dummy for year t-4 -0.213 *       
 (0.090)        
Logged value of total slack* 
Dummy for year t-5 -0.120        
 (0.116)        
Logged value of available 
slack   0.110 *     
   (0.055)      
Logged value of available 
slack* Dummy for year t-2   0.068      
   (0.065)      
Logged value of available 
slack* Dummy for year t-3   -0.007      
   (0.045)      
Logged value of available 
slack* Dummy for year t-4   -0.024      
   (0.052)      
 
 
   
Table continued on next page.. 
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 Variable name Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Logged value of available 
slack* Dummy for year t-5   -0.018      
   (0.050)      
Logged value of recoverable 
slack     0.019    
     (0.058)    
Logged value of recoverable 
slack* Dummy for year t-2     -0.073    
     (0.084)    
Logged value of recoverable 
slack* Dummy for year t-3     -0.008    
     (0.045)    
Logged value of recoverable 
slack* Dummy for year t-4     0.025    
     (0.052)    
Logged value of recoverable 
slack* Dummy for year t-5     0.075    
     (0.051)    
Logged value of potential 
slack       0.429 * 
       (0.206)  
Logged value of potential 
slack* Dummy for year t-2       -0.111  
       (0.166)  
Logged value of potential 
slack* Dummy for year t-3       -0.362 ƚ 
       (0.216)  
Logged value of potential 
slack* Dummy for year t-4       -0.470 * 
       (0.240)  
Logged value of potential 
slack* Dummy for year t-5       -0.423 ƚ 
       (0.222)  
Constant 15.115 ** 15.690 ** 15.371 ** 14.624 ** 
 (0.44)  (0.44)  (0.41)  (0.71)  
ƚ  Significant at the 10% level     
* Significant at the 5% level         
** Significant at the 1% level      
Robust standard errors are in parentheses      
 
Table 8.8:  Tests of Hypotheses 6a and 6b – panel regressions with dependent variable: log 
R&D 
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 Variable name Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Dummy for year t-2 -0.847  -0.235  -0.163  -0.195  
 (0.748)  (0.197)  (0.207)  (1.262)  
Dummy for year t-3 -0.166  0.027  0.118  1.163  
 (0.538)  (0.188)  (0.195)  (0.982)  
Dummy for year t-4 -0.248  -0.074  0.144  1.191  
 (0.627)  (0.205)  (0.211)  (1.101)  
Dummy for year t-5 1.222 * -0.217  0.016  2.536 * 
 (0.591)  (0.219)  (0.224)  (1.273)  
Decade of 2000s -0.057  -0.137  -0.160  -0.226  
 (0.273)  (0.198)  (0.199)  (0.293)  
Decade of 2010s -1.083  -1.502  -1.354  -0.431  
 (1.139)  (1.083)  (1.080)  (1.220)  
Survival indicator 1.049 * 0.518  0.572  -0.116  
 (0.529)  (0.503)  (0.457)  (0.842)  
Logged value of total slack 0.249        
 (0.157)        
Logged value of total slack* 
Dummy for year t-2 0.142        
 (0.237)        
Logged value of total slack* 
Dummy for year t-3 -0.180        
 (0.162)        
Logged value of total slack* 
Dummy for year t-4 0.037        
 (0.203)        
Logged value of total slack* 
Dummy for year t-5 -0.419 *       
 (0.197)        
Logged value of available 
slack   0.186 ƚ     
   (0.096)      
Logged value of available 
slack* Dummy for year t-2   -0.115      
   (0.110)      
Logged value of available 
slack* Dummy for year t-3   -0.020      
   (0.097)      
Logged value of available 
slack* Dummy for year t-4   -0.024      
   (0.096)      
Logged value of available 
slack* Dummy for year t-5   -0.086      
   (0.096)      
   Table continued on next page..
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 Variable name Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
        
Logged value of recoverable 
slack     -0.213 ƚ   
     (0.111)    
Logged value of recoverable 
slack* Dummy for year t-2     0.155    
     (0.124)    
Logged value of recoverable 
slack* Dummy for year t-3     0.081    
     (0.113)    
Logged value of recoverable 
slack* Dummy for year t-4     0.157    
     (0.112)    
Logged value of recoverable 
slack* Dummy for year t-5     0.142    
     (0.112)    
Logged value of potential 
slack       0.759 * 
       (0.319)  
Logged value of potential 
slack* Dummy for year t-2       -0.058  
       (0.381)  
Logged value of potential 
slack* Dummy for year t-3       -0.463  
       (0.296)  
Logged value of potential 
slack* Dummy for year t-4       -0.449  
       (0.346)  
Logged value of potential 
slack* Dummy for year t-5       -0.861 * 
       (0.402)  
Constant 0.916  1.980 ** 1.511 ** 1.106  
 0.811  0.535  0.477  1.573  
AIC 647.956  963.470  970.801  393.539  
BIC 698.585  1020.682  1028.235  431.202  
ƚ  Significant at the 10% 
level         
* Significant at the 5% level         
** Significant at the 1% level         
Standard errors are in 
parentheses         
 
Table 8.9:  Tests of Hypotheses 6a and 6b – panel negative binomial regressions with 
dependent variable: patent count 
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 Hypothesis Statement of the hypothesis Results Comments 
1a The research and development (R&D) expenditure of declining firms will be less than 
the research and development expenditure of surviving firms in each of the five years 
immediately preceding bankruptcy of declining firms. 
Supported.  
1b The patent count of declining firms will be less than the patent counts of surviving 
firms in each of the five years immediately preceding bankruptcy of declining firms. 
Partially 
supported. 
Supported for years t-2 and t-1 where t0 is the year of 
bankruptcy filing. 
2a The research and development (R&D) expenditure of declining firms will be more 
than the research and development expenditure of surviving firms in each of the five 
years immediately preceding bankruptcy of declining firms. 
Not supported.  
2b The patent count of declining firms will be more than the patent counts of surviving 
firms in each of the five years immediately preceding bankruptcy of declining firms. 
Not supported.  
3a The R&D expenditure of declining firms will decrease from each year to the next in 
the last five years prior to bankruptcy filing. 
Not supported.  
3b The patent count of declining firms will decrease from each year to the next in the last 
five years prior to bankruptcy filing. 
Not supported.  
4a The R&D expenditure of declining firms will increase from each year to the next in 
the last five years prior to bankruptcy filing. 
Not supported.  
4b The patent count of declining firms will increase from each year to the next in the last 
five years prior to bankruptcy filing. 
Not supported.  
5a The R&D expenditure of all firms will have a logarithmic relationship with 
organizational slack (total slack, available slack, recoverable slack and potential slack)
Partially 
supported. 
Supported for available slack and potential slack. Not 
supported for recoverable slack and total slack 
5b The patent count of all firms will have a logarithmic relationship with organizational 
slack (total slack, available slack, recoverable slack and potential slack) 
Partially 
supported. 
Supported for available slack, potential slack and total 
slack. Not supported for recoverable slack 
6a The R&D expenditure and patent counts of firms will be a function of the interaction 
of the amount of organizational slack of the firms and the annual calendar time. Even 
after controlling for these interaction effects, the R&D expenditure and patent counts 
of declining firms will be lower than those of surviving firms. 
Partially 
supported. 
Supported for R&D expenditure and total slack for year t-
4. Partially supported for R&D expenditure and potential 
slack for years t-5, t-4 and t-3 where t0 is the year of 
bankruptcy filing. Supported for patent count and total 
slack for year t-5. Partially supported for patent count and 
potential slack for year t-5.  
6b The R&D expenditure and patent count of all firms will be a function of the 
interaction of the amount of organizational slack of the firms and the annual calendar 
time. Even after controlling for these interaction effects, the R&D expenditure and 
patent count of declining firms will be higher than those of surviving firms. 
Not supported.  
 
Table 8.10:  Hypotheses and their results
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Variable:  
Total slack 
t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 
Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Bankrupt 32 30.21 95.15 34 6.69 28.31 36 -1.50 73.79 31 1.36 -2.79 22 20.88 96.07 
  (16.82)  (4.85)  (12.30)  (11.32)  (20.48)
Survivor 34 99.48 530.04 33 16.99 26.02 35 27.54 87.14 35 3.49 -14.73 34 10.95 43.83 
  (90.90)  (4.53)  (14.73)  (53.06)  (7.52)
Combined 66 65.89 384.93 67 11.76 27.49 71 12.82 81.39 66 2.49 -7.14 56 14.85 68.56 
  (47.38)  (3.36)  (9.66)  (39.15)  (9.16)
Difference  -69.28  -10.29   -29.04   -2.13   9.93  
  (92.44)  (6.64)  (19.19)  (9.20)  (21.82)
t-value  -0.75  -1.55   -1.51   -0.23   0.46  
Satterthwaite's degrees of 
freedom  35  65   67   37   27  
p-value for Ha: 
mean(bankrupt) < 
mean(survivor) 
 0.23  0.06 ƚ  0.07 ƚ  0.41   0.67  
p-value for Ha: 
mean(bankrupt)!= 
mean(survivor) 
 0.46  0.13   0.13   0.82   0.65  
p-value for Ha: 
mean(bankrupt) > 
mean(survivor) 
 0.77  0.94   0.93   0.59   0.33  
Standard errors are within parentheses just below each 
mean 
ƚ p-value < 0.1 
** p-value < 0.05 
*** p-value < 0.001 
 
Table 8.11:  Exploratory analyses – t-tests of total slack 
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 Variable:  
Available slack 
t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 
Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Bankrupt 36 1.61 2.44 36 1.45 2.74 36 1.08  1.94 31 0.71 1.27 23 0.33 0.56 
  (0.41)   (0.46)   (0.32)   (0.23)   (0.12)  
Survivor 35 2.19 1.09 34 2.82 4.24 35 1.30  2.30 35 1.05 1.59 35 1.32 1.62 
  (0.54)   (0.73)   (0.39)   (0.27)   (0.27)  
Combined 71 1.90 1.22 70 2.11 3.59 71 1.18  2.12 66 0.89 1.45 58 0.93 1.39 
  (0.34)   (0.43)   (0.25)   (0.18)   (0.18)  
Difference  -0.58   -1.38   -0.22   -0.34   -0.99  
  (0.68)   (0.86)   (0.51)   (0.35)   (0.30)  
t-value  -0.86   -1.60   -0.44   -0.96   -3.33  
Satterthwaite's degrees of 
freedom  63.47   55.93   66.44    63.28   45.13  
p-value for Ha: 
mean(bankrupt) < 
mean(survivor) 
 0.20   0.06 ƚ  0.33   0.17   0.00 *** 
p-value for Ha: 
mean(bankrupt)!= 
mean(survivor) 
 0.39   0.11   0.66   0.34   0.00 *** 
p-value for Ha: 
mean(bankrupt) > 
mean(survivor) 
 0.80   0.94   0.67   0.83   1.00  
Standard errors are within parentheses just below each 
mean 
ƚ p-value < 0.1 
** p-value < 0.05 
*** p-value < 0.001 
 
Table 8.12:  Exploratory analyses – t-tests of available slack  
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Variable:  
Recoverable slack 
t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 
Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Bankrupt 36 26.26 89.18 36 7.85 17.20 36 10.36  19.84 32 3.81 5.22 24 21.95 90.94 
  (14.86)  (2.87)  (3.31)  (0.92)  (18.56)
Survivor 36 90.86 514.41 36 3.69 7.68 35 6.62  21.42 35 5.72 16.05 34 7.24 22.90 
  (85.73)  (1.28)  (3.62)  (2.71)  (3.93)
Combined 72 58.56 368.00 72 5.77 13.39 71 8.52  20.57 67 4.81 12.10 58 13.33 60.78 
  (43.37)  (1.58)  (2.44)  (1.48)  (7.98)
Difference  -64.60  4.16   3.74    -1.91   14.70  
  (87.01)  (3.14)  (4.90)  (2.87)  (18.97)
t-value  -0.74  1.32   0.76   -0.67   0.77  
Satterthwaite's degrees of 
freedom  37.10  48.41   68.25   41.71   25.07  
p-value for Ha: 
mean(bankrupt) < 
mean(survivor) 
 0.23  0.90   0.78   0.25   0.78  
p-value for Ha: 
mean(bankrupt)!= 
mean(survivor) 
 0.46  0.19   0.45   0.51   0.45  
p-value for Ha: 
mean(bankrupt) > 
mean(survivor) 
 0.77  0.10 ƚ  0.22   0.75   0.22  
Standard errors are within parentheses just below each 
mean 
ƚ p-value < 0.1 
** p-value < 0.05 
*** p-value < 0.001 
 
Table 8.13:  Exploratory analyses – t-tests of recoverable slack 
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 Variable:  
Potential slack 
t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 
Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Bankrupt 32 -0.85 19.73 34 -3.08 20.03 36 -12.94 69.45 32 -3.19 9.44 23 -3.21 9.44 
  (3.49)  (3.44)  (11.57)  (1.67)  (1.97)
Survivor 35 0.97 53.79 35 9.70 27.06 35 19.63 86.28 35 -3.28 50.36 35 2.24 38.79 
  (9.09)  (4.57)  (14.58)  (8.51)  (6.56)
Combined 67 0.10 40.92 69 3.40 24.54 71 3.12 79.35 67 -3.23 36.72 58 0.08 30.64 
  (5.00)  (2.95)  (9.42)  (4.49)  (4.02)
Difference  -1.82   -12.78   -32.56   0.09   -5.45  
  (9.74)  (5.72)  (18.62)  (8.67)  (6.85)
t-value  -0.19   -2.23   -1.75   0.01   -0.80  
Satterthwaite's degrees 
of freedom  43.70   62.64   65.19   36.61   39.90  
p-value for Ha: 
mean(bankrupt) < 
mean(survivor) 
 0.43   0.01 **  0.04 **  0.50   0.22  
p-value for Ha: 
mean(bankrupt)!= 
mean(survivor) 
 0.85   0.03 **  0.09 ƚ  0.99   0.43  
p-value for Ha: 
mean(bankrupt) > 
mean(survivor) 
 0.57   0.99   0.96   0.50   0.78  
Standard errors are within parentheses just below each 
mean 
ƚ p-value < 0.1 
** p-value < 0.05 
*** p-value < 0.001 
 
Table 8.14:  Exploratory analyses – t-tests of potential slack
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APPENDIX 1 
Algorithm of ranking suitable matched surviving firms 
1. For each Excel worksheet corresponding to a bankrupt firm, run the same program. 
2. Declare variables. 
3. Read and store the required variables from the first row and separately store them in an 
array. The first row stores variable values of the bankrupt firm. The other rows include 
variable values from a possible group of matched surviving firms. 
4. Matching criterion 1 (Primary SIC code): Read values of Primary SIC code from Column 
K (for all rows except row 1). 
a. Check if the values of matching criterion for all rows are the same. If not, then 
eliminate the row (i.e. note the row number) that does not have the same value.  
5. Matching criterion 2a (Secondary SIC code): Read values of Secondary SIC code from 
Column AE (for all rows except row 1). 
a. Compare (i.e. simply subtract) each of the values of Secondary SIC code from the 
same value in row 1. 
b. Sort the absolute values (i.e. absolute differences) in ascending order in an array.  
c. Rank the absolute values (i.e. absolute differences) in the array in ascending order 
from 1, 2, …..to n. 
d. Store the ranks for each row. 
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 6. Matching criterion 2b (Additional SIC code): Read values of Additional SIC code from 
Column AK (for all rows except row 1). 
a. Compare (i.e. simply subtract) each of the values of Additional SIC code from the 
same value in row 1. 
b. Sort the absolute values (i.e. absolute differences) in ascending order in an array.  
c. Rank the absolute values (i.e. absolute differences) in the array in ascending order 
from 1, 2, …..to n. 
d. Store the ranks for each row. 
7. Matching criterion 2c (Product-market presence): This criterion is a combination of 
matching criteria 1, 2a and 2b where the primary SIC code, the secondary SIC code and 
the additional SIC codes are matched.  
8. Matching criterion 3 (Sales): Read values of sales from column AA (for all rows except 
row 1). 
a. Compare (i.e. simply subtract) each of the values of Sales from the same value in row 
1. 
b. Sort the absolute values (i.e. absolute differences) in ascending order in an array.  
c. Rank the absolute values (i.e. absolute differences) in the array in ascending order 
from 1, 2, …..to n. 
d. Store the ranks for each row. 
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 9. Matching criterion 4 (Total number of employees): Read values of Total number of 
employees from column S (for all rows except row 1). 
a. Compare (i.e. simply subtract) each of the values of Total number of employees from 
the same value in row 1. 
b. Sort the absolute values (i.e. absolute differences) in ascending order in an array.  
c. Rank the absolute values (i.e. absolute differences) in the array in ascending order 
from 1, 2, …..to n. 
d. Store the ranks for each row. 
10. Matching criterion 5 (Information available in COMPUSTAT - Historical Segments thru 
WRDS): Read values from column AQ.  
a. Rank the row = 10 if value= “no”. 
b. Rank the row = 5 if value = “partial”. 
c. Rank the row = 1 if value = “yes”. 
11. Matching criterion 6 (Information available in COMPUSTAT - Fundamentals annual 
Updates thru WRDS): Read values from column AR.  
a. Rank the row = 10 if value= “no”. 
b. Rank the row = 5 if value = “partial”. 
c. Rank the row = 1 if value = “yes”. 
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 12. Matching criterion 7 (Information available in COMPUSTAT North America - Monthly 
Updates - Simplified Financial Statement Extract thru WRDS): Read values from column 
AS.  
a. Rank the row = 10 if value= “no”. 
b. Rank the row = 5 if value = “partial”. 
c. Rank the row = 1 if value = “yes”. 
13. Matching criterion 8 (Status of stock): Read values from column F.  
a. Rank the row = 10 if value= “delisted”. 
b. Rank the row = 5 if value = “active till …”. 
c. Rank the row = 1 if value = “active”. 
14. Now, add the ranks stored for each row. 
15. Then, sort the summed-up ranking in ascending order. The best match is the one with the 
best rank. 
16. For each of the variables, first check for the presence of data. Only when data is present, 
then carry out the logical program. 
17. Also, for each of the values read, print it out in order to check it.  
18. Also for each solution arrived, print it out in order to check it. 
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  APPENDIX 2 






announced on Brief description about the company 
1 DelSite, Inc. 2-April-2009 DelSite, Inc. is an ISO 9001-certified, research-based, biopharmaceutical and consumer 





13-Jul-2009 Oscient Pharmaceuticals was formed by the merger of Genome Therapeutics Corp. and 
privately held Genesoft Pharmaceuticals in February, 2004. Oscient is a commercial-stage 
biopharmaceutical company. 
3 ReGen Biologics, 
Inc. 
8-April-2011 ReGen Biologics, Inc. is an orthopedic products company that develops, manufactures and 
markets innovative tissue growth and repair products for U.S. and global markets. 
4 Chemtura Corp. 18-Mar-2009 Chemtura Corp. develops, manufactures and markets application-focused specialty 
chemical solutions and consumer products. 
5 Solutia Inc. 17-Dec-2003 Solutia is a market-leading performance materials and specialty chemicals company. The 
company focuses on providing solutions for a range of products, such as: interlayers for 
glass lamination and films for automotive and architectural applications. 
   Table continued on next page..






announced on Brief description about the company 
6 GeoPharma, Inc. 23-Mar-2011 GeoPharma, Inc. is a rapidly growing Bio/Pharma company with a diversified business 
model participating in 3 main market segments: Specialty Pharma, Manufacturing and 
Distribution. The Specialty Pharma division specializes in the formulation of generic drugs 
for human and veterinary usage and the development of medical devices used by 
oncologists and other medical professionals. 
7 Biopure 
Corporation 
16-Jul-2009 Biopure is the developer of the first FDA-approved "blood substitute" for veterinary use. 
Biopure Corporation is a privately held, biopharmaceutical company focusing on the 
identification, ultrapurification, manufacture and marketing of room-temperature-stable 
therapeutic proteins for veterinary and human use. 
8 Gliatech Inc. 9-May-2002 Gliatech Inc. is engaged in the discovery and development of biosurgery and 
pharmaceutical products. Gliatech's pharmaceutical product candidates include small 
molecule drugs to modulate the cognitive state of the nervous system and proprietary 




30-Apr-2010 MiddleBrook Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is a pharmaceutical company focused on developing 




5-Jan-2001 Shaman Pharmaceuticals, Inc. discovers and develops novel pharmaceutical products for 
major human diseases by isolating active compounds from tropical plants with a history of 
medicinal use. 
  Table continued on next page..






announced on Brief description about the company 
11 TL Administration 
Corp. 
4-Sep-2003 This company manufactures brand name nutritional supplements.  These products are sold 
through health and natural food stores, national and regional drug store chains, 
supermarkets and mass merchandise retailers. 
12 Advanced Tissue 
Sciences, Inc. 
10-Oct-2002 Advanced Tissue Sciences is a tissue engineering company utilizing its proprietary core 
technology to develop and manufacture human-based tissue products for tissue repair and 
transplantation. 
13 Naturade Inc. 31-Aug-2006 Naturade manufactures innovative natural products for the well being of people. It makes 
its products widely available through mass merchandiser and club stores, drug and food 
stores, health food stores and natural supermarkets. 
14 Nutrition 21 Inc. 26-Aug-2011 This is a nutritional bioscience company. The company primarily develops and markets 
raw materials, formulations, compounds, blends and bulk and other materials to third-
party, non-end users to be further fabricated, blended or packaged for sales to end-users as 
nutritional supplements. 
15 North American 
Scientific Inc. 
11-Mar-2009 North American Scientific, Inc. manufactures, markets and sells products for the treatment 
of radiation therapy for diseases such as prostrate cancer. 
16 NutraCea 30-Apr-2010 NutraCea is a world leader in production and marketing of stabilized rice bran, rice bran 
oil and their derivative products. 
   Table continued on next page..






announced on Brief description about the company 
17 Vaso Active 
Pharmaceuticals 
Inc. 
11-Mar-2010 Vaso Active is an early stage company focused on commercializing, marketing and selling 
over-the-counter pharmaceutical products. 
18 Zaxis 
International Inc. 
6-Nov-2002 Zaxis International Inc. is a biotechnology company that produces electrophoresis gels for 





7-Apr-2009 Aventine Renewable Energy Holdings Inc. is a leading producer of clean renewable 
energy. Aventine is a leading producer of ethanol. 
20 Introgen 
Therapeutics, Inc. 
3-Dec-2008 Introgen Therapeutics, Inc. is a biopharmaceutical company focused on the discovery, 
development and commercialization of targeted molecular therapies for the treatment of 
cancer and other diseases. 
21 HealthSport, Inc. 23-Sep-2011 HealthSport is a company specializing in the development and manufacture of proprietary, 
oral thin film products. These products are for the pharmaceutical, nutraceutical and 
veterinary markets. 
22 Large Scale 
Biology Corp. 
9-Jan-2006 Large Scale Biology Corp uses its proprietary gene expression, molecular engineering and 
bioprocessing technologies to develop and manufacture therapeutic and industrial proteins, 
vaccines and diagnostic products for effective treatment of diseases. 
   Table continued on next page..






announced on Brief description about the company 
23 Pacific Magtron 
International 
Corp. 




6-Jun-2003 Sheffield Pharmaceuticals, Inc. provides innovative, cost-effective pharmaceutical 
therapies by combining state-of-the-art pulmonary drug delivery technologies with existing 
and emerging therapeutic agents. 
25 Fibrocell Science, 
Inc. 
15-Jun-2009 Fibrocell Science Inc. is an autologous cellular therapeutic company focused on the 
development of innovative products for aesthetic, medical and scientific applications. 
26 Orchestra 
Therapeutics, Inc. 
13-Oct-2008 Orchestra Therapeutics Inc., formerly The Immune Response Corporation (OTC Bulletin 
Board: OCHT, formerly IMRP), is an immuno-pharmaceutical company focused on the 
discovery and development of novel treatments for autoimmune diseases. 




17-Jan-2004 This company is focused in biotechnology and antimicrobial products. 
   Table continued on next page..
 






announced on Brief description about the company 
30 Immunicon Corp. 11-Jun-2008 Immunicon makes equipment designed to identify and analyze certain cells in blood 
samples, such as loose tumor cells. The company develops cell-based diagnostic and 
research technologies with a primary focus on the diagnosis, treatment and monitoring of 
cancer. 
31 Antex Biologics 
Inc. 
27-Mar-2003 Antex Biologics is a biopharmaceutical company that manufactures products for treatment 
of infections. 
32 Anpath Group, 
Inc. 
20-May-2010 This company produces cleaning and disinfecting products that it believes will help 
prevent the spread of infectious microorganisms while minimizing the harmful effects to 




11-Nov-2009 Altus Pharmaceuticals is a development stage biopharmaceutical company focused on the 
development and commercialization of oral and injectable protein therapeutics for 




10-Nov-2008 This company is committed to advancing the autoimmune disease therapy. 
35 Tronox, Inc. 12-Jan-2009 Tronox is a company focused on the production and marketing of titanium products. 
36 Alderox, Inc. 7-Dec-2009 Alderox Inc. is a world leader in productivity enhancing, environmentally friendly anti-
stick release agents and lubricants to the mining sector. 
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